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ABSTRACT
CONFUSION AND COHESION IN EMERGING SCIENCES:
DARWIN
,
WALLACE, AND SOCIAL DARWINISM
SEPTEMBER 1996
EDWARD S. RAYHER, B.A., UNION COLLEGE
M.A., McGILL UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.F.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph . D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert J. Ackermann
The thesis of this dissertation is that not only was
Darwin the first Social Darwinist, but that only through
appreciation of the roles of confusion, metaphysics, the
social and political context, and the work of Alfred Russel
Wallace can a better understanding of Darwin's achievement
be accomplished.
By revealing and then analyzing the Social Darwinist
aspects of Darwin's science of transmutation the position
of most critics—who hold that Darwin's Social Darwinist
followers perverted his "pure" science--is debunked.
Darwin's development of a race war theory was done for
scientific reasons which cannot be stripped away to reveal
a non-political "core" without utterly transforming his
ideas. For instance, Darwin developed a biological ranking
vi
of indigenous peoples which helped fill in evidential gaps
for the theory of evolution as well as provide confirmation
for his radical form of reductive materialism.
Darwin's Social Darwinism has been noticed by a few
critics
,
but is usually dismissed as either ephemeral or
indicative of commonly-held "backround" political biases.
The first view is shown to be inadequate by revelation of
the deep relation of his metaphysics to his science. The
second is exploded through an examination of the work of
Alfred Russel Wallace. He opposed Darwin's concept of race
war, and his opposition was rooted in his commitment to an
emergentist metaphysics. Once the juxtaposition of the
social and political aspects of Wallace's work to that of
Darwin is provided, the wider context of their work is
revealed by an examination of Darwin's use of Malthus, the
politics of emerging professional classes, Victorian birth
control, and the work of T.H. Huxley.
Revelation of the intimate social and political
details of the scientific work of Darwin and Wallace helps
to create an understanding of how nineteenth century
science was constituted and demonstrates that the
particular historical relations of science and ideology
make the concept of "pure science" an oxymoron.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
When not denied entirely, the social and political
dimensions of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution have
been seen by many as categorically separate from his
scientific enterprise. Yet it is remarkably easy to show
that Darwin was the first Social Darwinist and various
authors have already provided sufficient evidence for the
view that Darwinism was social at its inception. However
little headway has been made in reforming the generally
held view of Darwin as a "pure" (non-political and non-
ideological) scientist or in understanding his doctrine of
Natural Selection as essentially Social Darwinist. This
result stems from a failure to recognize and appreciate the
unity of Darwin's scientific and social ideas. ("Social
Darwinism" and "Natural Selection" are capitalized in order
to emphasize the historical particularity of Darwin's
version of the survival of the fittest doctrine, and to
separate it somewhat from more contemporary versions.)
This dissertation will reveal Darwin's ideology by
examining some major social and political aspects of his
scientific work and then put this augmented understanding
into perspective through juxtaposition with the work of
Alfred Russel Wallace. Finally, through an examination of
1
the wider social and political context in terms of the
Malthusian approach to class relations, the
professionalization of the medical trade and the politics
of birth control, the work of Darwin and Wallace will
assume their proper places in Victorian science. Only
through an understanding of the complicated relationship of
science and society in its concrete details will a better
understanding of the scientific enterprise be achieved.
The work of Alfred Russel Wallace is important not
only because he was the co-discoverer of Natural Selection
and worked closely with Darwin to defend the new science
from its detractors, but also in terms of its contrasting
scientific, social and political bias. Wallace's work
gives a useful local perspective on Darwin's project from
within Victorian evolutionary biology.
Yet despite good work by a few scholars showing
various social and political presences within Darwin's
writings, the vast majority of critical works boldly assert
Darwin was no Social Darwinist. In cases where Darwin's
social and political dimensions are too obvious to be
ignored, cornered critics often dismiss this appearance as
merely an aspect of commonly held ideology and therefore of
little moment. Given Darwin's importance in the history
and philosophy of science it is not difficult to comprehend
why his image has so far resisted the wrinkles of his
particular story. Darwin is truly one of the giants of
modern science and has for many symbolized what is best in
2
science. The widespread success of Stephen Jay Gould's
popularization of Darwin's work attests to the appreciation
of Darwin even beyond the confines of biologists and
university intellectuals.
Darwin's case demonstrates that icons of science
deserve critical consideration. Even as philosophy and
sociology of science revoke claims to "value-free" science,
it is safe to say that the term "pure science" is not yet
an oxymoron. Quite simply, despite existing criticism of
the desire to have "pure" heroes, it remains to be
explained how the two views of Darwin: pure scientist and
Social Darwinist, continue to exist side by side within
contemporary thought.
This gallery of opposites is not a new phenomenon,
however. Conflict between substance and the image of
purity bothered Darwin also: Wallace confronted Darwin with
alternatives to politically-motivated views manifested in
The Descent of Man . He responded to Wallace by cutting
short this discussion (see Chapter Three) with claims that
he was unable to investigate the connection of science and
politics because he only did "pure science." It is crucial
to any adequate understanding of Victorian science to
realize that the suppression of particular social and
political dimensions of evolutionary theory was done in a
context in which alternative views were readily available
and anxious to be heard. Thus the issue of Darwin as
Social Darwinist takes on additional interest for anyone
3
who wishes to understand how science, ideology and history
are related.
Since Darwin's work is currently revered as an example
of superior science, the denials of "impurity" or the only
slightly more honest dismissal of the social and political
aspects of his theory as "of the times" reveal a view of
science that is at the very least historically untenable.
Furthermore, once the historical picture is corrected it
can be shown that Darwin's social and political aspects
were not mere accidents or tangential aspects but rather
were structurally one with his theory. This thesis breaks
new ground by exploring particular instances in which
Darwin's science, metaphysics and politics form a unity.
While several critics find social and political ideas in
his work, none develop an understanding of how the various
aspects coalesce. Science and values are more intimately
related than many would admit. It is the intricate and
particular details of the history of science that once
revealed and analyzed will allow an accurate understanding
and fuller appreciation of the scientific enterprise.
Thus the first step to understanding Victorian and
present science requires settling the historical question:
Was Darwin a Social Darwinist? This dissertation will
begin with a sampling of the literature on this topic
juxtaposed with a demonstration that Darwin was indeed a
Social Darwinist. Yet the case is a complex one, for
Darwin's ambivalences over how to handle particular
4
scientific problems and cultural topics contributed to his
and others' confusion and has helped to allow
misunderstanding of his work to accumulate and persist.
At its core, however, Darwin's ideological science can
be shown to have arisen from particular epistemological and
metaphysical beliefs about materialism, hierarchy, progress
and morality. Thus the ideological features of Darwin's
work hold more interest than their mere appearance would
have in their own right, and this is due to their
suppression by Darwin, some of his followers and many of
his commentators. Not only did some of these ideas fill
gaps within his theory, both conceptual and evidential, but
they helped make Darwin's work harmonize with views and
concerns of the newly professionalized groups of biologists
and physicians. This harmony, for all its benefits,
promoted class prejudice and racial bias.
Although scientific racism in the Darwinian context is
currently lightly dismissed or ignored altogether the
origins of human evils deserve scrutiny not merely to set
the record straight but to put the scientific enterprise
into proper perspective. The work of Alfred Russel
Wallace, for all its unconventional aspects, presents an
antidote to the view that evolutionary biology was
monolithic and unaware of alternative views. If this
thesis does nothing else it will have succeeded if Darwin
can be understood within the social and political context
he shared with gentler souls such as ALfred Russel Wallace.
5
A. Organization
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two will
begin with the problem of values in science and then a
review of the literature on the topic of Darwin as a Social
Darwinist. To most commentators this conception of Darwin
is an unpleasant one as it links the brilliant and kind
biologist who wrote very technical and wonderful works on
such things as earthworms to a panoply of arguments
supporting such evils as sweat shops, poverty and disease.
But in fact the particular form of Darwin's ideas on
human social evolution held far more repulsive themes,
because it was intimately connected to concepts of
imperialism and race war. If racism may be defined as the
belief that the races of humankind are to be ranked in
terms of their moral (in nineteenth century terms:
intellectual, artistic and ethical) value, then Darwin was
a racist. If the ultimate form of racism may be defined in
terms of a struggle between races for survival, and that
the superior characteristics of one race will enable it to
extinguish the others, then Darwin can easily be shown to
have been a racist of this most extreme sort. This is an
ugly fact of history that remains to be dealt with.
Section "B" of Chapter Two will start with Darwin's
concept of race war and a discussion of the critical
response his ideology has generated. It will be shown that
6
while Darwin's politics come up for discussion but
infrequent ly , the problem his racial views present for an
appreciation of science in general surfaces hardly at all.
Yet Darwin was a racist and his work does not entirely
disguise this fact. His use of racist data and theory from
anthropology, paleontology, biology, philosophy and other
disciplines should be obvious to anyone who reads his work.
Section "C" details the use of the new science of
craniometries and the moral concept of sympathy in Darwin's
quest to resolve questions of "man's" place in nature, the
progress of civilization and the species, the status of
savages, and various problems of social change in terms of
evolutionary theory. Darwin's ambivalent attitude towards
progress, degeneration, perfection, telos, hierarchy and
even craniometry itself will be demonstrated and found to
be a key to understanding the difficulty of sorting his
theory out.
The insight of section "D" is that social and
political aspects are intimately enmeshed with Darwin's
biological theory and thus cannot be simply stripped away,
leaving a pure core of scientific theory behind. Thus
Darwin's work is essentially Social Darwinist. He needed
something to fill in gaps of his theory and various social
and political concepts as well as many forms of racial
evidence were used to help give coherence and plausibility
to his enterprise.
7
In particular, the problem of the relation of humans
to apes is discussed in terms of Darwin's ambivalent
solutions. Not only did "contaminated" ideas help by
filling in gaps of evidence or gulfs in theory, but they
contributed to acceptance of the theory by appealing to
like political minds. Much later on, in Chapter IV, the
issue of acceptance within the then newly formed clique of
professional biologists will be shown as a factor which
also contributed to the value of racially biologized social
theory for Darwin.
All of Chapter Two together shows that although Darwin
was the first to claim that his theory was "pure" and
non-political in the widest possible sense, at the most
basic levels his version of Natural Selection was rife with
metaphysical assumptions which were altogether enmeshed
with social and political positions. In particular the
Malthusian version of the materialist thesis Darwin
promulgated played a large role in his politically
conservative social theory.
By reducing human culture to a materially-determined
collection of inherited traits and retaining (ambivalently,
as we shall see) the view that nature expresses a
continuous hierarchy of organisms, Darwin saw the
competition between races as a facet of Natural Selection
and part of its proof. This meant that the domination of
"savages" in Africa, the "new world" and elsewhere by
Europeans was explicable through science; even more, it was
8
demanded by scientific principles, and in the end it was
taken to be an instance of proof
.
Section "E" concludes Chapter Two's argument with a
summing up of the discussion so far and sets the stage for
a presentation of the context of his views within the
biological, medical, and wider political communities.
Chapter Three elaborates on the social and political
ideology of Alfred Russel Wallace in order to reveal the
richness of Victorian thought about issues raised by the
new transmutation theory even within the small community of
biologists. Because the secondary literature on Wallace is
even more impoverished than the work done on Darwin's
social theory, much of the chapter will be devoted to
explicating Wallace's views on Natural Selection in
relation to indigenous peoples, technology, progress,
capitalism and allegedly unique human qualities.
Because Wallace did not share Darwin's radical
materialism he came to very different conclusions
concerning the relation of evolution to human society.
Wallace saw culture as ultimately independent of Natural
Selection and thus he tended to more openly discuss
politics in the course of describing "man's" relation to
evolution. Thus his ideology is much more accessible than
Darwin's as well as less hierarchical, and ultimately less
racist
.
The first section of Chapter Three starts with
Wallace's biography because he is unknown to most readers.
9
The working class origins of Wallace will become an issue
when the wider social context of Victorian
professionalization of the sciences is broached in Chapter
Four
.
Section B sets forth Wallace's views on indigenous
peoples. Unlike Darwin, Wallace spent many years living
amongst the local inhabitants of the "uncivilized" world.
Throughout his career he maintained an enthusiasm for
non-European cultures that is difficult to believe possible
if one takes Darwin's views as a benchmark for the period.
On issues ranging from slavery and cannibalism to the
politics of extinction, Wallace aimed at decoupling
evolutionary theory from the politics of domination.
The next section, "C," examines Wallace's view
that indigenous peoples, the working class, and women
shared a common position in the hierarchy of oppressive
capitalism. He comes to understand eugenics as a threat to
society, a pernicious politics based on an unsound
interpretation of Natural Selection.
(In this dissertation "Natives" and "Native" are
capitalized in order to combat the inherent racism in the
words by giving them the formal recognition usually
accorded similar appellations for peoples of the
"civilized" world, such as "European." For similar reasons
"primitive," "man," and "man's" are flagged with quotation
marks
. )
10
The fourth section, "D," examines Wallace’s
metaphysical views which put him in direct opposition to
Darwin. These beliefs form the theoretical grounding for a
socialist and feminist politics which set him apart from
more conservative members of his field, such as Darwin. It
is easy to demonstrate that an anti-racist, anti-sexist and
even ultimately ant i-Eurocent r ic politics emerged from his
particular synthesis of science and emergentist metaphysics.
Once summed up in the last section of Chapter Three,
"E," Wallace's work leads to consideration of the wider
social and political dimensions of Natural Selection.
Chapter Four begins with a demonstration that Darwin's use
of Ma 1 thus engaged an overt political dimension. Whether
one considers the debate over birth control, the movement
for workers' rights, or the battle by the medical community
for a monopoly of reproductive technology, a proper
historical understanding of the social context of Malthus'
claims for the inevitability of poverty must be seen as
controversial during the nineteenth century. Thus Darwin's
unqualified use of Malthus betrays his claim to "purity"
and reveals the political subtext bound up with his version
of Natural Selection.
That Darwin was a major force in the creation of
scientific racism is not to be denied and this fact should
not be dismissed as a minor or noncontrover sia 1 ideological
event of the time. It is only by examining the scientific
achievement of Darwin and Wallace in the full scientific,
11
political context that a proper appreciation ofsocial and
Darwinism and science may emerge
.
12
CHAPTER II
DARWIN WAS A SOCIAL DARWINIST
A. Pure Science, Politics and History
For the most part the relation of Darwin to Social
Darwinism has been ignored and in Shapin and Barnes' terms:
the literature on this topic is "impoverished." 1 When the
relationship is considered, even superficially, the general
impression given by the secondary literature is that
Darwin's theory of Natural Selection was one thing, and
Social Darwinism was another. As Shapin and Barnes so
cleverly put it:
...we can conclude this brief survey by observing
that Darwin's defense is far better staffed and
funded than its opposition. [2]
Foremost in the minds of these two critics is that the
suggestion of ideological "taint" is viewed as an assault
by most of Darwin's commentators. The usual assumption is
that Darwin was a great man and scientist, and hence a
"pure" thinker and thus certainly not a Social Darwinist.
Much ink has been used to defend Darwin's character by
claiming that he created his theory for "purely scientific
purposes." The philosophical problems inherent in a debate
13
over states of mind, or motives and beliefs 3 do not seem to
have bothered those who tackle the problem in this manner.
The defense in the Darwin case has rested upon
three assertions. The first is that of internal
purity: Darwin's intent ions and beliefs in 1859
were innocent of "ideological" taint... [4]
More sophisticated commentators ultimately rest their
case on the claim that Darwin worked as a true scientist,
gathering data in a neutral and scientific manner.
The second [defense] is purity of ancestry:
"influences" upon the Origin were entirely
wholesome and reputable; in particular, nothing
"ideological" was gleaned from Malthus. [5]
Implicit in this asserted innocence is the claim that
the theory of Natural Selection is scientific, and hence
value-free, while the Social Darwinists promulgated a
social theory by abusing science. Social theory is taken
to be a non-scient if ic enterprise, which in this case
perverts the pure work of the scientist for political
purposes
.
The third assertion is purity of germ-plasm:
nothing untoward could properly be deduced from
the theory of the Origin ; truth does not blend
with error; insofar as truth was used to justify
social Darwinism, it was misused. [6]
But if Social Darwinism may be defined as the idea
that human individuals in their relations to each other,
and societies in their relations to other societies, are
all subject to Darwin's law of the survival of the fittest
in the same or similar ways that all non-human living
beings are
,
then Darwin was a Social Darwinist •
Furthermore, Darwin clearly promulgated a race-driven
14
version of evolutionary theory as applied to humans: he
believed that the nations/races of "man" were locked in a
struggle for survival and that only the fittest— the white
races would survive. (And by logical extension only the
strongest white race would ultimately dominate world
politics
. )
Demonstration of this needlessly-controversia 1 view of
Darwin's social theory is simple. Consider the following
portion of Darwin's letter to William Graham in 1881:
I could show fight on natural selection having
done and doing more for the progress of
civilization than you seem inclined to admit.
Remember what risk the nations of Europe ran, not
so many centuries ago, of being overwhelmed by
the Turks, and how ridiculous such an idea now
is! The more civilized so-called Caucasian races
have beaten the Turkish hollow in the struggle
for existence. Looking to the world at no very
distant date, what an endless number of lower
races will have to be eliminated by higher
civilized races throughout the world. [7]
The details of how this view was an intimate and yet
overt part of Darwin's theory of evolution will only be
revealed as this dissertation progresses. The usage of the
term "race" includes familiar categories such as Caucasian
and Negro, however it also included nationalities and even
fine divisions according to location ("Negroes in general"
and "Negroes born in Africa"). See Figure 2, Vogt's
Craniometric Data.
Thus the claim that Darwin was no Social Darwinist is
clearly just plain false. Furthermore other writers have
already noted this result. Yet in his article of 1985:
15
"Darwinism I_s Social" Robert M. Young waxes despondent over
the current situation of Darwinian scholarship:^
...I want to begin by registering a certain
weariness, even impatience, that it's still
necessary to argue that: first, the intellectual
origins of the theory of evolution by natural
selection are inseparable from social, economic
and ideological issues in nineteenth-century
Britain ... second
,
the substance of the theory
was, and remains, part of the wider philosophy of
nature, God, and society, where conceptions of
nature and God are themselves changing in complex
ways which are integral to the changing social
order; and third, the extrapolations from
Darwinism to either humanity or society are not
separable from Darwin's own views, nor are they
chronologically subsequent. They are integral.
Young may be excused for his tiredness, for he
wrote on the topic a "dozen times" between 1968 and
He lets us know that he felt like a "Rip Van Winkle
the 1980'
s
woke to find the field unchanged in its
prejudice that Darwin should not be associated with
9Darwinism
.
himself
1973 .
" who in
Social
In attempting to clarify the problem for himself Young
writes that he thinks that the idealized picture of science
and an obsolete view of history has hampered an accurate
appraisal of Darwin.
The zeal with which current scient ists-histor ians
seek to separate Darwin's genius and achievements
from the work, ideas, and influences of Spencer,
Chambers, and Wallace seems to me to betray a
pathetic, sycophantic hagiography--Great Man
history—which I had thought was waning in the
history of science... [10]
Whether it be Young, Barnes and Shapin, or Adrian
Desmond, acute critics plead for the view that those who
wish to understand Darwin must consider his ideology as
16
well as the wider social and political context of his work
as part of his science .
^
All four critics have contributed greatly to an
increased awareness of the context of Darwin's work. Young
does an excellent job of showing that Darwin conceptualizes
human society in terms of Malthusian struggle and
individualistic capitalism. And Barnes and Shapin provide
a good focus upon the structure and nature of the claims
against considering Darwin a Social Darwinist. Desmond
provides one of the the best accountings of the political
context by focusing on the intricate relations between
Continental physiology, reform politics and the movement to
democratize the medical community in England.
But while these authors raise the problem of context
and make contributions towards understanding the social and
political struggle surrounding the acceptance of a
biologized evolutionary scheme, it has been left up to this
dissertation to investigate more specific manifestations
and structures of the social and political within the
scientific work of Darwin. The work of these critics must
be augmented so that a deeper understanding of Darwin is
possible. Thus a systematic exploration of the role of
gap-filling, hierarchy, materialism, professionalization,
and moral theory upon Darwin's development of his theory of
human society is the project of this chapter. This
analysis reveals the racist nature of Darwin's use of the
17
concept of the "savage," and opens up an unexamined
territory within the theory of Natural Selection.
Illustration 1: Portrait of Charles Darwin, age
B • Darwin and Social Darwinism
Despite often repeated words of wisdom on the
importance of social context many sensitive and intelligent
still misunderstand Darwin's position. A good
example of an academic who holds that Darwin could not have
been a Social Darwinist is that of Johannes Fabian. In
Time and the Other he takes the field of anthropology to
task for dominating other cultures through discourse which
due to its use of time disallows Natives the opportunity to
engage in a reciprocal dialogue with anthropologists.
Despite his sensitivity to issues of colonialism and
domination, he asserts that Darwin was not a Social
Darwinist. Not only that, he implies that Darwin, in
principle
,
cannot be a Social Darwinist because he uses
non-directional
,
or non-teleologica 1 , time. He asks us to
see that
...Darwin's own keen awareness that Time, once
naturalized, could and should not be rehistorized
(which is precisely what the social evolutionists
would try to do). [13]
Fabian's mis-cue raises one of the most fascinating
aspects of Darwin's work--namely that Darwin himself is
inconsistent on many key concepts, and in particular is
ambivalent about history's direction. More of this topic
will follow, but for now it is enough to realize that
readers, even sophisticated and pol i t ica 1 ly-sensit ive ones,
who wish to convince themselves that Darwin was no Social
19
Darwinist can find material in his work to support that
view, provided they miss or ignore other passages and are
unaware of the context and deeper structure of the Darwin's
survival of the fittest doctrine.
John C. Greene recognizes this problem and although
the following passage presents the pros and cons in reverse
order from Fabian, it is instructive:^^
How is it possible that Darwin scholars can
disagree so violently about a historical question
that is presumably subject to historical inquiry
and ver if ica t ion? . . . The main difficulty is that
The Descent of Man... is ambiguous ... Those who
view Darwin as a "social Darwinist" have no
difficulty in finding passages that seem to
out-Spencer Spencer... On the other side of the
argument, there are equally striking passages in
which Darwin seems to recognize the role of
education, public opinion, religion, humanitarian
sentiments, and social institutions generally in
social evolution, especially in civilized
societies ... Darwin seems to contradict himself...
While it is not clear why Social Darwinism cannot
encompass education, religion, etc., at least the point is
granted that Darwin's work is sufficiently complicated and
inconsistent that competent readers can be mislead.
Greene's argument above will be altered in this
dissertation to understanding Darwin's ambiguities and
inconsistencies in terms of his ambivalences over solutions
to various interrelated scientific, social and political
problems. Also, it is important to realize that in the end
Darwin is primarily a Social Darwinist and this is no
accident--f or various deeply held metaphysical and
epistemological decisions drive him to accept biases he
20
probably already held for deeper ideological reasons.
Going along with Barnes and Shapin, it is unproductive to
speculate about the inner beliefs of Darwin, or the forces
determining such beliefs (perhaps construed in terms of
class, gender, and fear of criticism (see Bowlby about
Darwin's psychosomatic response to stress)). it is enough
to make the theory of evolution explicit on the issues with
which we are concerned.
Furthermore, the worry that Darwin's ideology was
shared to such an extent within his culture that it would
be anachronistic to criticize him for, say, his belief in
race war, the inferiority of women or his assumption that
society is best understood in terms of biology, is
unfounded. Put another way, such a "defense" of Darwin
would be bad history, and not only because Alfred Russel
Wallace offered an opposing ideology. In Nancy L. Paxton's
George E 1 iot and Herbert Spencer Eliot's rejection of
racism, sexism and biological determinism is shown to be
part of an ongoing debate within the intellectual
community, and also an aspect of a larger discourse which
included the widespread readership of her novels. 15
There are many reasons why Darwin's work has been
misconstrued. Modern philosophy of science, in the
instance of logical neo-positivism, attempted to understand
science as a value-free pursuit. Robert Young points to
nineteenth century antecedents and the resurgence of
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positivism even in the 1980's as sources of various
attempts to sanitize Darwin's work.
At the moment it appears to me that the right
[who like the left attempt to separate science
from social and political aspects] is winning
hands down. . .That Darwin was a Social Darwinist
is not news, however often it is conveniently
forgotten. The point about this is a deeper one:
the search for the neat, isolable influence or
cleave plane is a search for the will o' the
wisp. It is a positivist search, and positivism
was a historical movement in the nineteenth
century just as physicalism in the philosophy of
science was in the 1940s-1960s, with its search
for a decontextua 1 ized neutral observation
language. I fear that Darwin studies are lapsing
into a positivism about the origins, originality,
and unequivocalness of Darwin's theory. [16]
Despite recent changes in theory, in general the
prevailing view inside academia and out has been, up to
recent times, that science must in principle be "pure." As
the contemporary critic Helen Longino points out, the major
task of contemporary philosophy of science is to
...reexamine the ideas of "good science" and "bad
science" and the assumption that value-laden or
ideologically informed science is always bad
science. [17]
While Longino dismisses current feminist analysis of
science and Marx's view that science is a social product of
1 8the ruling class as mere "perspectives," the task of her
book (1990) is to find out how deeply values permeate
science. She recounts how the theme of value-free science
runs in a strong current through the recent history of the
philosophy of science. Until the demise of the logical
positivists, Hempel's program promised a logical certainty
for science free from contamination by values. At least
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since Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and
the work of Feyerabend, Hempel's view has been seen as
problematic and the issue of social and political
influences on science has become acute.
In the context of the Darwin debate Longino's work
holds special interest because she wants to save the
Positivist project of producing a theory of objective
science even though she rejects Positivism and refuses
to take the path of the other major group, the wholists
(Kuhn et al.). Her approach depends on a distinction
between contextual and constitutive values. Despite
asserting that it is "nonsense" 19 to claim that science can
be value-free, she attempts to control the damage that
admission of the value-driven nature of the enterprise
entails by separating what might be called "legitimate"
values from other forms of values.
Science can remain objective, according to Longino,
when it
...is free of personal, social, and cultural
values, that is, independent of group or
individual subjective preferences regarding what
ought to be . . . I call the values generated from an
understanding of the goals of science
constitutive values to indicate that they are the
source of the rules determining what constitutes
acceptable scientific practice or scientific
method. [20]
The other sort of values, the personal, social and
cultural ones, are "contextual" values in her scheme.
Longino's distinction attempts to incorporate recent
sociological studies of science which have shown that
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science is a social practice, not a set of rules. ^ Thus
she accepts that scientific reasoning, like all other
forms, is context dependent, social and hence driven
inevitably by values and interests.
One nice feature of Longino's scheme is that it points
to the importance of historical investigation into how
science actually proceeds, as only this path will allow the
revelation of values, both constitutive and contextual,
that drive ever-changing science to yield knowledge, which
is now seen to be an historical product.
^
Unfortunately, in the end Longino's distinction will
not do the task it sets for itself. In the broadest sense
her scheme attempts to peel contaminating (a euphemism for
"bad") value-inputs away by isolating the "purely"
scientific values from "contextual" values through the
device of calling what might be called "second order" group
decisions and values objective while what might be referred
to as "ground level" or "first order" values are held to be
at least potentially subjective.
Constitutive values take on an ethereal quality: they
appear to be outside of time and place arising from a vague
plenum: "the goals of science." It seems improbable, and
Longino admits that the concept is rejected, that science
can be reduced to a rule-driven activity. How then do we
get from "the goals" to particular rules and then to
techniques? She does not give any derivations.
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Worse yet, her appeal to "acceptable scientific
practices" is circular. If a group accepts a practice, for
example: Darwinians accept craniometries as scientific,
does this make the acceptance non-ideologica 1 , even if the
scientists could point to a "deduction" from the goals of
science? A deduction from "seeking truth," the positive
value of guantitative data" and "repeatable experiments"?
Consider further the case of craniometries. One
possible goal of science, to explain the functioning of the
human brain, plus the value of accepting quantitative data
over qualitative descriptions and theories, plus the
principle that the human mind may be understood in terms of
its physical structure, yielded craniometries. Granted
this chain of arguments is not complete, or even untainted
by ideological concerns, but none the less it seems clear
that some sort of "neutral" argument of this type satisfied
many of the best scientific minds of the later nineteenth
century. But craniometries, despite its acceptance and
"derivation" was ideological to the core. (Craniometries
will be be discussed in detail later in this chapter.) The
point to be made here is that even if the required logical
argument can be constructed, a suppressed ideological
rationale may run parallel to it and both together yield an
activity that scientists call science. Longino's
distinction simply does not work.
As we shall see, Darwin's example shows the trouble
with Longino's distinction. Just because a group of
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scientists for the most part share a set of values so that
they generate a group of methods, technigues and
instruments as appropriate does not mean that the social
and political dimension is obliterated.
Problems with Longino's view can also be demonstrated
by her unaer standing of instrumentation. She claims that
instruments provide unequivocal raw data so that on this
basic level all scientists, regardless of personal values
or social pressures, "see" the same thing:
Whether we are reading an instrument or observing
a troop of baboons, there is always some minimal
level of description of the common world to which
we can retreat when our initial descriptions of
what is the same state of affairs differs. [23]
This might, perhaps, be true in the trivial case of normal
science in a hardened field, to use Kuhn's phrase, but
where science is interesting, scientists might not even
agree that anything at all is being observed, if a new
instrument is functioning properly or whether it is reading
anything at all. 24
Other scholars argue for the social construction of
2 Struth and even if this is not entertained as a real
possibility, and Longino rejects the social
constructivists' program, the fact remains that much
current science is based on unwritten and unarticulated
(and unarticulable) rules and procedures. This sometimes
accounts for the periodic failure to reproduce experimental
results. Furthermore, the idea that open discussion
between scientists of such differences will reveal cultural
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and social biases that can then be peeled away is utopian
at best. Real science can be messy and uncertain, even
when everyone is telling the truth to the best of their
ability and this is by no means guaranteed when groups
compete for limited research funds, control of patents, and
a portion of name recognition with the media and public.
The ultimate problem for Longino is that within the
ambiguous situation of new science there is not always one
group that establishes "objective" basic agreement on
values that determine practice and method. Various groups
compete with their own visions. This raises the issue of
what to call the schemes that are dropped later because
they didn't work or in the end were seen as dead ends or
maybe even based on false ideas--perhaps we could even
use the phrase "imaginary." Just because a group decides
on a guiding definition or set of procedures does not mean
that the constitutive values are separable from the
contextual ones. Thus where we need the distinction most
it is hardest to find. To say that a hardened normal
scientific situation allows the distinction yields little
comfort
.
Another aspect of contemporary science raises the same
issue, though in a different way. Since the release of new
scientific information is part and parcel of strategic
maneuvering to obtain grants and to maintain research
advantages over competitors, the release of misleading
information, posturing and other forms of corporate warfare
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are common practice even within academic science With
the intense pressure to keep ahead, scientists often guess,
gamble that new data will show up, and hope new instruments
work, etc. It simply is not true that at the most basic
level there is agreement about what they are seeing, why
they are seeing it, or how to understand what they are
doing. Darwin's approval of craniometries must be
evaluated in this light.
The strategic control of the flow of information to
protect a research strategy is not a new aspect to science.
In one of the early battles over evolution Richard Owen
bested Robert Grant by "showing" that Ornithorhynchus was
mammalian. Owen discredited evolution by emphasizing the
lactation organs of the duck-billed platypus as opposed to
its egg-laying system, depriving Grant of an example of a
2 9gap-filling organism between mammals and reptiles. On
the basis of this success and further disruption of the
evidence for evolution by his demonstration that the
accepted data on the low facial angle of chimpanzees was a
result of failing to account for the differences between
young chimps and fully developed ones, Owen was lionized by
political conservatives. In both cases the arguments might
be considered "purely scientific," but they carried social
and political implications, and these helped power Owen's
ascension to prominence within the scientific societies
(which were dominated by entrenched old-money and old-order
conservatives )
.
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In a reconstruction of the inner workings of history
Adrian Desmond describes in great detail how Owen set about
shaping the next scientific debate over the possibility of
evolution: the Stonesfield jaws. Despite biologists' and
historians' descriptions of Owen's "objective" and "correct
identification" of the jaws as mammalian, the event was
ideological to the core.
Formerly historians have seen this episode
as unproblematic. Looking only at published
papers, they stripped away the social framework,
ignored Grant's input, and attributed Owen's
success to his more "correct" identification.
But correctness is an anachronistic
eva luat ion . . . At its starkest, the political
protagonists were perceiving anatomical
differences in divergent ways. But is this so
surprising? As Jacyna reminds us, a microscope
does not present a privileged close-up of
reality so much as a set of images within a
cultural tradition, and it is this educative
process that supplies the social dimension to
perception: social prestructuring allows meaning
to be extracted from the magnified image. [ 30 ]
First, the blending of politics, perception, technique
and technology shows that ideology climbs back down through
the deductions from the "pure goals of science." Second,
even though the classification of an organism has a
clinical aspect—filing things in the right cabinet--there
is a strategic importance to some debates due to qualities
outside the particular classification instance itself. In
this case the jaws' assignation took much more credence
away from the theory of evolution than one failure of
evidence would merit--even if this result was not openly
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discussed and remained on the level of repressed and
ideological reasoning.
Third, as part of this debate Owen was actually able
to control the timing of the release of papers so that he
"set Grant up." Grant had convinced an ally, Harlan, to
travel and talk to the Geological Society. Owen, coached
by Buckland, intercepted Harlan and convinced him to retract
his original opinion about the fossils. The point here is
that the scientific debate was engineered with a particular
result in mind.
Previously Owen has been portrayed as acting
in "consultation with Harlan" in the interests
of international cooperation. But the letters
suggest that Owen and Buckland conspired to
present just such an image. Of course, Harlan's
change of camps might well have been an attempt
to gain greater recognition for American efforts.
But Owen and Buckland' s original intention was
far from furthering diplomatic relations or
creating a "transatlantic" science. They had
contrived to present the society with a fait
accompli--Har lan
,
the radical's guest, recanting
at his first appearance .. .With science integrated
into wider political strategies, it was essential
to weaken the paleontological base of serial
transmutation... [31]
It is difficult to see how to separate the constitutive
from the contextual when both run together.
Also, Longino gets Darwin wrong.
New theories of geological change began the
challenge that culminated in the publication of
Darwin's Origin of Species . Outrage at yet
another displacement of humans, this time into a
species of primate, thundered from pulpits and
reverberated through the Fleet Street press.
Almost immediately, however, social theorists
embraced Darwinism and used it to legitimate
social inequality. [32]
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As we shall see, Darwin was ahead of the social theorists.
Longino's case shows how the view that Darwin and science
are pure in their hearts is thriving still.
The fear of links between Darwin and Social Darwinism
is in part a result of the history of the twentieth
century. No one who values Darwin's work wishes to see
Natural Selection linked to the abuses of eugenics or the
concept of race war. Thus one can understand why John
Greene refers to writers who make these connections as
extremists." But wishing it is not so does not change
history. The parallels between the ideas of Spencer,
Darwin and the eugenicists are disturbing as they are real.
Analysis of the movement of Darwin's ideas into
Germany is particularly susceptible to distortion. In The
Scientific Origins of National Socialism Daniel Gas man 34
claims that Darwin's ideas were perverted by those who
passed them on to the politicians. In particular he
examines the work of the biologist Ernst Haeckel, who
popularized the new theory of evolution. From the point of
view of this thesis, Haeckel is important for understanding
Darwin's work because his uncanny reproduction of
unpublished Darwinian ideas demonstrates how the structure
of Darwin's argument for Natural Selection inevitably led
to particular scientific, social and political positions.
The exhuming of this relationship between these two men
allows aspects of the structure of the theory of Natural
Selection to come to light.
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Despite Gasman's attempt to distance Darwin from
Haeckel, Ernst Haeckel's Social Darwinism can be shown to be
essentially Darwinist. Haeckel's particular development of
Darwinian theory vividly points out how other scientists,
even as far away as Germany, understood the inherent logic
uniting competition due to overproduction of young, radical
reductive materialism, social progress, craniometries and
racism into a theory of the transmutation of species.
Besides illuminating an understanding obscure to twentieth
century readers but common to many scientists of the time,
Haeckels ' s response to Darwin's work indicates the
accessibility and acceptability of Darwin's ideas to those
around him who shared a common socia 1 / scient if ic world
view
.
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Illustration 2: Photogravure of Ernst Haeckel 35
33
—
Haeckels' discovery of love at the atomic IsvpI
Contemporary evaluations of Darwin's work often screen
out the political dimension--as has been shown earlier in
quotations from authors who deny his Social Darwinism. But
worse yet, even critics who manage to acknowledge the
existence of social and political aspects treat them as
add-ons," artifacts tangential to Darwin's accomplishment;
his "real" scientific work thereby remains "pure."
Darwin's work can be segregated in this way only if the
intellectual and historical specificity of his work is
denied. The usual way to achieve the common, and
distorted, view is to suppress the politics of Malthus,
embrace his competitive model, and apply it only to
"animals" only, reserving application to "man" in tne case
of prehistory or even further back in time. The more
problematic aspects of human "social evolution" are left to
the margins of biology or even to the social sciences, and
are seen as controversial and "non-essential" aspects of
Darwinism
.
In arguing for the interconnectedness of radical
reductionist metaphysics (a non-emergent materialism)
,
Malthusian competition and racism, my thesis is based on
the idea that an accurate historical view of Darwin must
result in a reevaluation of what is essentially Darwinist.
The unearthing of the fact that Haeckel reproduces many of
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the suppressed aspects of Darwin's theory that are crucial
to understanding the racist imperative within Darwinism
makes visible one level of evidence for a new way of
looking at Darwin's work. Independent of this, however, is
a proof made available by an accurate reappraisal of the
historical specifics of Darwin's work--and this forms the
bulk of the present chapter.
It will be shown that Darwinian Natural Selection is
the view that (1) progressive evolution is powered
primarily by competition resulting from the overproduction
of young relative to resources, (2) behavior, human or non-
human, is subject to and ultimately determined by
competition for resources, (3) all qualities result from
the characteristics of a material base, (4) there are no
emergent qualities (or qualities that are the result of
systems but do not inhere in the parts of the systems)
,
and
(5) mental powers are a function of brain size and
organization (this last point follows, more or less, from
items 3 and 4) . We are now ready to turn to the work of a
true disciple of Darwin, Ernst Haeckel.
Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) was, quite simply, a world
class biologist, zoologist and educator. Trained as a
medical doctor, like Darwin and T. H. Huxley, he turned to
an academic life of theoretical and applied science and
produced classic texts in zoology, as well as
interpretations of evolutionary theory and best-sellers in
popularized philosophy. Gasman tells us that Haeckel was
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one of the most renowned scientists and writers in
Germany." 37 Indeed, his Riddle of the Universe sold
180,000 copies in its second edition; over the years
Haeckel acquired four gold medals from scientific
societies, four doctorates, and eighty diplomas. 38 A few
of Haeckel's scientific contributions include: the
description of one hundred and fifty new species of single
celled organisms in Die Radiolarien
, contributions to the
emerging ideas on protoplasm, and research coming close to
the discovery of phagocytes. 39
Despite his impressive credentials, Haeckel's concept
of the domain of science looks odd to late twentieth
century readers. Even some of his contemporaries were
offended by his ideas. In particular, his scientific views
assumed a form of materialism that could best be described
as a non-denominat iona 1 form of pantheism. This hybrid
concept included such notions as: "Des ire .. lust and
ant ipathy . . . are common to all atoms" and furthermore,
Haeckel held that there was no fundamental distinction
between the organic and the inorganic. 48 Gasman claims
that these ideas are incompatible with the materialism held
by Darwin, and places Haeckel's work somewhere in the realm
of religion rather than science. 41 Over time, some of
Haeckel's prestigious work has fallen out of favor, as did
perhaps his most famous thesis that ontogeny recapitulates
phylogeny. Even so, as Stephen Jay Gould's work has shown
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in the case of recapitulation theory, Haeckel's work
continues to have an impact on current science.
^
According to Gasman it is Haeckel who perverted
Darwin s ideas, transforming evolutionary theory into a
racist form of Social Darwinism. "Darwinism in Germany
was... often transformed almost beyond recognition," 43 and
...insisting on the literal transfer of the laws
of biology to the social realm. . .Haeckel and hisimmediate followers held to ideas which were
remote from the familiar naturalism of Spencer,
Darwin, and Huxley. [44]
and
Although he considered himself to be a close
follower of Darwin... and invoked Darwin's name in
support of his own ideas and theories, there was,
in fact, little similarity between them. [45]
Gasman claims that it was Haeckel who borrowed widely
held beliefs of racial superiority from other disciplines
in order to create a scientific racism.
Haeckel .. .decisively contributed scientific
authority to the cause of racism. By bringing
biology and anthropology to its support, in works
that were widely read and credited, he succeeded
in investing the ideas of racial nationalism with
academic respectability and scientific assurance.
It was Haeckel, in other words, who was largely
responsible for forging the bonds between
academic science and racism in Germany in the
later decades of the nineteenth century. [46]
and
To identify Darwin, instead of Haeckel as the
matrix of Hitler's social Darwinism ... is to
ignore, in addition to the enormous success of
the Weltr^tsel and Hitler's reference to Haeckel,
the obvious reality that since the publication in
1866 of Haeckel's Nattir 1 ich Schflpfungsgeschichte ,
the Germans understood Darwin and Darwinism
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through the distorted lenses of Haeckel.
Germans refer to Darwin, more often than
in fact mean, not Darwin, but Haeckel...
The view that Darwin promulgated a scientific
and because scientific non-racist or at least esse
non-racist— so that it must be the Social Darwinis
add the racist and nationalistic elements, is not
Gasman. In fact most commentators hold a view of
evolutionary theory similar to that of George
Fredrickson
:
When the
not they
[47]
theory--
nt ia 1 ly
ts who
unique to
What emerged in the racial thinking of the
metropolitan British between the 1850s and the
1880s and in that of the northern middle class
between the late 1860s and the 1890s was a
greater sympathy, or at least tolerance, for the
settler or white southern point of view. The
growing popularity of "scientific racism," with
its stress on biological differences as
determining the natural capacities and destinies
of racial groups, was the most obvious
manifestation of this tendency. The
pseudo-Darwinian conception that the contest of
human races entailed a "struggle for existence"
leading to the survival or dominance of "the
fittest" became a late-Victor ian shibboleth in
both Britain and the United States. [48]
Likewise, D.R. Oldroyd ( Darwinian Impacts ) intones:
in fact, what is customarily referred to as
Social Darwinism might in many cases better be
described as Social Spencerism. [49]
Oldroyd also says:
Turning now from economic matters, it does not
require much stretching of the imagination to
appreciate that the arguments of Social Darwinism
might readily be extrapolated to the conclusion
that the evolutionary progress of mankind may be
furthered by inter-racial or international
struggles. [50]
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Oldroyd tries to place racism at two removes from
Darwinism
,
by suggesting that it was an extension of Social
Darwinism which in turn was an illegitimate extension of
Darwinism itself. 51
The movement known as Social Darwinism was made
up of people who tried— in many different or
even contradictory ways--to apply the theories
of Darwinian evolutionism to descriptions of the
way society is constituted, or, more riskily, to
say how they thought it ought to be structured.
The passage above assumes, rather characteristically
of the secondary literature, that moral prescription in the
description of society was not performed by Darwin, so that
such "extensions" of evolutionary theory were not
originally parts of biological theory.
Thus Gasman's book is interesting on three counts:
(1) as one of the more extended accounts of Darwinism to
deal with the social and political dimensions of the
biological theory, and (2) as an in-depth look at the
transmission of scientific ideas into and within the
National Socialist State, and (3) by drawing attention to
the metaphysical core of materialism in Darwinism. Items
(1) and (3) concern us most here.
Gasman uses a two-pronged attack to differentiate
Darwin from Haeckel. On the one hand Gasman cites
Haeckel's pantheism as a break with Darwin's materialism.
On the other he claims that the racist content of Haeckel's
Darwinism is Haeckel's alone.
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As we shall see. Gasman is wrong on both counts. It
will be shown that it was Darwin, not Haeckel, who
initially brought the legitimating authority of the
biological sciences to bear for racism through evolutionary
theory. From a theoretical perspective it is easy to see
why this must be so for in the end Haeckel's work remains
true to Darwin's in its deep structure. Both are
mater ia 1 ist s of a particular radical-reductive sort, both
accept racial differences as the equivalent of biological
varieties, and both therefore conceptualize political
struggle as an instance of Natural Selection. Both could
be said to be Malthusian radical reductive-materialists.
In his writings Haeckel refers to his scientific and
popular philosophical work as based on a concept taken from
Spinoza. Haeckel dwells on the evils of dualism and the
virtues of monism. By "monism" he means that the universe
is an essential unity, one substance. He explains:
I. Pure monism is identical neither with the
theoretical materialism that denies the existence
of spirit, and dissolves the world into a heap of
dead atoms, nor with theoretical spiritualism...
which rejects the notion of matter, and considers
the world to be a spatially arranged group of
"energies" or immaterial natural forces.
II. On the contrary, we hold, with Goethe, "that
matter cannot exist and be operative without
spirit, nor spirit without matter." We adhere
firmly to the pure, unequivocal monism of
Spinoza: Matter, or infinitely extended
substance, and spirit (or energy), or mental
attributes are principle properties of the
all-embracing divine essence of the world, the
universal substance. [52]
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The first thing to note is that Haeckel performs a
classic and crude metaphysical move by defining spirit in
terms of a scientific entity, in this case energy. The
materialist basis is not undercut by the appeal to energy,
for energy is seen as a quality of matter— i.e. movement,
which amounts to a description of location over time . 55
This definition allows Haeckel to assert some bizarre
sounding theses. For instance—he claims that atoms are
psychological entities. This must strike contemporary
readers as ridiculous, and tends to confirm the belief that
Haeckel was some sort of mystic obscurantist, a
non- sc ien t i f ic writer, and surely no true Darwinian.
However, such as assessment would miss the truth.
Monism, perhaps better understood as a materialistic
pantheism (Haeckel asserts that they are one in the same
thing)
,
must ultimately be thought of as anti-mystical.
Haeckel wants to draw theists into the camp of the
atheistical scientists. Thus he starts with the idea that:
"Pantheism teaches that God and the world are one ." 54 So
far he is appealing to those with a religious bent.
However, he goes on to say: "This pantheism is sharply
opposed in principle ... to all possible forms of theism..."
And then: "It fol lows ... that pantheism is the world-system
S S
of the modern scientist . This odd claim gets explained
as follows:
Atheism affirms that there are no gods or
goddesses, assuming that god means a personal,
extramundane entity. The "godless world-system"
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substantially agrees with the monism or
pantheism of the modern scientist; it is only
another expression of it, emphasizing its
negative aspect, the non-existence of any
supernatural deity. In this sense Schopenhauerjustly remarks ; Pantheism is only a polite form
of atheism. The truth of pantheism lies in itsdestruction of the dualist antithesis of God and
the world, in its recognition that the world
exists in virtue of its own inherent forces. The
maxim of the pantheist, 'God and the world are
one,' is merely a polite way of giving the Lord
God his conge .
" [56]
Thus, rather than arguing for a mysticism, or even a
theism, Haeckel considers himself a "polite" scientist
because he calls his materialism a monism, or pantheism.
He sees the world as reducible to two things: matter and
energy. Thus science, in what we might call a "traditional
sense," is the only form of true knowledge for Haeckel. If
people want to think in terms of gods, Haeckel is pleased
to let them call the world of science god, or God.
Whatever they like. Gasman refers to Haeckel's pantheism
as a religious view, but this is a gross distortion,
especially if one considers the fact that Haeckel is
comfortable with the idea of being called an atheist. In
metaphysical terms, Haeckel is better referred to as a
reductive materialist with pantheistic overtones.
Furthermore, the link between pantheism and
evolutionary theory was established at the beginning.
Adrian Desmond describes the origins of transmutation
theory in terms of the deist materialism of radical medical
students and teachers in the 1820's, 30's and 40's. As
opposed to conceptualizing order as static and imposed from
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without, a creationist order which on an ideological level
supports a static and God-sanctioned clerical, aristocratic
and royal hierarchy, the radicals claimed orderly change
arose from the activity of atoms. The presence of god
(God) was restricted to initial creation and initial law
giving, and thus science and democracy were seen as the
"natural" extension of the presence of the divine in all
things. This radical and pantheistic view assumed that
animal evolution and human social change or revolution was
inherently progressive and Darwin was exposed to these
ideas during his medical training in the "new physiology"
at Edinburgh.
We are now ready to deal with Haeckel's strange
sounding claim that atoms are psychological entities.
First remember that Haeckel was an expert on unicellular
organisms. These "monera" presented the nineteenth-century
scientist with serious conceptual difficulties going far
beyond questions of structure and taxonomy. Some monera
react to their environment in rapid and complicated ways.
They are only one-celled, thus do not have nerves, and yet
they respond to stimuli with movement that Haeckel thought
was comparable to that of an animal with a nervous system.
He reasoned that the monera ' s movements must therefore be
considered psychological. Granted, he continued, it was a
very low level of psychological response:
The phenomena of the lowly psychic life of the
unicellular protist and the plant, and of the
lowest animal forms--their irritability, their
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reflex movements, their sensitiveness andinstinct of self-preservation--are directlydetermined by physiological action in theprotoplasm of their cells—that is, by physicaland chemical changes which are partly due toheredity and partly to adaptation. [58]
Haeckel next makes the additional claim that there is
no difference in kind between psychic activity in monera
and humans. This may be defined as the "continuity" or
non-emergence" thesis, and as we shall see it is also at
the center of Darwin's metaphysical views. Haeckel writes:
And we must say just the same of the higher
psychic activity of the higher animals and man,
of the formation of ideas and concepts, of the
marvelous phenomena of reason and consciousness;for the latter have been phy logenet ica 1 ly evolvedfrom the former, and it is merely a higher degree
of integration or centralization... [ 59 ]
Thus Haeckel shows himself to be a reductive
materialist of an extreme sort, despite vague references to
"integration" and "centralization." This detour through
the work of Haeckel would have been more speculative in
terms of an analysis of Darwin's work had not the latter's
notebooks become available to us. The happy fact that he
recorded his private thoughts allows us to witness a
remarkable parallel in ideas. That the coincidence was not
accidental, but a result of the structure of the theory of
Natural Selection, points to Haeckel's faithfulness to
Darwin's project.
Darwin had very similar views on the existence of
psychological functions in plants and microscopic animals.
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I ri his notebooks
,
which were unavailable to Haeckel or
anyone else at the time, Darwin jots down:
Instinct is a modification of bodily structure /
(connected with locomotion) / ((no! for plants
have instincts) )
.
[60]
He not only attributes instincts to plants, but
consciousness to planaria. Furthermore, he finds it
interesting to think of psychic powers as physically
divisible and a type of entity that may be conceptualized
numer ica 1 ly
.
A Planaria must be looked at as animal, with
consciousness, it choosing f ood--crawl ing from
light. --Yet we can split Planaria into three
animals, & this consciousness becomes
multiplied ... [ 61
]
Yet this shared view of continuity and reductive
materialism would remain interesting but perhaps less
compelling were it not for the fact that both thinkers made
a further and rather astounding extension of the
materialist thesis.
We are about to witness an unusual philosophical move
by Haeckel. From the standpoint of science, the following
assertion or speculation was risky for there could be no
direct observation in this instance. Yet both Haeckel and
Darwin felt compelled to make the intellectual move out of
the particular impetus of ideas they already held.
Haeckel extends the reduction of psychology (as
equivalent to the actions of atoms and motion) --to the
location of some forms of psyche at the atomic level. As
we saw above, Haeckel makes an understandable and perhaps
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plausible case for locating psychological functions at the
level of protoplasm, as does Darwin. Haeckel calls the
chemical compounds which support psychic activity
"psychoplasm." From here he argues that atoms, too, react
to their environment in fixed ways, and that this should be
considered the lowest, or most basic form of psychological
activity
:
Every shade of inclination, from complete
indifference to the fiercest passion, is
exemplified in the chemical relation of various
elements towards each other...
Haeckel continues:
The irresistible passion that draws Edward to the
sympathetic Ottilia, or Paris to Helen, and leaps
over all bounds of reason and morality, is the
same powerful "unconscious" attractive force
which impels the living spermatazoon to force an
entrance into the ovum... the same impetuous
movement which unites two atoms of hydrogen to
one atom of oxygen for the formation of a
molecule of water. [ 62 ]
In the end Haeckel conceptualizes psyche as the energy
component of the mat ter /energy unity:
Even the most elaborate and the most perfect
forms of energy that we know--the psychic life of
the higher animals, the thought and reason of
man—depend on material processes, or changes in
the neuroplasm of the ganglionic cells; they are
inconceivable apart from such modifications. [ 63 ]
While one might raise eyebrows at the assertion that
human love is nothing different in kind from atomic
attraction, the line of reasoning leading from the organic
to the inorganic basis of psyche is not outrageous if one
is willing to assume the continuity thesis. This extreme
reductive materialism works with the principle that since
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there is nothing but matter and motion (or energy), all
aspects of all things--inc luding organisms & man—must
result from either a quantitative addition of material
building blocks, or else the arrangement of such blocks and
the interactions of their accompanying energy. it should
be noted, however, that it is only the continuity thesis
that prevents the emergence of new qualities due to
threshold effects or organization.
Commentators have failed to notice the fact that this
radical reductive-materialism lies at the heart of
Haeckel's work, and have missed the significance of this
s c i e n t i f i c / me t a phy s i ca 1 view for Darwin. But this remarkable
extension of materialism to the current theory about atoms by
Haeckel would be more of a curiosity except for the fact
that Darwin shared the same view.
Remarkably enough, Darwin has left us evidence that he
wondered about the possibility that thought, because
physiological (a secretion of the brain 64 ), is similar to
—
or perhaps merely a more complex form of— atomic forces:
...is the attraction of carbon, hydrogen in
certain definite proportions (different from what
takes place out of bodies) really less wonderful
than thoughts . --One organic body likes one kind
more than another--What is matter? The whole a
mystery. [65]
and
:
Why may it not be said thought perception will,
consciousness, memory, etc. have the same
relation to a living body (especially the
cerebral portion of it) that attraction has to
ordinary matter. [66]
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It should be noted that even if a plausible argument
might be made for assertion of identity between atomic,
cellular and psychological "attractions" there was no way
to verify the claim for the atomic level at the very least.
In this sense the assertion was pure speculation and it is
exactly here that one might expect values to find entry
into scientific work. Agreement in such a vacuous arena
provides compelling evidence for unity of approach for both
thinkers
.
Speculation about atomic attraction must also be
placed in the context of contemporary physics. Atomic
theory of the time centered around the work of John Dalton
(1766-1844), who laid the basis for the Periodic Table and
modern physics by developing the view that atoms of any one
type are uniform and combine with other atoms in strict
proportions to form molecules. One of his great
innovations was conceptualizing a proliferation of
elements. (See Andrew G. Van Melsen's classic work From
Atomos to Atom (New York: Harper and Row, 1952))
Precisely because atomic theory of the time centered
on various set proportions of elements for particular
molecules and a large array of elements, the analogy Darwin
and Haeckel drew between sexual attraction and atomic
bonding was strained at best. The instance of water— two
hydrogen and one oxygen atoms—presents an analogy for
sexual union not readily observed in nature. The human
sexes combine in one proportion (indulge me here) while
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atoms combine in a wild array of groupings. Also, there
are only two sexes, while there were dozens of elements.
While their argument could be cleaned up with ad hoc
remedies and the analogy could be spun extensively through
poetic license it is clear that the lack of focus on
details made their speculation more reasonable that any
extended inspection could allow.
Even if Darwin resists overt articulation of these
metaphysical observations in his published work, it cannot
be said that Haeckel's ideas concerning psychological
attributes of atoms and microbes distinguishes his work
from that of Darwin. Haeckel merely makes explicit the
radical reductive materialism that Darwin leaves implicit.
It is significant that Darwin himself even thought about
this issue and it is furthermore revealing that he was not
willing to put it into print. This suppression was not an
accident. Yet Haeckel saw through to the suppressed and
made it visible. Where Darwin winced, Haeckel published.
Darwin put considerable effort into concealing the radical
nature of his materialism. In his notebooks he reveals the
fi 7following strategy for his public work:
To avoid stating how far, I believe, in
Materialism, [and] say only that emotions,
instincts degrees of talent, which are hereditary
are so because brain of child resembles parent
stock. --(& phrenologists state that brain alters)
There were political reasons for suppressing his
materialist beliefs. Despite the Malthusian dimension of
his materialism—which destroys the democratic potential of
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Natural Select ion— in the context of British politics
materialism was considered hostile to clerical,
aristocratic and even owning/manuf actur ing elites.
By "netting" man and ape together in a
materialist evolutionary sweep Darwin invited
being identified with Dissenting or atheistic
lowlife, with activists campaigning against the
"fornicating" Church, with teachers in court for
their politics, with men who despised the
"political archbishops" and their corporation
"toads." Ultimately Darwin was frightened for
his respectability. These fears of a fierce
reaction were justified. [68]
Darwin found himself in a tight spot, for as we shall
see his radical reductive materialism plays an important
part in providing cohesiveness and evidence as well as a
social basis for acceptance of the Natural Selection
doctrine. Thus it is no accident that both Haeckel and
Darwin speculate about the love affairs of atoms even if
they present different public facades on this matter.
At this point Gasman's development of his third focus:
the materialism of Darwin, and his subsequent claim that
Haeckel was a pantheist and therefore not a Darwinian
scientific materialist, can be seen as erroneous. Next we
need to examine Gasman's first major exploration, a look
into the social and political dimensions of biology. He
claims that Haeckel added the elements required for the
support of racism to Darwin's essentially scientific and
non-racist theory of evolution.
Haeckel's social views must strike many a contemporary
reader with horror, for he felt that the chronically sick,
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vagrants, the insane, and the poor should not be allowed to
reproduce, and better, should be eliminated. 69 But Darwin
shared the first half of this view. He says:
With savages, the weak in body and mind are soon
eliminated.
. .We civilized men.
. .do our utmost to
check the process of elimination; we build
asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, the sick;
we institute poor-laws— Thus the weak
member s ... propagate their kind. No one who has
attended to the breeding of domestic animals will
doubt that this must be highly injurious to the
race of man. It is surprising how soon a want of
care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the
degeneration of a domestic race... [70]
Darwin hoped that legislation, guided by the dictates of
biological theory, would prevent injurious forms of
reproduction
:
. . .when the principles of breeding and
inheritance are better understood, we shall not
hear ignorant members of our legislature
rejecting with scorn a plan for ascertaining
whether or not consanguineous marriages are
injurious to man. [71]
It is easy to see how the radical materialist thesis
determined an interest in projects to control social
behavior by "weeding out" undesirable characteristics.
Eugenics was a logical outcome. For instance, Darwin felt
certain that such characteristics as thievery were
inherited and this implied a particular solution to this
specific origin of crime.
I have heard of authentic cases in which a desire
to steal and a tendency to lie appeared to run in
families of the upper ranks; and as stealing is a
rare crime in the wealthy classes, we can hardly
account by accidental coincidence for the
tendency occurring in two or three members of the
same family. [72]
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Thus Darwin and Haeckel both thought that poverty and
other social problems were biological problems with eugenic
solutions. It is interesting that the idea of legitimate
theft in particular circumstances does not intrude here
into Darwin's ideas. He flattens out the concept to one in
which all theft is wrong, inheritable and determined, and
socially disadvantageous. Justice is taken at face value
despite a social context in which many people questioned
mainstream va lues--think of Marx, Dickens, the woman's
movement, Utopian Socialists, or even George Eliot.
However, unlike Haeckel,
to an active and overt social
Darwin was generally opposed
policy of "eliminating" the
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sick and poor for the sake of the race's genetic well
being, despite the obvious clarity of thought that led to
the idea:
The aid which we feel impelled to give to theelpless is mainly an incidental result of thesocial instincts.
. .nor could we check our
sympathy, even at the urging of hard reason,
without deterioration in the noblest part of ournature... we mus t therefore bear the undoubtedlybad effect of the weak surviving and propagatingtheir kind. [75; my emphasis]
While one might be tempted to think this constitutes a
major difference with Haeckel's point of view, such is not
the case. First, Darwin admits that a reasonable, i.e.
rational, person would opt for destroying the poor. He
does this openly in the passage above; note my emphasis.
Second, his argument that the weak should be allowed
to live depends on a doctrine given in terms of
evolutionary theory. This means that he is not opposed, in
principle, to the elimination of the poor, but rather he
holds that particular and historical evolutionary results
—
i.e. Victorian morality, prohibit such social policies in
Britain at this particular time.
The ideological adjustment Darwin makes to
evolutionary theory becomes more visible at this point.
Whereas the 30's radicals saw natural evolution implying
social revolution leading to progress, Darwin's Malthusian
version sees change as gradual and decoupled from progress.
By emphasizing overproduction of young and the resultant
inevitable shortage of resources Darwin implies that social
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change for instance helping the poor through a shift in
resources from the wealthy to the less well off— will not
improve matters, in principle 76 although it does raise the
issue of human ability to create artificial deviations from
the "natural” course of events. The social hierarchy thus
is necessarily static, even within the context of dynamic
evolutionary forces that drive Britain to dominate much of
the world.
Within this argument for stasis however, lies the
intractable problem of gradual change or evolution. The
poor expand their numbers faster than the upper classes,
resulting in "degeneration."
The moral sense, or sympathy, is a brake on
evolution's "hard reason." Thus if "man's" evolution
"progressed" in the appropriate manner, Darwin would be
compelled to assent to new results--for example, if
sympathy were overcome by rational thought based upon an
understanding of genetics, then the poor might be
legitimately destroyed. In fact, in describing the
extermination of the indigent peoples of South America (as
we shall see) he conceptualizes the slaughter in terms
of an unavoidable struggle for survival. In these cases
sympathy is checked by cultural differences causing a lack
of recognition. Recognition creates empathy, which results
in sympathy.
The moral sense, or faculty, presents an interesting
facet of Darwin's theory. According to him it is a very
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ernts of the development of
recent acquisition in t
"civilized man" and he leaves its status ambiguous. On the
one hand
, it is a product of evolution and hence temporary:
merely one particular organic development subject to
changes as evolution requires. On the other, Darwin treats
it like an end in itself--a "highest" or "noblest"
development—which hints that Natural Selection ceases at a
certain point and morality takes over. Thus Darwin writes:
"degeneration of a domestic race ..." 77 "Domestic" entails
the existence of a place outside the natural order, beyond
the domain of animals and plants as unaffected by "man."
Perhaps all he meant was that British morality
provides an evolutionary advantage over other cultures that
have not evolved to the point of being ruled by Victorian
sympathy, and the evolutionary disadvantages of allowing
the poor to propagate are more than compensated for by the
advantages yielded by sympathy. But Darwin is teetering on
an abyss here. In addition to flirting with group survival
as opposed to the success of individuals, if he follows
reason, he believes logic demands mass murder. If he
follows his moral feelings, he finds that he shortchanges
the clarity of rationality.
Rationality in this case resides in the assumption,
long the basis of evolutionary thought, that nature must be
viewed as "as a working out of pre-existing laws." 7 ® It is
irrational or "unlawful" for the less fit to displace the
more fit. This would be so if selection only operated at
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the level of the individual, hence Darwin’s mention of
doniesticity--the breeder culling the herd.
Central to this dilemma is an ambivalence and a
conumdrum. The ambivalence is between "knowing" that the
poor should be actively eliminated and feeling that killing
one's countrymen is somehow wrong. But both of these flow
from the logic of Natural Selection, and this is the
conumdrum. How can an essentially rational (law-following)
process—evolution—have an irrational (law-breaking)
result? The answer lies with two things: one, the
assumption that there is a telos to evolution and two,
Darwin's ambivalence over whether Natural Selection selects
individuals or groups.
Although Darwin is credited with doing away with final
ends, the claim for a "noblest" nature as a result of
nature which limits and yet defines evolution reasserts
telos. Also, despite contemporary claims, such as that by
Malcolm Jay Kottler that "...Wallace supported, while
Darwin rejected the possibility of group selection""^ it is
clear that the doctrine of sympathy invokes the mechanism
of group selection on several levels. It is interesting
that even Darwin’s contemporary champions display a split
personality over this issue. Kottler's text definitively
claims that Darwin rejected group selection, as noted
above, but his end note on this passage reads:
In the Descent Darwin did adopt group selection
to account for the origin of the moral sense in
humans ... [ 80 ]
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To be consistent, Darwin could appeal to the special
survival advantages of morality, but then he cannot
legitimately appeal to its extra-evolutionary status as
nobler" as the definitive reason this path must be
endorsed. Darwin is trapped between Victorian mores and
various scientific demands of his theory. On the one
hand, he fears for the "degeneration" of English (human)
stock, on the other the obvious solution appalls him. Nor
could he turn the other way, placing more emphasis on the
artificial or extra-evolutionary aspects of civilization,
because then it is impossible to claim inferiority of the
poor due to their being less fit, for they survive and
reproduce. He is stuck, conceptually. To his credit, he
was not as consistent as Haeckel was in regards to
elimination of the "weak."
Commentators miss the point that morality was for
Darwin ambivalently held both as a result of evolution, and
its highest result— its escape; Oldroyd says;
Darwin and Wallace said that evolutionary change,
according to the mechanism they envisaged, gave
rise to a 'better' adaptation of organisms to
their environment. They also agreed that the
evolutionary process produced a constantly
increasing
' complexif ication ' of organisms. But
they wholly rejected the idea that the
evolutionary 'progress' of organisms had any kind
of moral dimension. [ 81 ]
We shall develop Darwin's views on progress and evolution
later, in section "C,": "Progress, Craniometries and Race."
But right now it should be emphasized that both Darwin and
Haeckel argue that any cultural aspect is an evolutionary
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artifact
,
produced through strict application of biological
law and reducible to biological components.
The relation of reason, morality, and Natural
Selection in Darwin is complicated and contradictory, and
presents an excellent example of Darwin's ambivalent
attitudes. He suggests that morality supersedes reason,
but this is undercut by the materialist metaphysics. Any
behavior, moral behavior included, by altering the material
base (the brain)
, is an inheritable characteristic
providing human variation and is selectable as such and so
is enmeshed in Natural Selection. Indeed, what could be
extra-evolutionary, if one accepts radical materialism?
The problem of the level of selection, group or
individual, merely multiplies possibilities, but does not
a 1 ter the fundamental point here. One can argue, for
instance, that sympathy results in a structural change of
the brain and provides survival advantage. This is so
despite the lurking problem that group selection (or action
by the group) disconnects individual selection and so no
longer can human evolution be evaluated purely in terms of
the traits of the individuals: the "unfit" individuals
survive
.
Reason is assumed by Darwin to accord with Natural
Select ion--on the one hand, through admission of the
rationality of extermination of the poor. On the other, by
resisting morality, reason seems to be out of sync with the
reality of group or individual advantages. Darwin seems to
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assume, unref lect ive ly , that reason-because materially
based and a product of evolution— is in principle and a
££iori in harmony with Natural Selection, but he also
undercuts this idea because reason is inadequate to the
situation which also includes the emotional and moral life
of "man . "
Darwin's harmony principle for reason is questionable
at once
, even outside the present sympathy problem: reason
can be used to argue for multiple courses of action, some
advocating short-term selective advantage, some middle,
some long range. It is by no means clear that accidental
environmental shifts can be anticipated by reason, so to
take a reasonable, or adaptive course now is not
necessarily a productive way to gain selective advantage in
the future. Perhaps his hesitancy to eliminate the poor is
based on such considerations. In any case, implicit in
this situation is the problem of how to understand the
human ability to conceptualize the future, create a plan
and act accordingly, as opposed to the plant and animal
procedure of having a strategy selected for them by
nature's history of contingencies.
Jeffrie G. Murphy ( Evolution , Morality , and the
Meaning of Life ) is correct in writing that Darwin waffles
on whether morality is a part of Natural Selection or
o o
not. However, he fails to understand the complexity of
Darwin's ambivalent understanding of morality, selective
advantage, and the nature of reason. In the end Darwin is,
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I believe, committed to a Malthusian radical reductive
materialism even though this creates conundrums and
complications he cannot solve. Thus other Darwinists, such
as Haeckel, rightly call their less ambivalent social
programs essentially Darwinist.
Darwin's commitment to a Malthusian approach must be
understood in relation to the social history of the Poor
Law Amendment Act of 1834.
The act was designed to end outdoor relief and
force the "genuinely" sick poor into the
workhouses. These were made so abominable
through physical discomfort, family breakup, and
prison regime that none but the chronic would
endure them. By keeping more people at work, it
was reasoned that competition would increase and
wages decrease, in line with the low workhouse
relief. [83]
The act was widely attacked at the time, and accused of
being a right-wing attempt to hurt those who had
nothing. (See Chapter IV.) In terms of Darwin's "hard
reason" argument, several aspects must be noted. First,
even without active measures being taken, governmental
policy could, by removing "unnatural" support ("care
wrongly directed"), help to put the poor in their "proper"
place (in nature). Second, sympathy is viewed as
ineffectual and irrational, so an increase in the hostility
of the environment through a lowering of wages is seen as
sensible, realistic and neutral. Third, the end result
implicitly hoped for was increased profits for
industrialists
.
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Even though Darwin places sympathy above rational
arguments for culling the poor, he is still committed to
the restrictions Malthus places on the poor's well-being.
Thus domestic social policy on Darwinian terms favors the
industrialist and foreign policy favors colonialism.
The ranking of individuals, cultures and races according to
complexity," technological status and moral codes becomes
a basis for the scientifically sanctioned, but perhaps
emotionally distasteful domination of the local poor, the
individuals of a different culture, and the non-European
(the Native)
.
While Darwin felt that poor Englishmen should be
allowed to die off at a "natural" pace, out of the moral
obligation engendered in sympathy, he felt otherwise about
the poor, and even the rich, of races which were not
English, or at least European. Darwin understood the
slaughter of the indigent peoples of the world by the
colonizing Europeans as an unavoidable and unalterable
evolutionary struggle. In fact, he saw the over-powering
of the "savages" as proof that they were inferior . 84
At the present day civilized nations are
everywhere supplanting barbarous nations,
excepting where the climate opposes a deadly
barrier; and they succeed mainly, though not
exclusively, through their arts, which are
products of the intellect. It is, therefore,
highly probable that with mankind the
intellectual faculties have been mainly and
gradually perfected through natural selection.
The idea that the destruction of indigenous peoples
could be understood in terms of a battle of national or
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individual racial strengths was not a new one for Darwin
and may have even predated his version of evolutionary
theory. In an early work he writes:
Wherever the European has trod, death seems topursue the abor igina 1 . . . The varieties of man seemto act on each other in the same way as different
species of animals--the stronger always
extirpating the weaker. [85]
Lest one think that the phrase "supplanting barbarous
nations" indicates the abstract viewpoint of one
unacquainted with the realities of the colonization
process, we need only attend Darwin's misgivings over the
extermination (he uses this term) of Natives to know
otherwise :
This [the slaughter of the male Indians] is a
dark picture; but how much more shocking is the
unquestionable fact, that all the women who
appear above twenty years old are massacred in
cold blood! When I exclaimed that this appeared
rather inhuman, he answered, "Why, what can be
done? they breed so!"
Every one here is fully convinced that this
is the most just war, because it is against
barbarians. Who would believe in this age that
such atrocities could be committed in a Christian
civilized country? [86]
Despite the scruples voiced above, Darwin acknowledged
that the "just war" ideology was rational to some extent,
or at least understandable:
This expression [most just of all wars, because
against barbarians] it must be confessed, is very
natural, for till lately, neither man, woman, nor
horse, was safe... [87]
Later on in the Journa
1
he adopts the stance of the Descent
when he admits that the domination of the savage is cruel,
but necessary.
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All the aborigines have been removed to anisland.
. .This most cruel step seems to have beenquite unavoidable, as the only means of
stopping.
. .robberies.
. .murders.
.
. [88]
Note that the premise of colonialism, the Malthusian
expansion of British hegemony throughout the world, goes
unremarked but assumed none the less.
In the end he saw the "savage" as a lower, or perhaps
degenerated form of humanity. However he does place the
"savage" one cut above the criminal. Unlike the criminal,
the savage's depravity is not willful:
...the brightest tints on the surrounding woods
could not make me forget that forty hardened...[criminals] were ceasing from their ... labours
,
like the slaves from Africa, yet without their
holy claim for compassion. [89]
Thus Darwin had no illusions about what "supplanting"
meant, and his compassion was blunted by an acknowledgment
of necessity. This necessity had two components: the sense
of a natural, and hence uninterruptable
,
process, and the
rational needs of the conquering Europeans.
The assumption of conventional moral disapproval of
slavery is held side by side with the imperative for
British expansion. In terms of the equation of evolution,
slaves and the lower classes are particulars instantiating
the variable which under the Malthusian law must suffer and
then die. Darwin is consistent in his pity tinged with
regret that so many must perish so that civilization will
survive
.
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In terms of his evolutionary theory, Darwin's
Malthusian and reductive-materialist view precludes the
analysis of colonization as a political event having causes
and results that function outside evolutionary concerns and
strictures as morality might. At this pole of the
ambivalence of "man's" place in nature, sympathy is seen as
an advantage the European conquerors have over the Natives.
This flattening of possibility occurs because in this
context he allows the metaphysical demand for a reduction
of all aspects of culture to competitive advantage to
overpower post-evolutionary possibilities.
Political decisions to attack another nation or to
annex land from Natives may be construed on Darwinian
grounds as technological events. Due to particular social
organization (social technology) and the availability of
military power (material technology)
,
the combatants enter
a struggle that begins with the premise that one side or
the other must perish due to limitations of supplies
(Malthusian technological constraints) in the context of
two populations that "naturally" attempt to expand.
Darwin equates the technological level of a society
with its evolutionary level. It is the development of
machine technology which lifts humans above the other
species and distinguishes civilization from "savages" or
other Natives. It is the human technique of imitation
which allows for the reproduction of machine culture. Thus
social skills are reduced to technological concerns, and
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the reproduction of social skills itself is reified into a
technique for survival. 90
Now, if some one man in a tribe, more sagaciousthan the others, invented a new snare or
weapon... the plainest self-interest
.. .wouldprompt the other members to imitate him... Thehabitual practice of each new art must likewisein some slight degree strengthen the intellect.
Thus an invention, through use by individuals of the group,
increases the evolutionary advantage of each individual and
their evolutionary ranking. The issue of ranking of the
group is left vague here, for even those of the group who
did not adopt the technology, such as women who do not use
the new weapons, for example, would benefit. By the
application of a variation on Lamarck's thesis (i.e. he
allowed for acquired characteristics to be biologically
encoded and passed on in his theory of "Pangenesis")
,
the
acquired behavior engenders an inheritable trait, and thus
in this case advances the ranking of descendents and
possibly even the group. Darwin therefore feels entitled
to claim that important inventions, for instance gunpowder,
not only give an edge to the European colonizers, it
defines and codes a superiority that allows, explains,
and ultimately justifies colonization.
If the new invention were an important one, the
tribe would increase in number, spread, and
supplant other tribes. In a tribe thus rendered
more numerous there would always be a greater
chance of the birth of other superior and
inventive members. [91]
Technology, intelligence, progress. Where early
evolutionists following the Jacobin implications of change
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based on individual cooperation and empowerment find
progress m materialism
,
92 Darwin's Malthusian version sees
progress through struggle and elimination of the "less
fit . "
2. Natives and the ranking of species
In the paragraph immediately following the one in
which Darwin tells us that the Europeans are everywhere
supplanting the barbarous nations, he describes the savages
as ranked close, in level, to apes: "Apes are much given to
imitation, as are the lowest savages..." 92 This
juxtaposition is not accidental, for in reducing the
colonial wars to the mechanical progression of Natural
Selection, Darwin is able to place the savage securely on
the level (or as close as possible to that level) of the
animal. This placement has many results, one of which is
preventing an invocation of the moral sentiment of
sympathy. This allows the ideology of colonization to
escape unanalyzed, and furthermore explains and justifies
European domination. In his private notebooks, Darwin's
view that colonialism is a form of evolutionary struggle is
i 94clear
:
When two races of men meet, they act precisely
like two species of anima Is . --they fight, eat
each other, bring diseases to each other etc, but
then comes the more deadly struggle, namely which
have the best fitted organization, or instinct
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(i.e. intellect in man) to gain the day. ..Thepeciaiiar skulls of the men on the plains ofBolivia ... they have been exterminated onprinciples strictly applicable to the universe—
The ideological aspect of this argument is exposed
when two things are recognized: Darwin often emphasizes the
"gulf" between savage and civilized Englishman, but he also
offers first-hand testimony that this divide may be closed
through a few years' education:
In contradiction to what has often been stated, 3years has been sufficient to change savages into
as far as habits go, complete & voluntary
Europeans. [95]
On the face of it, the evolutionary imperative to
exterminate Natives becomes suspect when a little education
will vault them into the English culture. Of course the
unstated rejoinder is that in Malthusian terms this ability
of the Native to rise through the tiers of civilization is
irrelevant to the problem of shortages. But this is
insufficient too, for one could argue that the best Natives
would rise higher than most ordinary Englishmen if given
the chance. Thus the most competitive society might be
comprised of a mixture of races.
The suppressed argument for the necessity of
extermination is not merely an oversight. The very
discussion of this topic would invite overtly political
dimensions to surge forward. Other thinkers of the time
were already voicing alternatives to practices of
annihilation. As the devious Westermack pointed out:
67
I am convinced that in our dealings with
non-European races some sociological knowledge,
well applied, would generally be a more
satisfactory weapon than gunpowder. It would be
more humane and cheaper too. [96]
The power of this objection is more keenly felt when
one realizes that Darwin's ideas on the inher itabi 1 ity of
traits (pangenesis) included the notion that learned
behavior is incorporated physically and thus makes ready
for transmission an increased learning capacity for
descendents. The possibility of altering characteristics
through education contains many progressive alternatives
that should complicate Darwin's views on the transmission
of culture. He argued in the "M" notebook that childhood
education was desirable because knowledge would then be
more readily available for inheritance by later
generations. Education that occurred after the procreative
stage would be wasteful, and so would be irrational and
counter to sound evolutionary doctrine.
Given Darwin's materialism any form of human thought
or activity is reducible to a material base which must obey
the laws of nature. Thus politics--on all levels— is a
manifestation of the laws of Natural Selection. Given this
fact, in order for Darwin to substantiate his claim that a
race war is unavoidable, (given evolutionary laws), he must
be able to establish the biological base which mandates
struggle unto death. If there are adequate biological
resources, of if an alternative political solution is
possible, the biological imperative goes away or at least
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lessens and the extermination becomes senseless as far as
scientific theory is concerned. (This point will become
more pointed when considered in terms of birth control.)
There is another wrinkle in Darwin's idea of necessary
and lethal competition, namely that many systems gain
stability through a failure to eradicate opposing forces.
Darwin may have sensed this in his discussion of the
rationale for destruction of the lower classes, and a
contemporary example might be the hegemony of the
Republican and Democratic parties in the United States.
Also, if the poor were eliminated, and replaced by the more
fit upper classes would the wealthy want to work in the
factories ?
Clearly a struggle between opposing political systems
or beliefs does not demand the death of the opponent. This
is doubly true, for a change in beliefs (as brought on by
education, rational argument, agreement to disagree, or a
political solut ion--f or instance by democratic process)
accomplishes change without bloodshed. Thus we see that
political struggle can look very unlike Natural Selection,
and might best be compared to it only metaphorically. Of
course Darwin's controversial theory of pangenesis further
complicates but does not settle this issue.
Oddly enough, Darwin endorses such "re-education" in
his notebooks:
Animals do attack the weak & sickly as we do the
wicked. --we ought to pity & assist & educate by
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putting contingencies in the way to aid motivepower.
— [98]
Furthermore, in order to be scientifically credible,
the exercise of political power must be evaluated in terms
of survival value if Darwin is to have it his way. It
wouldn't be enough to point to colonial expansion as proof
of superior survival value. Such a gesture would violate
his principle of progress, for success is but related to
current conditions. Colonial policies might lead to over
extension and collapse of the empire in question.
Isolationism might produce a better survival strategy. The
ideological nature of the scientific application of
biological laws to human geopolitical activity becomes
apparent when these issues remain on a level of politics
and the theorist does not require biological evidence or
explicit and extended arguments. Darwin's racism provides
the biological evidence necessitated by his claims for the
scientific justification of empire. This will be spelled
out shortly.
So let us re-examine Gasman's claim (from above) :
Haeckel... decisively contributed scientific
authority to the cause of racism. By bringing
biology and anthropology to its support, in works
that were widely read and credited, he succeeded
in investing the ideas of racial nationalism with
academic respectability and scientific assurance.
We have witnessed Darwin's use of biology to support racial
domination. Furthermore, a more detailed examination of
Darwin's work reveals that he, like Haeckel, thought that
nationalism was an evolutionary artifact. Darwin reveals
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his view that evolution moves man from the levels of tribe
to community to nation when he describes the function of
sympathy. While Darwin attempts to relate this "advance"
in loyalty to an individual's sense of rationality, the
germ of a group entity is inevitably present.
As man advances in civilization, and small tribes
are united into communities, the simplest reason
would tell each individual that he ought to
extend his social instincts and sympathies to all
members of the same nation. [99]
Darwin goes on to claim that the movement from nationalism
to pan-nationalism is prevented only by "an artificial
barrier
,
i.e. the "great differences in appearance or
habits" between nations .
Thus for Darwin the domination of inferior races is a
scientific matter (i.e. under the constraints of a radical
materialist evolutionary theory) which functions,
potentially, at a more brutal level than is "necessary" due
to the "artificial" barrier of strangeness between
cultures. Darwin's complex array of ideas allows him to
simultaneously endorse a noble moral conceit via sympathy,
while Malthusian evolutionary forces demand the destruction
of foreign cultures. Darwin's ambivalence to "savages"
takes the form of an articulated wish to treat them as a
part of a universal humanity (thus deserving sympathy)
,
but
alongside this desire is a scientifically-validated
justification of more overt and violent domination.
Furthermore, the abuses to which the latter is capable are
claimed to be unavoidable, though of course "unfortunate,"
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side effects of the difficulties that plague the path
higher civilization. Darwin created Social Darwinism
if he held the doctrine ambivalently.
to
even
C. Progress, Craniometries and Race
The scientific racism Darwin creates is based on his
concept of progress, the craniometric evidence available to
him, and ultimately on a Malthusian reductive materialism.
These seemingly disparate elements are not independent of
each other, but rather form an interconnected complex.
The Darwinian idea of progress is complex. Initially,
critics attacked Natural Selection as manifestly false
because not all organisms had evolved to "higher" forms.
But it is often noted that one of the major advances of
Darwinian theory was that it dispensed with the view that
evolution is equivalent to progress . ^*"*1
Let us review the situation. One problem for
evolutionary theory vis a vis creationist thought during
Darwin's period was the continued existence of simple or
"unevolved" organisms, such as infusoria (roughly
equivalent to ciliated protozoans) or rhizopods (protozoans
with-root like pseudopods). These organisms bucked the
assumed evolutionary trend of "progress" or change towards
"increased complexity." Their simple morphology stood out
as a challenge to the idea that Natural Se lect ion--as a
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force demanding change—could be the uniform law of nature
it claimed to be.
Darwin had an adequate response to this challenge:
On our theory the continued existence of lowly
organisms offers no difficulty; for natural
selection, or the survival of the fittest, does
not necessarily include progressive
development
. . .And it may be asked what
advantage
... wou Id it be to an infusorian
animalcule.
. .to be highly organized. [102]
Quite simply, according to Darwin the process of
Natural Selection allows particular organisms which possess
survival advantages over other organisms competing for the
same niche to leave a higher proportion of progeny. Since
selection pressure is neutral, it has no agenda and
therefore unless increased specialization of parts, or
complexity, yields a particular advantage vis a vis the
other competing organisms it will confer no survival
differentia 1 and complexity will not be selected. Darwin
thought that the specialization of parts to particular
functions need not be an advantage and this would be
especially obvious in the case of tiny organisms. To
create an example, what use would an amoeba have for a
nerve cell or a liver cell added to itself?
Indeed, Darwin noted to himself that "in my theory
there is no absolute tendency to progression." 10 ^ While
explaining that progress and history is opaque to himself,
however, he points to the deeper structure which demands
and powers an all but inevitable progress.
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f various checks... do not prevent the reckless,the vicious and otherwise inferior members of
society from increasing at a quicker rate thanthe better class of men, the nation will
retrograde, as has too often occurred in thehistory of the world. we must remember thatprogress is no invariable rule. it is verydifficult to say why one civilized nation rises,becomes more powerful, and spreads more quickly
at one time than another; or why the same nationprogresses more quickly at one time than another.We can only say that it depends on an increase inthe actual number of the population, on the
number of men endowed with high intellectual and
moral faculties, as well as on their standard of
excellence. Corporeal structure appears to havelittle influence, except as far as vigour of body
leads to vigour of mind. [104]
Despite initial claims that progress is no rule, and its
development opaque, selective advantage is expressed in
terms of intelligence/morals which pan out in terms of
technology, brain size and social organization. This
factor is adjusted according to the ratio of smart/dumb
or upper class/lower class. The second factor is an
increase in population—which in the animal world is the
sine qua non of success.
Of special interest here is the Victorian (Malthusian
and Darwinian) perception that the poor (reckless),
criminals (vicious), and the sick (inferior) were swamping
out the intelligent, responsible and virtuous
(entrepreneuria 1 /noble classes) . In Darwinian terms there
is a conflict between increasing population as an indicator
of success and the ratio of poor to managerial classes.
There is also a related conflict between fitness and
sympathy. In the end it is intelligence/brain size that
powers progress. Thus racist craniometries provides a
reliable indicator of success as long as sympathy is held
m check. In this sense progress is more or less
inevitable and ultimately based upon intellectual power.
A conceptual problem for Darwin on this topic
is that in the case of more complex organisms, such as
mammals, most species have evolved analogous specialized
organs and this specialization ultimately arose from
ancestors who were simpler in organization. Thus the very
concept of change becomes entangled with a movement to
increased specialization of parts. While Darwin recognized
that this trend was independent of change in itself, and he
recognized that change is accidental— i.e. historically
contingent and non-teleological
,
he at times succumbed to
the idea that evolution is inevitably driven to increasing
complexity. This drive is encoded in "noblest" as applied
to sympathy and "excellence" as applied to intelligence and
class. Furthermore, he implies that some force (most
likely government), through "various checks," should
prevent the poor/criminal/sick— insane population from
increasing "too quickly."
Despite the lack of an invariable rule, and an
incomplete knowledge of causes, Darwin promulgates a social
agenda in the name of progress. This is so despite his
decoupling of change and progress for species other than
"man." Within his argument there is a tension between
evolutionary success in terms of sheer numbers--and success
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m terms of a preconceived notion of fitness (large brains,
higher ratio of upper to lower class)
.
Within the social context Darwin's attempt at
decoupling change and progress was quite revolutionary.
Change, or evolution in the general sense, had been linked
by radical materialists of the 1830's to social revolution
in their attacks on the Poor Laws, Malthus, the privileges
of "Oxbridge," the clergy, royalty and the establishment as
artificial impediments to "natural" advances available
through democracy and the legitimation of social position
through fair competition. 105 Darwin personally knew some
of these would-be reformers, such as Grant, with whom he
went to medical school in Scotland. And on the right wing
of politics, Spencer presented a conservative version of
progressive evolution.
But Darwin's conservative Whig politics were
incompatible with ideas of social revolution, 106 and the
addition of Malthusian competition to radical materialism
altered the simpler idea of progress in terms of the
breakdown of class privileges and a promulgation of fair
competition
.
Darwin does talk of evolution leading to, or
progressing to "man." And when Haeckel was introducing
Darwinism the battle was described as between "evolution
and progress [on the one side]
,
and on the other the
10 7
creation and immutability of the species." Most
biological terminology continues to code the preference for
76
progress"—despite the connotation to idea of "descent" as
merely a lineage. For instance, most evolutionary trees
Place the present at the top, coding a preference for the
elevated," rather than descending to the present at the
bottom. Recent, more differentiated organisms are referred
to as "higher" or "more complex" by Darwin and even our
contemporaries. Why not "lower" (as in "descended") or
less simple ? A subtle bias for a positive view of
progress underlies Darwinian and Victorian vocabulary
despite a negative view of the world situation (e.g.
Ma 1 thus
,
and Darwin's claims for Victorian "nobility" being
the source of degeneration)
.
As we saw above, Darwin held the view that
civilization results from evolution's press for larger
brains and greater complexity (specialization)
. Such a view
is coded by both his and Haeckel's normative vocabulary
even when they ostensibly refer to survival power; he
refers to the "superiority" and "advanced" state of
civilized man. Haeckel follows Darwin's lead, for Darwin
quite clearly enunciates the view that progress and
evolution are synonymous:
...here we enter on a very intricate subject, for
naturalists have not defined to each other's
satisfaction what is meant by an advance in
organization. Amongst the vertebrata the degree
of intellect and an approach in structure to man
clearly comes into play... Von Baer's standard
seems the most widely applicable and the best,
namely, the amount of differentiation of the
parts of the same organic being... and their
specialization for different functions... [108]
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Darwin continues:
If we take the standard of high organization, theamount of differentiation of the several organsm each being when adult (and this will includethe advancement of the brain for intellectual
purposes)
, natural selection clearly leads
towards this standard... [109]
First, it should be noted, even Victorian biologists
were aware that insects were by far more successful than
any imitator of humans. On a deeper level, a teleological
view exists side by side with Darwin's theoretical
decoupling of progress and evolution. This result is
if one thinks of Darwin's work as a consistent
whole. On the other hand, if one accepts the
inconsistencies as surface distortions as opposed to
mistakes, one can start to think about what deeper issues
prevent the homogenization of articulated theory.
In this particular case Darwin is inventing a
secular/scientific reason for recreating what might be
called a "religious view" of "man" as the center of the
universe. Remember his quip about "noblest." In the
context of Victorian ideas about "man's" place in nature we
see Darwin above resuscitating a variant of the "Great
Chain Of Being" theory. (See A. Lovejoy's classic: The
Great Chain of Being
. ) Whereas the old classification of
organisms was based on a hierarchy leading to God, Darwin's
is based on a hierarchy leading the specialization of parts
(and its correlates in capitalist industrialism), man,
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greater intellect (the entrepreneur) and (Victorian)
mora 1 ity
.
Darwin was quite aware of the deficiencies of this
hierarchical view, and the passages quoted are hemmed in
with qualifications and observations about the various
intricacies" of the topic. He knows that it makes little
sense to compare species that occupy separate niches:
...if we look to the different grades of
organization within the same great group; for
instance, in the vertebra ta ... [we find] the
co-existence of mammals and fish... But mammals
and fish hardly come into competition with each
other; the advancement of the whole class of
mammals, or of certain members in this class, to
the highest grade would not lead to their taking
the place of fishes. [110]
But the lumping of all mammals together as a group of
species attempting to become human is odd. Why human
attributes would aid animals that occupy different niches
than humans do is unclear, unless one assumes that there is
a special value
which case the
secondary, and
those attribute
to human attr
"human" aspect
the "inevitabi
s reasserts it
ibutes regardles
of the qualitie
lity" of progres
self
.
s of niche, in
s is
s based on
Another way to make the Darwinian structure visible
is to observe how he uses the language of the Great Chain
to code the view of a hierarchy of development in terms of
evolution to greater complexity:
Although organization, on the whole, may have
advanced and be still advancing throughout the
world, yet the scale will always present many
degrees of perfection... [Ill]
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Darwin makes perfection a telos and links it to an
increasing complexity of morphology. The inadequacy of
this view is obvious, and Darwin recognized this for
lower species. Environmental parameters can sometimes be
better met through increased specialization, and sometimes
not. The use of the word "perfection" is notable because
it allows Darwin to traffic in a normative element without
explicitly having to defend "superiority" with biological
facts or confront his own opposing theoretical insight that
superiority is a particular local and historical fact of
the most radically contingent and reversible sort.
In his use of the word "perfection" Darwin takes on a
vocabulary of earlier radicals such as Lamarck and Geoffroy
who use it as "tricolor banners" demanding social and
political reform'*'^ and reconfigures it for more
conservative ends. The hierarchical view implied in
"perfection" contributes to the scientizat ion of capitalism
and racism.
Darwin will echo the claim of some of his
contemporaries in anthropology that civilization is more
specialized than primitive existence. He will argue that
the success of Europeans against Natives shows superiority
based on differentiation, technology and mental powers.
This approach to the topic deflects attention from the
conceptual possibility that domination of Natives is based
on political will backed up by a lucky accumulation of
technological power, in favor of an analysis in terms of
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racial characteristics linked to the "higher evolution" of
larger brains and the resulting more lethal weapons.
On the one hand Darwin wants to rate organisms on
their 'perfection" (degree of differentiation, or
hierarchical status) and on the other he wants to dispense
with the scale altogether and claim that any organism (or
species) is fit or "perfect" insofar as it evolves a
successful strategy for its niche.
A bias toward the view that adaptation is always
enhanced by complexity of organization need not be
blatantly ideological as it might be accounted for by
Darwin's assumption that environmental change is always
slow. Catastrophism on the other hand might favor more
basic systems, for those animals that specialize too finely
would not be able to change rapidly enough to cope with a
radically altered environment. In this way the assumption
of the ubiquitous value of complexity can be seen as both
"neutral" and "loaded." Insofar as the appeal is to
geological assumptions of slow change (although even this
can be construed as politically tainted--as a devaluation
of revolution) the assumption looks neutral. But at the
same time assumptions of the advantages of a division of
labor and a non-cooperative (i.e. anti-welfare state)
political economy look loaded. Here overdetermination
makes distinctions such as Longino's questionable.
In terms of the fitness of Natives, in order to be
consistent Darwin would have to rate "savages" as "perfect"
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in regards to their niche as it existed before Europeans
changed the niche through their presence. But as we shall
see, he does not take this approach. The application of
this consideration about perfection to the problem of
colonialism within Darwin's evolutionary theory yields
interesting results. On the one hand, he argues that due
to less "severe" competition113 (although no argument is
advanced as to why this is true; this could refer to the
lack competition from the more advanced Europeans) the
indigenous peoples of America and Africa have evolved
less than Europeans. (But in other places he argues for
the degeneration of civilization due to an artificial end
of natural competition through the implementation of laws
helping the poor, and late marriage of the elite who also
have fewer children.) Thus, Darwin concludes, these
peoples must be displaced by the "more advanced" Europeans.
"Progress" in this context is decoupled from Darwin's other
claims for moral supersession of nature.
Also, the Malthusian imperative for expanding
territorial holdings was highly questionable even at the
time Darwin was writing. (Much more on this in Chapter
Four.) Even so, the necessity of the destruction of
Natives is not the only conclusion to erupt from Darwin's
conflicted theory. Sympathy as the "noblest" virtue of
civilization could preclude extermination and suggest a
more benign form of colonization. And the possibility of
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education engendering a Lamarckian change of
characteristics suggests another wrinkle.
The deep structure which causes Darwin to waffle on
progress and the role of civilization resides in an
ambivalent attitude to change, especially in how it applies
to humans in terms of perfection, morality, degeneration
and whether the human will puts humans to one side or
within evolution.
One disturbing piece of paleontological evidence in
this regard was the fact that the skulls of the
Neanderthals proved "capacious l
^
in comparison to the
contemporary average. This judgement was based on the idea
that brain size correlates with intelligence. Darwin
endorsed the use of this correlation:
The belief that there exists in man some close
relation between the size of the brain and the
development of the intellectual faculties is
supported by the comparison of the skulls of
savage and civilized races, of ancient and modern
people, and by analogy of the whole vertebrate
series. Dr. J. Bernard Davis has proved, by many
careful measurements, that the mean internal
capacity of the skull in Europeans of 92.3 cubic
inches; in Americans 87.5; in Asiatics 87.1; and
in Australians only 81.9 cubic inches. [115]
That Darwin was uneasy about what he claims to be
"proved" is clearly shown in his treatment of the evidence
at hand. Initially he notes that Prof. Broca claims that
the skulls of medieval Frenchmen were smaller than modern
French skulls "in the proportion of 1484 to 1426 .
(Broca's data is reproduced from Vogt's table of
craniometric evidence, which Darwin cites (in a footnote)
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in Figure 2. Darwin also cites Broca's work at this
location.
)
117
Directly after this passage Darwin points out that the
Neanderthal skulls indicate just the opposite trend, and
the fact that these remains are many times older than
Broca's data from the 12th century. The ratio of 1484 to
1426 represents a 4% difference. In terms of cubic inches,
this would comprise of a change of 3.7 for the "modern"
(19th) European, or a difference commensurable with the
jump down from the "modern" European to the "modern"
American. As Stephen Jay Gould has pointed out, these
measurements were the results of racist preconceptions,
poor manipulations of the data, and data which sometimes
had a margin of error in excess of 4%. 118
Also, despite the certainty previously expressed,
Darwin comes to doubt that craniometry can accurately gauge
intelligence. 119 While Darwin might be thought to be
pushing the point that craniometry gives general evidence,
rather than specific details, such a point of view raises
more questions than it answers. For, if the specific
evidence was not fine-grained enough to capture
intelligence, and the acknowledged margin of error was high
enough to swamp out trends between races, the whole project
collapses. Gould points out that "with a 3.5 percent mean
difference between smallest and largest sample, it is
likely that no statistically significant differences exist
at all" 120 (i.e. between Broca's data on twelfth.
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eighteenth and nineteenth century Parisians— the very data
Darwin cites from Carl Vogt)
.
In terms of the Parisian skull evidence, Gould points
out that while the shift from 1426 to 1484 seems to
indicate an increase in average cranial size from the 12th
to the 19th centuries (for upper-class individua Is—note
that this data assumes the private vaults contain upper
class individuals, otherwise the class spread between
commoners and the aristocracy of the 19th century: 81 cc,
would swamp out the 59 cc difference between the 12th and
19th centuries and this is circular reasoning on Broca's
part), Broca's average for the 12th to 18th centuries was
1,409 cc (lower class) .1^1 The average for common grave
skulls for the 19th century was 1403 cc. This data
indicates degeneration for lower class individuals since
the 12th century.
In order to utilize the data for proving (1) the claim
that skull size reflects intelligence, (2) the claim that
brain size increases over time, and (3)
,
the legitimacy of
a hierarchy of intelligence isomorphic to class status,
Broca classified the skull samples according to these
views, and then cited the evidence as proving his points.
Gould puts it nicely:
Broca claimed that if differences in social class
do not explain why calculated values fail to meet
expectations, then the data are unintelligible.
Intelligible, to Broca, meant steadily increasing
through time— the proposition that the data were
meant to prove, not rest upon. [122]
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However, this blend of modern and contextual criticism
is not needed to throw the endeavor into question, for the
theoretical basis of racist craniometries founders on
deficiencies that it itself recognized during Darwin's own
time. Thus Darwin's use of craniometries is another
manifestation of an ambivalence held in place by a blend of
scientific and ideological needs.
Darwin's ambivalence about the value of craniometries,
shown by his qualifications and asides, is overpowered by
the utility the new discipline offers. First, he benefits
from an emerging science that boasts quantitative data.
It is worthwhile at this point to interrupt the
narrative to go back to Longino's distinction between
constitutive and contextual values. Darwin's clear
interest in the quantitative aspect of craniometries could
easily be seen as following a constitutive dictate. Yet it
is impossible to separate the desire to put a discipline on
a quantitative basis from the particular problems and
deficiencies of the theory and data being adopted. On one
level one cannot fault Darwin for such oversight because
every theory and its data has its own problems. One could
point to the switch in craniometries from using millet seed
to measure the volume of skulls to using metal shot as
proof of the new discipline's drive to improve methodology
and technique. The compressibility of millet seed resulted
in bad data. Such error was especially racist because the
experimenters tended to push less (unconsciously, we can
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assume for the sake of argument and probably to some degree
truthfully) on the millet in Native skulls as opposed to
harder on the seed in white skulls. (See Gould's The
M ismeasure of Man, particularly chapter 2, as well as his
article in Science
, 200, pp. 503-9.)
Even the more global constitutive value: to seek to
understand human behavior in terms of biological evolution
is itself chock full of what should be called contextual
values. There are "good scientific" reasons to see
Darwin's use of craniometries as in "good faith" and in
accordance with "purely" constitutive values. Yet such a
perspective is incomplete. As will be shown by the
following argument, Darwin's use of craniometries was
over-determined and problematic. Specific problems within
the field of craniometry lead inevitably to the conclusion
that this discipline was racist and incomplete, if not
incompetent. Longino's distinction fails to give any
leverage for prying the problem apart. Let us turn back to
Darwin's ambivalence towards craniometries.
Another plus for the new discipline was that the
results of craniometries fit the race and class prejudices
of many of his peers: the newly emerged professional
group of biologists. Also, Darwin required a link between
contemporary man and earlier pre-human forms, which Broca's
data helped forge. Given the lack of fossil evidence
Darwin attempted to adopt the strategy of the
anthropologists and look to "savages" as not just
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representatives of the past, but as living fossils.
Craniometries helped support this project.
Vogt's craniometries were invaluable to Darwin because
(1) Vogt's conclusions about racial hierarchy fit Darwin's
and others' ideas, (2) Vogt's work tied Natural Selection
to geopolitics--thus claiming a new territory (that others
would attribute to culture or politics) for biology, (3)
craniometries lent the scientific status of a quantitative
field to Natural Selection, which was at the time primarily
qualitative, and (4) Vogt's work turned the "savage" into
the missing link filling an undesirable gap in the
geological record.
Given all these benefits the role ideology plays in
science is shown to be complicated indeed. Ideological
concerns related to class and personal bias, questions of
scientific status for a novel and controversial theory, and
internal requirements of a new theory for missing data
combine to form an over-determined impetus to shape
nineteenth century biological science.
However Darwin's use of Broca and Vogt, useful as it
was, was fraught with difficulties. Craniometries
presented an example of the worst sort of ideologically
driven scientific work. Quite simply, Vogt's new science
was a technical failure in its own terms despite its
increasingly widespread acceptance within mainstream
science .
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Fig. 68. Negro skull, side view.
Fig. 69. Idiot skull, side view.
Fig. 72. Chimpanzee skull, side view.
Illustration 4: Three skulls by Carl Vogt. This depiction
of human skulls was intended to show a gradient of
development from the chimpanzee to the negro. [124]
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1. Negroes, women and sympathy
At this point let us turn to the details of Darwin's
use of Dr. Carl Vogt's work. Lectures on Man . One relevant
set of data for our discussion is given by Vogt (born 1817,
died 1895)
,
and derives ultimately from Aitken (see Figure
Two)
. Aitken claims that an average cranial capacity for
Negroes in general" is 1347.66 cc and for "Caucasians in
general" is 1427 cc.
For a radical reductive materialist this data suggests
an argument for the ranking of intelligence— as long as one
accepts a correlation of cranial size with intelligence.
Vogt's now-infamous position on the ranking of races and
sexes is outrageously clear:
The grown up Negro partakes, as regards his
intellectual faculties, of the nature of the
child, the female, and the senile White. He
manifests a propensity to pleasure, music,
dancing, physical enjoyments, and imitation,
while his inconstancy of impressions and all
other feelings are those of a child... The Negro
resembles the female in his love of children, his
family, his cabin; he resembles the old man in
his indolence, apathy, and his obst inacy . . . He
knows not steady work, cares little for the
future; but his great imitative instinct enables
him to become a skillful workman and artistic
imitator. [125]
Furthermore the "discovery" of a human race fitting
into the evolutionary gap between "civilized man" and
animal was an important find for him:
The existing materials for bridging over the gulf
between man and ape I have placed before you. I
have shown in what points the three anthropoid
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apes establish the similarity; in what respectsthe races of mankind, and especially the Negro,
approach the ape-type, without, however,
completely reaching it. [126]
Vogt, and as we shall see--Darwin, thinks of the Negro
as a more instinctual, less reasoning animal than the
Caucasian. Vogt and Darwin also share a view of women as a
step in the direction of the animal, and who, along with
"savages," are bridges linking "man" (i.e. white male
Europeans) to his ape forebears. (By the way, the idea
that the female of a species could be less developed
in terms of evolution than the male, and inhabits a state
of development already passed through by the male is rather
odd. It would be interesting to know if Darwin allowed
this condition for any other species.)
Many evolutionists had attempted this bridge between
"man" and ape before and met opposition. Remember that
Owen had successfully beaten back Geoffroy, Bory and
Lamarck by debunking their appreciation of the proto-human
characteristics of chimps. Lyell too despised attempts to
create a scale of beings proved by "apes with foreheads
villainous low," and even evolutionists such as Tiedemann
dismissed claims of Black inferiority as mere prejudice
12 7attempting to justify slavery (1835).
Darwin's concept of women mirrors, develops and
complicates his concept of Natives. Darwin on women:
Man differs from woman in size, bodily strength,
hairiness, &c., as well as in mind, in the same
manner as do the two sexes of many mammals. So
the correspondence in general struct ure ... between
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man and the higher animals, especially the
anthropomorphous apes, is extremely close. [128]
And :
Woman seems to differ from man in mentaldisposition, chiefly in her greater tenderness
and less selfishness; and this holds good even
with savages ... Man is the rival of other men; hedelights m competition, and this leads to
ambition which passes too easily into
selfishness. These latter qualities seem to behis natural and unfortunate birthright. It isgenerally admitted that with woman the powers ofintuition, of rapid perception, and perhaps ofimagination, are more strongly marked than in
man, but some, at least, of these faculties are
characteristic of the lower races, and therefore
of a past and lower state of civilization.
The chief distinction in the intellectual
of the two sexes is shewn by man's attain
higher eminence, in whatever he takes up,
can woman... If two lists were made of the
eminent men and women in poetry, painting
sculpture, music science the two list
not bear comparison. [129]
powers
ing to a
than
most
r
s would
The above passages allow Darwin's ambivalence over the
status of moral qualities such as sympathy and altruism to
surface. Earlier it was shown that Darwin considered
sympathy the "noblest" aspect of civilization. One would
assume he thought of morals as the province of cerebral
males, and this elevation derives in part from the long
intellectual traditions of higher education, which excluded
women
.
Yet in the quotes above women are derided for
possessing sympa thy--accused of being more negroid and
animalistic, and selflessness is made out to be a nicety
that is all very well and good, but hardly the kind of
thing that drives civilization to greater heights. Darwin
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declares female selflessness to be an attribute of "lower
civilization" and he expresses sadness that men cannot
share that mode of being: the male's "unfortunate
birthright
.
"
Darwin s dilemma arises from the desire to retain
mainstream Victorian morality (in itself a complicated
thing) in its broadest outlines and yet adopt a radically
competitive and a-moral view of human nature. Neither one
satisfies him, yet he retains both by constantly juggling
his perspective as circumstances of the argument for
Natural Selection require.
Vogt shares an interest in several problems that
plagued Darwin. Vogt notes that the Neanderthal skull's
measurements do not fit the pattern expected
.
Cast Length* Width of
anterior lobes
Greatest
Width Height
Neander Skull 100 64.7 78.6 38.9
Australian 100 60.9 76.2 46
Apostle 100 61.1 70.5 35
*
Length taken as 100%, all other figures are
proportional
Figure 1 Vogt's Neanderthal Data
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's proportions seem
Quite simply the Neanderthal skull
"too high," for he "knows" that it was the housing of an
inferior mind:
I know not whether these measurements can be
considered as measures of the cerebral
deN/elopment for if this be the case, the Neander
skull would in every respect stand above those ofthe Australian and the Apostle skull... [131]
Luckily for Vogt, the relief on the inside Neanderthal
skull wall provided "evidence" that could be used to
invalidate the quantitative data which proved so
incorrigible
.
The characters of cerebral development, still
recognizable, thus indicate a very degraded human
race, approaching the simian type. [132]
Vogt expands on the importance of this mitigating
evidence
:
But whom did this primitive race of Europe
resemble most?--the Australian, the most
disgusting type of living savages! Poor Adam!
Poor Eve! [133]
While Vogt's gymnastics with "bad" data is ad hoc and,
shall we say, rather creative, it has its rationale. But
his problems do not end with large-brained Neanderthals.
The very basis of hierarchy based on brain size was
hopelessly flawed. While this seems obvious from a late
twentieth century vantage point it might be claimed that it
would be anachronistic to criticize Vogt in this way. But
we need not rely on twentieth century assumptions about
cerebral organization, for on the contrary, even Vogt
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understood that the theory of craniometries was seriously
compromised
.
Illustration 5: Portrait of Carl Vogt. Reproduction
of the frontispiece of Vie d 1 un Homme / Carl Vogt by
William Vogt.
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The remarkable thing is that Vogt, Broca, Darwin and
others knew the limitations of craniometries and yet they
plowed ahead. While it is now known through the sociology
of science that it is not uncommon or "unscientific" for
scientists to adopt ideas which are problematic or argue
for ideas which are unsupported but for which they hope to
get evidence, this practice of "floating" an idea requires
an admission of the state of things in order to be honest.
Both Vogt and Darwin express worries about the value of
craniometries, but because the theory and its data were so
useful they end up using craniometries as if it was beyond
dispute
.
Vogt presents a large mass of empirical evidence, but
this data is compromised by the fact that Vogt himself
admits his theory requires further evidence which in most
cases is unavailable. It would be one thing if these
inadequacies were dealt with when possible, but Vogt never
tries to fill in the gaps. He makes no attempt to rectify
his data, and neither does he offer an explanation, or even
an excuse, for this failure.
First, Vogt notes that cranial size, in and of itself,
can't be the absolute measure of intelligence:
Formerly, the opinion prevailed that man
possessed a brain absolutely heavier than that of
any other animal. This is true as regards most
animals; but intelligent colossals--such as the
elephant, and we may also add, the whale--soon
proved the axiom unfounded. If, it was then
said, it be not the absolute, it is the relative
weight. [134]
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But the concept of relative weight proved inadequate.
Whilst in the former case it was the giants, it
was now the dwarves of creation that upset the
axiom. The host of small song birds vary as
regards this proportion, within limits which far
exceed the normal proportion in the human race.
The small American monkeys, too, exhibit a
proportionally heavier brain than that of the
lord of creation. [135]
Vogt's final solution involved calculating the ratio
of brain size to vertebral column length as the solution to
this relational problem. But this idea proved troublesome
for while it might solve the inter-species comparison
difficulties it wreaks havoc with intra-species relations.
While these considerations are important and deserve more
attention, given below, the astonishing thing is that
nowhere in his book does Vogt use this ratio! He relies on
skull measurement data exclusively.
It is not as if Vogt was devoid of all desire to be
consistent and thorough for he is sensitive to other
technical and methodological problems of craniometry. He
realizes that the weighing of brains--despite its
quantitative aspect--is plagued by a high margin of
experimental error:
A difference of fifty grammes or more may easily
be caused by the way in which the brain is
prepared ... [ 136
]
Although in the end he claims that
"should on no account be neglected," he
brain weight data
acknowledges that
...privileged individuals may sometimes possess
lighter brains than others who are noways
distinguished from the common horde... [137]
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This admission is important, for with it he undercuts the
value of his weight data and shows why he switches to the
cubic capacity of skulls as a better measurement.
Going back to his chart (Figure 2) we note that the
difference between common and private grave skulls is on
average 81 cc and this swamps the 59 cc difference between
the 12th and 19th centuries for upper class skulls. This
information throws credibility for "progress" of skull size
into doubt when taken in the context of the doubts about
whether graves going back six hundred years could be
accurately classified by class.
More disturbing however, is Vogt's attempt to find a
theoretical justification for the ranking of intelligence
in terms of skull size through adjusting the volumetric
data by relativizing it to body size.
There also exists a certain proportion between
the size of the skull and that of the body...
Thus though giants have generally a larger skull
than dwarfs, it is proportionally smaller in the
former than in latter. [138]
So it looks as if dwarfs are on the whole more intelligent
than giants, and presumably "normal" people. Vogt even
applies this principle to the "Negro problem":
From long skulls of considerable size we may,
therefore, generally infer that their possessors
were tall, muscular men, and it is known that
among Negroes, who are characteristically
long-headed, we frequently meet with strikingly
athletic forms. [139]
The potential for abuse of this qualitative
observation is now obvious. Finding Negro skulls that are
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too big can be rendered a less problematic event because
their big skulls indicate big bodies, a lower
crania 1 /height ratio and hence a relatively lower intellect
than first suggested. And abuse does result. In passages
that follow the one above on Negroes Vogt claims that the
smallness of female skulls demonstrates the inferiority of
women. It is simply remarkable that he does not look to a
proportional measure that would factor out the obvious bias
built in by neglecting the fact that women are generally
smaller than men— a fact noted by most Victorians
(including Darwin, as above)
. Given this major
inconsistency, it is not surprising that he neglects to
correct for relative size in his comparison between races
or over time. The problem of time is acute and throws the
entire chart (Fig 2) into chaos. If, for instance,
medieval people were smaller than 19th century people, the
difference in skull size is meaningless until is is
corrected for this factor.
Even worse, Vogt acknowledges that diet and
environment influence physical health--and so influence the
chances of fulfilling one's physical potential:
There can be no doubt that the prosperous and
wealthy classes of human society are, on the
whole, physically finer and stronger than the
lower classes, who are much exposed to misery and
want. [140]
However it never occurs to him to question the validity of
his data due to the problem that the wealthy are
"physically finer" because they have access to better food,
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shelter and the amenities of life, rather than finer
because they have greater somatic potential.
Let us turn to Vogt's table of measurement s:^!
CRANIAL CAPACITY IN VARIOUS RACES
No . People No. of skulls
measured
Volume
(cc)
Observers Remarks
1 Australians
.
8 1228 . 27 Aitken Meigs.
2 Polynesians 1230 Morton
.
3 Hottentots
.
1230 II
4 II 3 1233.78 Aitken Meigs.
b Peruvians .
*
152 1233.78 II
6 1246 Morton
7 Oceanic Negroes. 2 1253.45 Aitken Meigs.
8 Mexicans
.
1296 Morton
.
9 Americans in General 341 1315.71 Aitken Meigs.
10 Negroes born in 12 1323 .90 II
America
.
11 Malays
.
1328 Morton
12 Mexicans 25 1338.65 Aitken Meigs.
13 Greenlander 1 1340 Welcker
.
14 Chinese
.
1345 Morton
15 Negroes in general. 76 1347.66 Aitken Meigs.
16 1361 Morton
17 Ancient Peruvians. 1361 II
18 Negroes born in Africa 64 1371.42 Aitken Meigs.
19 Wild Indians. 164 1376.71 II
20 Parisians, from a 35 1403.14 Broca. Skulls of
common grave. the 19th century.
21 Parisians from the 117 1409.31 Broca. Skulls of
Cimetiere des Innocents. 12th to 18th century
22 Esquimaux 1410 Morton
23 Parisians of the 12th 115 1425.98 Broca. From a vault
24 Caucasians in General 1 1427 Aitken Meigs.
25 Malays 1 1430 Welcker
26 Germans 30 1448 II
27 Parisians of the 19th 125 1461.53 Broca
.
28 Anglo-Americans
.
7 1474 . 65 Aitken Meigs.
29 Parisians from private 90 1484.23 Broca. Skulls of
graves the 19th century.
30 Parisians from La 17 1517 Broca. The same.
Morgue
31 Germans in general. 38 1534.127 Aitken Meigs.
32 Brachycepha le
,
from 1 1540 Broca. From a
Meudon Dolmen
.
33 English 5 1572.95 Aitken Meigs.
* [With artificially compressed skulls—EDITOR.]
Figure 2: Vogt's Craniometric Data
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As we have seen, Vogt attempts to solve the relational
problem by proposing that a ratio of brain size to height
would correct the data. Such a ratio would eliminate the
bias of the measurements for races or nationalities that
on average possess a larger stature. If we take some of
Vogt's own figures on the difference in height between
Caucasians and Negroes, and then correct the information of
the table with this ratio, we obtain surprising results.
But first, let’s look at the details of Vogt's explanation
of the height issue:
The Negro is on the average shorter than the
German... Six negro skeletons yielded as their
mean length 160 centimeters; whilst as many
European skeletons gave above 172 centimeters.
There are no doubt athletic forms occurring among
Negroes, and some tribes among the blacks, just
as among the whites, are distinguished by a high
stature; but even these exceptional ly tall
Negroes never reach the length of the tall tribes
among the Germans or Anglo-Saxon races... [142]
If we take the ratio to be 160/172 (Negro height/
European height) and put it to work on the data of Aitken
(Figure 2) for the average Caucasian: 1427 cm 3
,
we get the
projected average of 1327.4 cm 3 for Negroes who would have
an equal brain ratio ranking. We now have the expected
value for a race of equal braininess to Caucasians, given
the fact that the former is on the average shorter than
Caucasians. Aitken finds the average for Negroes to be
1347.66. Thus Vogt's table, when corrected in the manner
demanded by his own theoretical understanding of
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craniometries, yields the result that Negroes are on the
average brainier than Caucasians.
Illustration 6: Drawing of Carl Vogt. From Vie d 1 un
Homme / Carl Vogt , facing page 176.
It's true that Vogt questions the use of height, rather
than backbone length, because in
variable in human stature is leg
his opinion the main
length
.
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On adopting the whole length of the body, that of
the legs is included, and it is just the length
of the legs which exhibits the greatest
variations. The trunk of man varies much less,
and this offers a much more accurate standard.
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While it would be better for my purposes to show that
Vogt's data fails his prejudices when corrected for
backbone length, such a demonstration founders on Vogt's
own lack of data— information which he claims to be
essential. The next best thing is to correct for body
length, which Vogt provides but fails to utilize.
Although Darwin might be excused for not checking Vogt
in this way, he cannot be held faultless in his lack of
attention to the theoretical problems Vogt faced,
articulated clearly, and failed to meet. Clearly the need
fill 9 a P s in the theory of Natural Selection overpowered
concerns for consistency and thoroughness. Darwin's
citation of this table (Figure 2) as proof of a correlation
of skull size and intelligence must be understood as an
overdetermined scientific/ideological move.
The sources of Darwin's ambivalence are suppressed in
the Descent but the fact of his uneasiness is not:
...on the other hand, no one supposes that the
intellect of any two animals or of any two men
can be accurately gauged by the cubic contents of
their skulls. [144]
Worse yet, the "on the other hand" refers to his view that:
No one, I presume, doubts that the large
proportion which the size of man's brain bears to
his body, compared to the same proportion in the
gorilla or orang, is closely connected with his
higher mental powers. [145]
Darwin shows that he is on some level aware of the problem
that sent Vogt off in search of a relativizing criteria.
But Darwin fails to produce as sophisticated a failure as
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does Vogt. On the other hand, Darwin excels at
consideration of the "degeneration" problem. That he held
some sort of degeneration thesis along side a theory of
progress is clear from the passages cited earlier in which
he notes that the development of sympathy (a good thing)
results in the degeneration of civilized human stock
through tolerance of the continued survival of the poor,
criminals, and the sick.
It is a curious thing that the passage on
craniometries ends with Darwin giving evidence for the
degeneration of the cranial size of domesticated rabbits as
a contradiction to the thesis advanced by Lartet that the
brains of mammals have enlarged over time . 146 Darwin's
evidence on rabbits could be taken as an analogy for
civilized (domesticated) "man," though Darwin does not
overtly articulate it that way.
Furthermore, this curious and ad hoc passage about
rabbits points to another inconsistency in Darwin's
position towards "savages." That is, he attributes greater
selective forces to "natural life" as opposed to domestic
or "civilized" life, both in the case of rabbits, and in
"man." Thus one would think that non-Europeans, being
"closer to nature" and so under greater selective pressure,
would evolve more quickly than their European counterparts.
Thus his claim, cited earlier, that savages must have been
under less selective pressure, is complicated or perhaps
even compromised by other positions he holds.
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In particular, by suggesting (as we have seen) that
sympathy goes beyond the domain of reason, Darwin opens up
the possibility of there being other spiritual or moral
qualities that would supersede biological considerations.
While such a move would be welcomed by Darwin's critics,
such as Wallace and George Eliot, and could accord with
various conservative or left-wing religious scruples of the
times, it simply doesn't fit with the major themes of
Darwin's theory.
Darwin admits it is hard to make any kind of argument
about the mental life of animals:
It would be very difficult for any one with even
much more knowledge than I possess, to determine
how far animals exhibit any traces of these high
mental powers. This difficulty arises from the
impossibility of judging what passes through the
mind of an animal... [147]
Yet he is willing to create a chasm between animals and
"man" on the basis of the unique quality of
self-consciousness: "It may be freely admitted that no
I/O
animal is self-conscious..." Language too, separates
"man" from beast: "The habitual use of articulate language
14 9is, however, peculiar to man..."
There are two main considerations here. First,
Darwin's materialism forces all aspects of human behavior
into the domain of inheritable characteristics and,
therefore. Natural Selection. He did not have the concept
of recessive or linked traits available to him. Thus his
pains to show that morality, like tool use, is not an
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accidental quality, or one that would distinguish animal
from human, but rather ethical activity is a behavioral
device which confers selective advantage. It is suggested
that the advantage is for the group although Darwin in
other places attempts to keep all descriptions of advantage
located at the individual level.
However he is ambivalent about the value of sympathy.
Part of the problem with the theory of Natural Selection is
that it robbed glory from "man's" best achievements.
Somehow value needed to be pumped back into human activity.
Paxton writes:
...the old problem was exactly reversed. No
longer was man attempting to explain his
bestiality in the face of his divine nature; he
had to define and assert his humanness in the
fact of his demonstrated participation in the
bestial nature. [150]
Darwin speaks to values: sympathy is what makes humans
"noble." Yet we noted how he suggests that moral values
are primarily female, negroid and uncivilized. Nor was
this conflict unique to Darwin, Spencer shared it:
...by recognizing the social benefits of the
sympathy nurtured in the family, Spencer came
perilously close to identifying women rather than
men with the forces of "moral"--as opposed to
material
—
progress. For a moment then, in his
analysis of the forces shaping human evolution,
Spencer seemed to confirm Eliot's view that women
have "an art which does mend nature" and so
contribute more to the moral evolution of the
race than men do. [151]
Notice how Spencer can be understood to suffer from the
supercession of morality too: "mend" nature, to put it in
Eliot's vocabulary. Darwin's attempt to undercut the value
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of morality can be seen as damage control for the problem
that women were getting too much credit for human
evolution. Spencer was stuck with this too.
By this concession [that women contribute to
moral evolution]
, Spencer undermined all his
arguments that sought to confine women to the
domestic sphere, for their liberation from it
would clearly help to advance the moral progress
of society as a whole. [152]
Both Darwin and Spencer use a claim for the
craniometric and competitive superiority of men to try to
contain the argument from unfolding. 153
Spencer could only defend the traditional
separation of men's and women's spheres, then, by
an appeal to the authority of natural law, which
ensured that men were intellectually superior to
women. He concludes by begging the question:
"The human race, though a gregarious race, has
ever been," and "still is a predatory race."
For Darwin ambivalence enters not just because "noblest"
status is stolen from men by a wrinkle in Victorian morals,
but also because sympathy--a 1 though perhaps devalued by
being mechanically biologica l--by removing vast segments of
the human population from the rigors of Natural Selection
brings up the artificial nature of human social
arrangements. Whereas animal strategies based on sympathy
are easily seen as selected, human ability to alter and
discuss strategies raises issues about continuity.
On the one hand Darwin assumes there is a selective
advantage for
extermination
morals, noble
sympathy and it overpowers suggestions for
of the poor. But he does not want to allow
though they be, to define the change of
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society as progress despite the fact that in other contexts
he does so define it. From this perspective Darwin speaks
of the degeneration that results from sympathetic treatment
of the poor and refrains from speaking of Natives in
similar contexts.
Another aspect of Darwin's ambivalence over morals
results from his attempts to avoid new, or emergent,
qualities and to shun consideration of Natural Selection at
the level of groups. His materialism pushes thought and
consciousness towards the atomic level, despite his
reservations. Analogously he waffles over similarity
between sexual selection in savages and animals:
When... it is said that the lower animals have a
sense of beauty, it must not be supposed that
such sense is comparable with that of a
cultivated man, with his multiform and complex
associated ideas. A more just comparison would
be between the taste for the beautiful in
animals, and the lowest savages, who admire and
deck themselves with any brilliant, glittering,
or curious object. [154]
On the one hand Victorian aesthetics are seen as a pinnacle
from which all other appreciations of beauty pale. On the
other, human and animal senses must be different in terms
of quantity only. Therefore savages provide a useful cusp,
linking the animal to the human.
There are points at which he interrupts the continuity
of reason, for instance by separating reason from
instincts. Desmond writes:
A second point emerges from Richards' work:
Brougham's Dissertations convinced Darwin that
some instincts (like that of a wasp sealing a
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grub into its egg cell as future food for the
l^tva) could not possibly have developed from an
intelligent habit. In other words Brougham moved
Darwin away from older sensationalist notions.
Darwin was forced to use natural selection to
explain instinctive acts—to search for evidence
that instincts (like organs) vary slightly,
giving selection something to work on. So Darwin
appears in an ultra-Broughamite tradition, rather
than a radical ideologue one. [155]
If this chasm between higher reasoning animals and
lower instinctual ones is emphasized, the opening is made
for more sympathy- 1 ike events: the emergence of
qualitatively new characteristics which interrupt Natural
Selection. This split in qualities is materialist because
it depends upon a material base and organization of that
base, but it strains Darwin's continuity thesis and raises
problems for craniometries and the necessity of race war.
Another source of ambivalence over the status of
morals resides in the problem of where to locate selection:
at the level of individuals or groups. Consider two
societies, A and B. If A eliminates the the poor, in order
to preserve genetic fitness, it will look quite different
from a society, B, which because of sympathy, allows the
poor to propagate. These two alternatives can be
schematized as follows:
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This figure emphasizes that the term "fit" is relative
to a level of selective pressure, and to a niche. Thus in
society A the wealthy (*) are fit, while in B some of the
poor (0) are fit, as well. We can view A and B as
different strategies: in modern terms perhaps something
like pure-trait vs mixed-trait strategies.
If we give priority to Darwin's non-teleologica 1 view
of Natural Selection over his teleological version, it is
not necessary that strategy A turns out to be a priori
better, unless Darwin can prove that nature selects A over
B. In fact, the very "problem" of the high reproductive
rate among the poor and corresponding low rate among the
wealthy classes would point out that the "natural" strategy
is B, whether it be "degenerate" in terms of human
evaluations or not.
The key to understanding Darwin's problem here is that
by definition "unnatural" should be an oxymoron if natural
selection is ubiquitous. If sympathy is thought of as a
characteristic selected by evolutionary forces, it remains
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subject to selective pressure. In this case "noblest" and
"highest" have little meaning—other than some sort of
extraneous approval that evolution has selected a
particular characteristic. Thus synthetic or civilized
life is just as "natural" as nature, in that what has
survival value remains and what does not tends to
disappear
.
But Darwin wants to say that just because nature has
selected society B does not mean that this is best. He
wants to say that A would be better--on evolutionary terms,
he implies that man can decide to change the way things are by
(political) will and so alter the course of evolution for
the better. In this sense society B is unnatural or
removed from nature, and "degenerate," even though it is
human will that changes what is to what ought to be.
The appraisal of society A as better, however, in one
sense cannot be said as it is the unsayable in Darwinian
terms--it is merely the urging of "hard reason." Muteness
results because the claim for the greater value of A rests
on a normative claim for which Natural Selection has no
use--as proven by the presence of "degeneration" itself.
Darwin is caught within the competing demands of two lines
of thought, mutually exclusive, each of which contains
elements he does not wish to surrender. Thus his
ambivalence towards nature, man's place in nature, and the
power of understanding to shape the world, manifests
itself
.
Ill
His "hard reason" is not as decisive as he would wish,
for unless future biological constraints place A at a
competitive advantage over B for the same niche, there is
no reason to refer to B as less fit than A, or a degenerate
form of A. In fact, he rules out the case that A is more
fit than B, by asserting the survival advantages of
sympathy (morality)
:
...none of the differences between the races of
man are of any direct or special service to him.
The intellectual and moral or social faculties
must of course be excepted from this remark. [156]
Here we have seen a case in which social and race bias
comes into conflict with moral scruples. He attempts a
synthesis of these views, but ends up with a confused
doctrine
.
Furthermore, since the poor reproduce at a greater
rate, according to Darwin, fitness, as defined by the
ability to leave reproducing progeny, seems to reside with
the poor, rather than the rich. If this idea is pushed to
its conclusion, Darwin should be arguing that the
"degeneration" of the upper classes is an evolutionary
shift to a more optimal composition. Darwin wants to make
claims for the advantages of intelligence and ethical
behavior (of the managerial class) over sheer reproductive
force (of the poor) , but this is a tricky business because
it involves social factors such as a low birth rate driven
by conscious choice and the use of birth control--topics he
was loathe to discuss (as we shall see later).
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Spencer ran into similar problems. He resorted to a
doctrine that races tend to advance and decline in an
analogous way to the birth, youth, maturity and decline of
an individual, in order to explain degeneration. But he
also wanted to claim that the human mind and nature fit
together in such a way that over time progress and harmony
are produced.
...there is a gradual harmony between man's
mental nature and the conditions of his
existence. After finding that from it are
deducible the various characteristics of
evolution, we finally draw from it a warrant for
the belief, that evolution can end only in the
establishment of the greatest perfection and the
most complete happiness. [158]
While Darwin does not see evolution ending and is ambivalent
about progress (noblest but degenerate)
,
he does share
the concept of harmony of mind--or reason, and nature. For
example, intelligence is equal to evolutionary power. But
when he considers degeneration and the status of women
Darwin finds disharmony between reason and reality.
To make matters more complicated, the main thrust of
the Descent : sexual selection, can be understood as a third
element in the ambivalence between nature and the
artificial. Consider the fact that in sexual selection,
the competitor is not killed, but is deprived of progeny:
[Sexual selection] depends, not on a struggle for
existence, but on a struggle between the males
for possession of the females; the result is not
death to the unsuccessful competitor, but few or
no offspring. [159]
The advantages of this idea are obvious; it allows for the
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selection of traits inconsequential or even harmful to
survival (e.g. bright plumage), which the theory of Natural
Selection up to this conceptual point prohibits. Recently
there has been a surge of studies documenting the
mechanisms and strategies various species adopt in sexual
selection. However sexual politics finds ready access to
Darwin s formulation, especially when applied to humans, as
we shall see in the next chapter. Hints of what is to come
can be seen in his nervousness over the lack of selective
advantage for sexually selected traits. In this vein he
reintroduces fitness, and tilts the agency of choice back
to the male.
There can also be no doubt that the most
vigorous, best nourished and earliest breeders
would on average succeed in rearing the largest
number of of f spring .. .But in very many cases the
males which conquer their rivals, do not obtain
possession of the females, independently of the
choice of the latter... it is obviously probable
that they [females] would at the same time prefer
the most vigorous and lively males. [160]
While male power is discounted initially— "do not
obtain possession"— it is reintroduced through preference
for vigor. Recent studies tend to disconnect vigor from
female choice in favor of a maximization of the trait for
which females select. In a recent study of swordtail fish
by Alexandra Basolo females selected a males of a different
species which had a tail surgically implanted--indicat ing
"females were basing their choice on sword preference and
not on other traits." 161 While Darwin must be credited for
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bringing female choice to the fore, his version is imbued
with the social context.
In relation to colonialism, the doctrine of sympathy
undercuts his view that genocidal colonization is an
inevitable result of survival of the fittest. That is, by
allowing Natural Selection to include, or even be
superseded, by culture or morality, Darwin allows the
possibility that any cultural aspect—be it treaties or
religion—may interrupt colonial expansion.
Once political decisions allow for the maintenance of
disadvantageous traits, the choice as to which traits are
allowed to survive is removed from the biological realm and
placed in the political arena (assuming equal social
selective advantage for a group of options) . Two problems
occur here. The first is practical and methodological.
There was no method for determining selective advantage of
anything so complex as human society. No one was in a
position to claim they had sufficient understanding of
nature or society to predict survival power of various
contemporary social and political arrangements and
possibilities. Appeal to the "degeneration" of stock in
terms of cranial capacity means little if the nation is
successful or the group characteristics overwhelm
individual traits.
Furthermore, on a practical level, no one could claim
to be able to convince a political system, such as the
government of Great Britain (remember Darwin's quip about
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consanguineous marriages)
,
that biologists should be given
control of social policy. Darwin's ambivalence depends
upon the clash of reductive materialism and Victorian
morals
.
Farrington senses the conflict in Darwin:
This is sad stuff. Patriots do not necessarily
beget patriots. There is no gene for virtue.
Moral progress is not achieved in this mindless
way. Nor did Darwin really think so. But he had
no philosophy which could provide him with any
other reasonable account of the true nature of
the mental world. After all, he had been
satisfied, and more than satisfied, with his bold
speculation that "thought is a secretion of the
brain." [162]
Darwin's radical reductive materialism demanded a
causal chain from atoms to culture. This made culture--in
toto— an adaptation subject to Natural Selection. He was
therefore encouraged to think of race warfare and the
colonial process as an inevitable result of biology.
Craniometries plus cultural chauvinism and an equation of
complexity and progress, and an anthropology proclaiming
Natives as simpler and "living fossils" all depended upon a
reductive materialism which allowed and encouraged Darwin
to embrace a scientific racism.
D. Scientific Origins of Scientific Racism
Clearly Darwin embraced
justified this point of view
a racist ideology
with contemporary
and he
racist
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science, such as Vogt's and Broca's craniometries, as well
creating it anew in his own work. Although Darwin was a
racist to begin with— as his Journal shows, and may have
used the work of the craniometers or other scientists to
justify his prejudice, his views were also in part
generated by his metaphysical assumptions and required by
his biological theory, due to its gaps. We turn now to a
consideration of the biggest lacuna his theory faced.
The main problem confronting the early evolutionists
was to show that not only was transmutation possible, but
that it had occurred. One possible strategy would be to
show that there was no fundamental distinction between one
species and the next, so that a ladder of development
(descent, or change) could be established. The traditional
"Great Chain of Being" theory aimed at providing a
different kind of structure, for it needed to explain a
hierarchy of organisms from the simplest to the most
complex: God. Thus it provided a perfectly "dense"
ordering of a non-deve lopmenta 1 ladder--for the chain had
to express God's maximization of creativity and so it
assumed a static hierarchy of fundamentally different
orders. But scientific discoveries in biology such as
comparative anatomy (see Desmond on Grant) were reducing
the distinctness of each species and the next.
Indeed Haeckel made important contributions to filling
the interstices of the biological catalogue. Haeckel knew
the value of this data for convincing others that Natural
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Selection was possible. Thus Haeckel sought a bridge
between differentiated unicellular organisms and dead
matter. He found this transitional entity in the "monera,"
a unicellular organism that had no nucleus or organs. 163
To his utter joy, Haeckel could point to the
radiolaria (his area of undisputed expertise) as an example
of transitional organisms. Even more fortuitous was the
fact that these organisms build a silicon shell. This,
according to Haeckel, showed them to be on the edge of the
organic world, just one step away from the inorganic. 164
Although it was merely insufficient technology that
prevented Haeckel from noticing the nuclei of radiolar ians
,
the concept that Haeckel and Darwin wanted instantiated is
now fleshed out by the virus.
Darwin lacked expertise in this area and took another
route that was to have serious implications for social and
political aspects of his theory. He adopted the more
direct and perhaps controversial strategy of producing
evidence of an evolutionary link between man and some
"lower" creature or previous form. The fossil record was,
for all practical purposes, of no use in this regard. The
Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon discoveries were baffling: they
seemingly presented creatures with greater-sized brains
than some nineteenth-century peoples, and in the case of
the Neanderthals, "non-human" attributes (heavy brow ridge,
large jaw) as well. Thus it was easy for others to argue
that the Neanderthals were diseased or not human at all,
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and that the Cro-Magnons, who were very similar in terms of
bone structure to contemporary people
' s—were proof that
evolution didn't happen at all. Also, the age of these
remains was grossly misunderstood:
Even the best practicing archeologists werelumping strata belonging to fifty thousand yearsinto single "ages" without any real awareness ofthe immense amounts of time involved. [ 166 ]
Most scientists of Darwin's era thought in terms of
Biblical time, attributing the fossil finds to the
diluvial period: the Great Flood. The more accurate
placement of these fossils in time, in terms of the two
year span of their existence did not occur "until
well into the twentieth century.
Given the lack of fossil evidence, Darwin had little
choice but to turn to anthropology. Here he could point to
"savages" as living representatives of prehistoric man.
However his problems were only beginning for he found
himself caught between two divergent needs—within the
"savage paradox," as it were.
On the one hand, he needed to place as much distance
as possible between civilized man and the "savage." The
mainstream views of "man's" place in nature and religious
views on the God-given nature of the human soul carved out
a unique order for humans, one that tended to unify
humanity and make it distinct from all other organisms.
Here Darwin's talk of morality as the "highest" result of
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evolution
,
distance
.
man's" noblest quality, served to create
On the other hand, in order to forge a link between man
and beast, the lowest man must be clearly beast. For as
long as the "savage" was clearly human, the old hierarchy
of creationism stood steady and evolution discredited at
this crucial intersection.
But Darwin could not go too far, for success in
showing the savage to be animal could be problematic too.
Darwin needed to show continuity with "savages" so they did
not get written off as beasts but were clearly understood
to be men." This problem had already happened in the case
of the Neanderthals. Brace and Montague write:
...the Neanderthal remains, while of unknown
date, were clearly different from modern man and
the differences had been declared to be due to
pathology by the greatest living pathologist and
one of the founders of German anthropology...
[The] Neanderthal ... [was] not regarded as a
representative of a former stage of evolution and
[was]... not regarded as a precursor of modern
man. [168]
Thus Darwin's scientific construction demanded an
understanding of humans that is racist at its core: he
required the savage races to be something on the cusp of
humanity. No allowance for limiting the differences
between cultures to differences of culture could be
considered. This also accords with the materialist thesis.
But it does contradict, as has been pointed out above, the
Darwinian positions that culture can be post-evolutionary
and that survival of the fittest is not a doctrine of
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progress which entails increased differentiation (assuming,
as he did, that the "savages" are less dif f erent iated-i
. e
.
less developed in culture, and so also more primitive in
brain physiology)
.
Although Darwin does not address these issues head-on,
he does display an ambivalent doctrine concerning the
status of the "savage." It is this ambivalence that betrays
his conflicted ideological and scientific concerns.
Darwin writes: 169
The Fuegians rank amongst the lowest barbarians;
but I was continually struck with surprise how
closely the three natives on board H.M.S.
"Beagle," who had lived some years in England,
and could talk a little English, resembled us in
disposition and in most of our mental faculties.
Furthermore, we should note that Darwin was sincere in his
empathy for "savages":
The remembrance of screams [he] heard in
Brazil, when he was powerless to interfere with
what he believed to be the torture of a slave,
haunted him for years, especially at night. [170]
In his journal of the Beagle's travels he says:
While staying at his estate [in Rio de Janeiro],
I was very nearly being an eye-witness to one of
those atrocious acts which can only take place in
a slave country. Owing to a quarrel and a
law-suit, the owner was on the point of taking
all the women and children from the male slaves,
and selling them separately ... I do not believe
the inhumanity of separating thirty
families .. .even occurred to the owner. [171]
He also offers the hope that slavery be abolished. But in
the same book he betrays his hope with another comment on
the nature of common men:
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Yet I will pledge myself, that ingood feeling he [the slave owner]
the common run of men. [172]
humanity and
was superior to
Yet his scientific need for
between the human and the animal
a close resemblance
is clear to himself:
If no organic being excepting man had possessed
any mental power, or if his powers had been of a
wholly different nature from those of the lower
animals, then we should never have been able to
convince ourselves that our high faculties hadbeen gradually developed. [173]
It is the "savage" who provides crucial evidence for
evolutionary theory. Darwin requires small jumps between
every level of species, a density like that of the Great
Chain—but for different reasons. The jump from ape to man
is of course the most important.
We must also admit that there is a much wider
interval in mental power between one of the
lowest fishes, as a lamprey or lancelet, and one
of the higher apes, than between an ape and man;
yet this interval is filled up by numberless
gradations. [174]
Here the homogenization of thought processes implies a
difference only of degree. This idea is made more specific
in relation to race relations:
Differences between the highest men of the
highest races and the lowest savages, are
connected by the finest gradations. Therefore it
is possible that they might pass and be developed
into each other. [175]
Yet here the theme of difference is stressed, even in
the same breath uttering sameness. The concepts of
. "passing into" or "development" are ambiguous as to whether
the gradations lead to change of degree only or of kind.
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It is clear from the context that the overt claim is for
degree only.
But however much continuity the savage provides,
Darwin also wants to emphasize the gap between savage and
civilized man:
Nor is the difference slight in moral dispositionbetween a barbarian, such as the man described bythe old navigator Byron, who dashed his child onthe rocks for dropping a basket of sea-urchins,
and a Howard or a Clarkson; and in intellect,between a savage who uses hardly any abstract
terms, and a Newton or Shakespeare. [176]
Here the use of abstract terms is all but a difference in
kind. The implication of the savage/Newton comparison is
that the gap is real, insurmountable, and has a moral
dimension as well as an intellectual basis.
The moral difference proves to be an important one for
it separates the human distinctively from the animal
A moral being is one who is capable of reflecting
on his past actions and mot ives . . . and the fact
that man is the one being who certainly deserves
this designation is the greatest of all
distinctions between him and the lower animals.
Darwin is in trouble here of making humans unique, but one
must remember that consciousness goes right down to the
level of atoms. One moment he speaks of "the finest
gradations," the next he talks in terms of vast divides.
Again
:
The variability or diversity of the mental
faculties in men of the same race, not to mention
the greater differences between men of distinct
races, is so notorious that not a word need here
be said. [178]
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His racial ideas were not new with the Origin or the
Descent, but are recycled from his earliest work, such as
the Journal ; "savages" are
...like wild beasts .. .We can hardly put ourselvesin the position of these savages, and understandtheir actions. [179]
Also
:
One s mind hurries back over past centuries, andthen asks, could our progenitors have been menlike these?-- men, whose very signs and
expressions are less intelligible to us than
those of the domesticated animals; men, who do
not possess the instinct of those animals, nor
yet appear to boast of human reason, or at least
of arts consequent on that reason. I do not
believe it is possible to describe or paint the
difference between savage and civilized man. It
is the difference between a wild and a tame
animal
. .
.
[180]
Darwin gets a little carried away in order to prove
his point. "Less inte 1 1 igible ... than ... domest ica ted
animals is certainly aimed at placing the savage in the
animal kingdom by assigning the Native to a place even more
animalistic than animals themselves. Note also the
distinction between the "wild" and the "tame," which
further isolates the savage as animal (natural) as opposed
to the human (artificial).
When he is not overstating his case Darwin uses the
standard examples of tool use and language to separate man
from the animals:
Man in the rudest state in which he now exists is
the most dominant animal that has ever appeared
on this earth... He manifestly owes this immense
superiority to his intellectual faculties...
social habits... and corporeal structure...
Through his powers of intellect, articulate
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language has been evolved; and on this his
wonderful advancement has mainly depended ... Hehas invented and is able to use various weapons,
tools [181]
Darwin's ambiguous feelings towards savages surface again
and again. The savage invents humanity, yet cannot be too
human lest he or she command too much respect. One way to
keep the savage at arm's length is to treat the
contemporary indigenous people as relics of the past, or
living fossils.
In the Journa
1
he refers to some of the Indians'
languages as "scarcely ... [deserving] to be called
18 2articulate." Also, he saw many of their abilities
terms of animal instincts versus human reason: "Their
in some respects may be compared to the instincts of
animals, for it is not improved by experience."'*'^
The concept of a species or in this case a variation
of a species as a relict or living fossil carries useful
overtones of validation for domination.
Darwin pointed out a consistency about relic
species of the sort we call living fossils: They
generally have a very limited geographical
distributions. Relict species are generally
thought to be at a competitive disadvantage with
respect to more advanced forms and manage to
survive only by retreating to some isolated
environment where some special circumstance
allows them to hang on. Therefore, in principle
one would not expect a "relic" species like
Lat imeria cha lumnae to have a broad geographical
distribution. (In this case, for an oceanic
fish, what do you call broad--hundreds of miles,
or thousands?) [184]
As Keith S. Thomson makes clear in the above quote,
the concept of a living fossil combines a lack of
in
skill
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evolutionary change (stability of form) combined with a
competitive disadvantage (or more specialized niche) vis a
vis "more evolved" forms. Darwin is developing the idea
that Natives are only living during his time because they
have been isolated from Europeans up to that point. The
fact that Natives possessed a huge geographical
distribution is seen not in terms of evolutionary success
but rather as a happy accident for the Native up to this
t ime
.
What is missing from Thomson's interpretation is that
the Coe lacant h ( let imer ia cha luninae ) is a complicated,
highly developed animal—even if it is unchanged, for the
most part, over the last seventy million years (as far as
we can tell)
.
The Coelacanth has a longevity few creatures
can equal. Perhaps restriction of range may present a good
strategy for long term survival.
This desire to place present savages far above and yet
cheek to cheek with advanced apes creates a disturbing
tension within Darwin's work. Racist ideology, reductive
materialism, hierarchical development, and lack of fossil
evidence created a need for savages to be as low as
possible on the developmental and competitive scale, while
the facts of human activities and the bias of human
chauvinism pushed in the other direction. Critics of
Darwin wanted to emphasize the discontinuity of man with
the "lower" primates. For instance, the continuity thesis
received criticism from Darwin's contemporaries, especially
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St. George Mivart:
Thirdly, in addition to the argument that bruteshave not intellect because their actions can be
accounted for without the exercise of thatfaculty, we have other and positive arguments in
opposition to Mr. Darwin's view of their mentalpowers. [ 185 ]
It is easy to see that Darwin, even if already already
predisposed to radical materialism, was forced for
strategic reasons to embrace it absolutely in this context.
Continuity in Natural Selection has several
components. First, there is density: change is said to
proceed by small incremental changes to what already
exists. Related to density is pace: change proceeds at a
more or less even and slow speed. Lastly, there is no
emergence of unique qualities, so that any particular
quality can be traced back in terms of quantity.
The legitimacy of Darwin's dependence upon the
continuity thesis has been taken for granted up to recent
times due to a lack of alternatives, but this situation has
changed. While standard Darwinian and Neo-Darwinian
evolutionary theory has retained the view that change
occurs slowly and evenly, at least from a geologic
perspective, Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould have
proposed the theory of "Punctuated Equilibria." On this
new and controversial view change concentrated during
periods of speciation and then slows to a point where the
species could be said to be stable—and the slow and more
Darwinian evolution occurs. Such a view harmonizes
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with gaps in the fossil record 186 but flies in the face of
the historical battle with catast rophisni
.
Density, pace and emergence are enmeshed. Darwin
sensed this in that he pioneered the idea that much of
evolution is accidental in that sense that attributes
developed for one need may switch functions and take the
organism in another direction of development. Emergence
might be construed as the rapid or instantaneous coming
into being of an entirely new trait. In other words the
switch in function, if rapid and extensive enough, may
constitute emergence. The key is a lack of a causal chain
from the old to the new when the new is not a guantitative
change but a qualitative one. Gould makes this argument
for the emergence of human language : 187
I can't prove that language was not the selected
basis of increasing brain size, but the
universals of language are so different from
anything else in nature, so quirky in structure,
that origin as a side consequence of the brain's
enhanced capacity, rather than as simple advance
in continuity from ancestral grunts and gestures,
seems indicated. (I lay no claim to originality
for this argument about language. The reasoning
follows directly as an evolutionary reading for
Noam Chomsky's theory of universal grammar.)
Darwin denies emergence but his insight into function
switching is perilously close to emergence, saved perhaps
only by strict adherence to the principles of slow and
quantitative change.
Given the new view of the fossil record even if one
rejects emergence Darwin's position stands out in relief as
only one strategy among many. Wallace's view of
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discontinuity may boil down to disagreement over how to
interpret the accidental in evolution, and his appeal to
other-worldly forces an attempt to motivate a view more in
harmony with religious metaphysical views.
Another way to motivate Wallace's view of the
uniqueness of humans would be to emphasize the magnitude of
change made possible by relatively small somatic
alterations. Such changes during a period of rapid
speciation (Punctuated Equilibria) could be interpreted as
emergent. In terms of the geologic record one could then
say some gaps demonstrate a "break." But to return to the
Victorian context, T.H. Huxley also made an absolute
distinction between "man" and beast. He even argued that
there was no living "missing link" between the two:
...in present creation. . .no intermediate link
bridges over the gap between Homo and
Troglodytes
. [188]
Huxley speaks of the "chasm" separating the two, even if he
agrees that it is some, perhaps small, structural
difference that generates this split:
The argument, that because there is an immense
difference between a Man's intelligence and an
Apes's, therefore, there must be an equally
immense difference between their brains, appears
to me to be as well based as the reasoning by
which one should endeavour to prove that, because
there is a "great gulf" between a watch that
keeps accurate time and another that will not go
at all, there is therefore a great structural
hiatus between the two... A hair in the balance-
wheel, a little rust on the pinion, a bend in a
tooth of the escapement, a little something so
slight that only the practiced eye of the
watchmaker can discover it, may be the source of
all the difference. [189]
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These comments are especially interesting as they come in
the context of a discussion of craniometries. While
rehearsing the arguments Darwin will use concerning the
wide differences of cubic capacity in "man," Huxley sticks
to the point of "man's" uniqueness. He finds
...the minds of men being everywhere similar,
^iff^ting in quality and quantity but not in kind
of faculty ... [ 190
]
In this context, given Huxley's emphasis on speech as one
of the distinguishing characteristics of "man" it is in
direct opposition to Darwin's claims for "barely
articulate" savages that he writes:
But, even admitting the that differences may
obtain among the various races of men, to this
extent, I do not think that there is any good
ground for the supposition that an infant of any
race would be unable to learn, and use with ease,
the language of any other race of men among whom
it might be brought up. [191]
This difference between Darwin on the one hand and Huxley
and Wallace on the other is an important distinction, for
it shows that Victorian biology was not monolithic.
Darwin's ambivalence to the continuity thesis is
evident in his passages purporting to show the closeness of
ape to savage:
...as soon as the progenitors of man became
social (and this probably occurred at a very
early period)
,
the principle of imitation, and
reason, and experience would have increased, and
much modified the intellectual powers in a way,
of which we see only traces in the lower animals.
Apes are much given to imitation, as are the
lowest savages; and the simple fact... that after
a time no animal can be caught in the same place
by the same sort of trap, shows that animals
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learn by experience, and imitate the caution ofothers. Now, if some one man in a tribe... [192]
We see Darwin starting out with the premise that
socialization sets humans apart from the beasts. However,
he quickly shifts modes and attempts to retract the
separateness by an eliding movement between apes and
savages who hold the 'same 1 (similar?) powers of imitation
and utilization of experience. Next he suggests, through
direct juxtaposition, that the invention of snares and
weapons by "some one man in a tribe" is on the same order
of intellectual activity as the ape's imitation mode. This
positioning of the "savage" relies on a suppression of the
great differences between Native cultures and the
activities of other primates.
Despite the claim that the scale of human development
leads to an apex which the English owning-classes inhabit,
Darwin is aware that the accidental or historical nature of
evolution (see Gould) detracts from the inevitability of
any one historical construct. Thus while Darwin affirms
that the English morality is the "noblest" development of
evolution to date, he also realizes that given his
definition of fitness in terms of survival power--progress
and evolution become decoupled--with the result that
English morality need not be the only evolutionary
successful variant:
I do not wish to maintain that any strictly
social animal, if its intellectual faculties were
to become as active and highly developed as in
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man, would acquire exactly the same moral sense
as ours. [193]
This view harmonizes with his idea that greater
differentiation is not a uniform result of evolution, and
that many different social strategies could be considered
rational or advantageous from a selective standpoint.
However, for Darwin there is the troublesome specter of
cultural relativism or diversity lurking in this doctrine.
Darwin did not appear to fret over such relativism, but
once the relativist thesis asserts itself, more pressure is
put on racist anthropology. This would also point
questions at craniometries and even the reductive
materialist thesis.
The doctrine of accidental history also impacts on
Darwin's ambivalent feelings for the place of rationality
within science. Darwin's discomfort with his radical
reductive-materialism is evident by his desire to place the
moral faculty of sympathy both inside and outside Natural
Selection
.
By now it is obvious that Darwin used racist ideas to
further his theory of Natural Selection and he used
evolution to explain domination of Natives. I am not the
first to note Darwin's racism. Gould and Oldroyd make note
of it; Oldroyd;
Darwin, we may suppose, would have utterly
repudiated the racism of Hitler, yet even Darwin
occasionally put forth a remark that gives some
indication of racist tendencies... [194]
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Gould downplays Darwi n's racism and sexism by arguing,
(1) Virtually no white male of that era ... doubted the
superiority of his race," and (2) Darwin treated
individuals in a decent way. 195 Most commentators miss the
boat entirely— for example, Farrington says:
nothing could be less in keeping with Darwin's
personal character than racial antipathy, racial
enslavement of weaker peoples, or extermination
of those judged by butchers to be less fit. [196]
John Greene goes further than most in exposing
Darwin's prejudices and like Gould dismisses the idea that
Darwin can be held responsible because these biases were
shared with his contemporaries who wrote on social matters
and science. The passage from Greene found in Darwin's
letters to William Graham in 1881 used at the beginning of
this chapter deserves restating.
I could show fight on natural selection having
done and doing more for the progress of
civilization than you seem inclined to admit.
Remember what risk the nations of Europe ran, not
so many centuries ago, of being overwhelmed by
the Turks, and how ridiculous such an idea now
is! The more civilized so-called Caucasian races
have beaten the Turkish hollow in the struggle
for existence. Looking to the world at no very
distant date, what an endless number of lower
races will have to be eliminated by higher
civilized races throughout the world. [197]
Following this quote Greene comments in the following
way
:
This view of history would find few supporters
today, but we should not therefore rush to brand
Darwin a "racist" or dismiss him as a bourgeois
exponent of British imperialism. If, as it seems
clear, he shared the belief of most of this
contemporaries in the existence of racial
differences in intellectual ability and moral
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disposition, he did so because he thought the
evidence seemed to require it, and he qualified
1S etatements in cases where the evidence seemed
contradictory, as in the case of the moraldifferences "believed to exist" between human
races... [198]
Greene believes that Darwin presents a case of
good-faith imperialism/racism. However "good intentions"
do not separate Darwin from other Social Darwinists. Also,
Greene fails to note that Darwin's reliance on racist
science, such as Craniometries, was flawed. Furthermore
Darwin was especially prone to accept racist sciences
because they mesh with his metaphysics and Malthusian
assumptions, as well as fill gulfs in theory and evidence.
Apologists for Darwin miss the point that many of
Darwin's contemporaries despised racism. in the next
chapter Wallace's views will contradict Darwin's in these
matters. Within the culture at large others, such as
George Eliot, disputed notions of class and race
superiority
.
...in noting the oppression suffered by the Jews
in gentile culture, Eliot both questions
Spencer's hierarchy of "race" and demonstrates
how racial discrimination multiplies the problems
of obedience and resistance. [199]
Virtually all commentators fail to notice that
Darwin's racism is not merely a non-scient if ic bias which
seeps into his "pure" science but is an integral aspect of
his evolutionary theory. Later biological theorists could
in time dispense with Darwin's racist doctrines only
because they changed his work in scope and detail.
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Furthermore, the uncomfortable result that science
sometimes moves through morally repulsive phases needs to
be acknowledged and dealt with.
Greene's suggestion that Darwin was especially
conscientious because he was willing to admit to gaps of
data and theory deserves further comment. Darwin's hints
of ignorance concern central aspects of evolutionary
theory
,
such as how variations arise ("from whatever
cause") and how tightly selection functions ("tend to"): 200
Owing to this struggle [for existence]
,
variations, however slight and from whatever
cause proceeding, if they be .
.
prof itable . . wil
1
tend to the preservation of such individuals...
And Darwin freely admits that the physical basis of
variation is unknown to himself. His theory of pangenesis
had no evidence of any kind to recommend it and was
disputed by even his most ardent followers. This is of
crucial importance to those who would attempt to engineer
the genetics of society. Until one knew the principles and
mechanisms of descent with change, one could not in good
conscience embark on eugenics programs even if general
trends were recognized.
E. Conclusion to Chapter Two
The
Darwin '
s
claim that Haeckel perverted and de-scient ized
evolutionary theory with racism and nationalism
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cannot be supported. Rather, the origin of Social
Darwinism must be traced to Darwin himself. Darwin
supported eugenics in theory, though he tempered calls to
implement activist policies in England out of moral
considerations. It is unclear whether it was out of a
temporary lack of understanding of evolutionary mechanisms
as or on the other hand it was purely moral scruples which
held Darwin back from actively seeking the extermination of
the poor. In any case, Darwin was a Social Darwinist.
While several critics have noted Darwin's Social
Darwinism, the actual details: structure of the theory of
Natural Selection, metaphysical, epistemological and
methodological assumptions, as well as imperialist and
racist biases, have been neglected and left invisible. One
of the transparent aspects of Darwin's thought that needs
to be rendered visible is that he embraced several
interna 1 ly-inconsistent doctrines, which rendered his work
ambivalent in regards to central themes of evolutionary
theory
.
Darwin was ambivalent about the place of "man" in
nature, and this showed in his handling of the relation of
Natives to apes and in his discussion of the role of moral
values for human evolution and of his understanding of
sexual selection and the level at which selection operates.
Darwin was also ambivalent about the notion of progress,
and this showed in his inconsistent handling of ideas about
perfection, degeneration, hierarchy, telos, social programs
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and the new science of craniometry. These results show
that a proper historical understanding invalidates any neat
distinction between science and ideology, at least in the
case of nineteenth century biological theory.
Thus, for example, Longino's neat distinction between
constitutive and contextual values fails. "Pure science"
and bias are not mutually exclusive, and inattention to
this problem has led to a dangerous distortion of our
understanding and evaluation of science, and therefore our
relation to it.
This chapter draws to its close with a newly directed
attention to the very last words of the Descent of Man
where Darwin tries to shift attention away from human
history and focus instead on the "less shameful"
predecessors of man:
The main conclusion arrived at in this work,
namely, that man is descended from some lowly
organized form, will, I regret to think, be
highly distasteful to many. But there can hardly
be a doubt that we are descended from barbarians.
The astonishment which I felt on first seeing a
party of Fuegians on a wild and broken shore will
never be forgotten by me, for the reflection at
once rushed into my mind— such were our
ancestors. These men were absolutely naked and
bedaubed with paint, their long hair was tangled,
their mouths frothed with excitement, and their
expression was wild, startled, and distrustful.
They possessed hardly any arts, and like wild
animals lived on what they could catch; they had
no government, and were merciless to every one
not in their own small tribe. He who has seen a
savage in his native land will not feel much
shame, if forced to acknowledge that the blood of
some more humble creature flows in his veins.
For my own part _I would as soon be descended from
that heroic little monkey , who braved his dreaded
enemy in order to save the life of his keeper, or
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from the old baboon, who descending from the
mountains, carried away in triumph his young
comrade from a crowd of astonished dogs— as fromthe s avage who delights to torture his enemiiiT"
of fers
_up bloody sacr if ices
, practices
j.nf ant icide without remorse
, treat s his wives as
slaves
, knows no decency
, and is haunted by the
-
grossest superstitions
. [201]
That almost all critics have denied, disputed and
suppressed the racist characteristics of Darwin's theory of
Natural Selection is interesting but the question remains:
why all the anxiety over a point that by now should be
merely an historical fact?
Shapin and Barnes' work presents the most insightful
and entertaining analysis of the cognitive disturbance that
charges of racism and Social Darwinism in Darwin's work
bring to scientists and academics. Playfully tackling the
problem as one to be investigated by anthropologists like
themselves in terms of "phenomena" encountered in the
"tribal setting" of the academic world, 202 these two
conclude that real understanding of the situation cannot be
obtained until one realizes that
Darwin is a sacred totem by virtue of his
" foundership" of modern biology; science is
sacred, so must Darwin and his book be sacred,
both must be protected from contamination from
the profane. As the author of the Origin he must
himself be pure; his thought must be unmingled
with worldly pollutions and incapable of
satisfactorily blending or combining with the
suspect formulations of social Darwinism. Thus,
"influences" from the "profane" Malthus can only
be the spiritual emanations of mathematics and
genuine science, or nonessential stimuli or
manners of speech. And implications for social
Darwinism can only be misunderstandings. [203]
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Shapin and Barnes note that when discussions of
Darwin's work which is unrelated to Malthus and Social
Darwinism occurs, the language of critics changes— no
longer are '"blame,' 'responsibility,' and internal
purity” 204 the key phrases. This shift allows us to see
that the fuss over Darwin's purity is based on an
unarticulated desire to control the visible shape Darwin
and science presents to scientists, historians and the
public
.
I ri other words, the display of Darwin's purity of
internal state is nothing but a way of making him
out as the ideal-type of a modern scient ist
.
[ 205
]
The purification process also attempts to give
...the Origin status as proper science, and thus
align it for study by the methods of the history
of science proper, rather than as (say) "popular
culture" or "ideology." [206]
In order to understand science and its relation to
culture, Shapin and Barnes continue, the cultural inputs
into science must not be seen as evil, but rather as "what
happens." 207 Their best insight, which this dissertation
hopes to instantiate, is that cul ture— inc luding science
itself— is never homogeneous, and in order to understand
, ? f)
science no "a priori conceptions of how science must be"
can drive an understanding of science, but rather the task
of the investigator is to go and look at the details of
what occurred in history in order to develop knowledge of
science
.
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The issue remains as to how we are to evaluate
Darwin’s work. The understanding we have reached on the
interplay of science and social bias precludes simply
attacking Darwin as an unscientific racist, for (1)
scientific facts could be used (even if ideologically) to
support racism at that time, and (2) Darwin's bias was not
unique, but rather shared by some of his peers, even if
disputed by others.
The political ramifications of Social Darwinism,
particularly as witnessed in this century, point to the
grave potential for evil inherent in Darwin's particular
version of the theory of evolution. But within the
framework of his theory there is also an emancipatory
potential: first, the de-hierarchizat ion implied by the
undermining of the concept of progress in biology, and
second, the anti-radical-reductive-materialist evidence
that allows culture to supersede Natural Selection in such
a way that it is possible that humans may make meaningful
attempts to control the path of evolutionary or cultural
change
.
Clearly Darwin's work presents a complicated case to
consider. A more elaborate critique might even suggest
that even Darwin's cautious (but naive) approach to
biologically-mandated social action, which demanded
knowledge of the biological mechanisms of social change
before proceeding to active measures--is another escape
from moral responsibility through invocation of scientific
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expertise and results as the final arbiters of social
policy. This misuse of the classic is/ought distinction
and of science will be made more clear in the chapters to
come in which Darwin's relation to Wallace, Malthus and
legislative reform of the Poor Laws are revealed and
Darwin's work is placed in a wider historical and
philosophical perspective.
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CHAPTER III
ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE: CRITIC OF SOCIAL DARWINISM
A. Wallace's Work in the Darwinian Context
Illustration 8: Portrait of Alfred Russel Wallace 1
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1 . Wallace's life
Although the co discoverer of the theory of Natural
Selection, Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) remains an
obscure figure outside the domain of biology. Despite the
travails of the Darwin Industry," little has been written
about Wallace and his relation to Darwin remains virtually
unexplored. 2 This gap in scholarship has contributed to a
lack of understanding of the ideological context of
nineteenth century biology in general and of Darwin's work
in particular.
Due to Wallace's almost invisible status a general
biographical sketch is called for here. Besides being the
second to discover the mechanism of the transmutation of
species, his other recognized and major contribution was
the discovery of the "Wallace Line," a geographical
division of fauna species between Asia and Australia
falling in the Malay Archipelago. During his own time he
was renowned for both theoretical and applied biology by
those within the field and without and published
extensively within the scientific and political domains.
Known to Victorians as a scientist, social reformer and
critic of contemporary values, he was valued for his many
contributions to science and society.
His origins were unlike those of most professional
biologists of his time and therefore it is interesting to
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review his early history. The scientific societies were
dominated by people with backrounds similar to Darwin.
While Darwin went to the best schools and graduated with
top-notch references and trust funds waiting, Wallace was
self-educated and earned his daily living through the labor
of his own hands. Such self-reliance resulted in part from
his father's financial failures. Early in his life his
father squandered most of the modest family inheritance on
a publishing venture, and litigation took the rest.'5 Thus
at fourteen Alfred left home in order to earn his on living
as a land surveyor with his brother. 4 His father died when
he was 21.
A turning point in his life came when he met Henry
Walter Bates (1825-1892)
,
and the two, having read W. H.
Edwards' book on the insects of the Amazon, decided to
become insect collectors in the jungles of the "New World."
They managed to scrape together boat fare and left in 1848.
The idea was to capture and then send specimens back to
London in order to raise funds to continue collecting and
perhaps even save something for their return. Bates fell
ill soon after arriving in Brazil, which was not an
uncommon fate during these dangerous times when allopathic
medicine had little grip on health in the tropics. Wallace
went off on his own, and soon fell in love with collecting.
He was enthusiastic about the Natives he met, and accounts
of interactions with the local people fill his diaries and
books. Because the "best" insects, the ones unknown to
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European collectors, were to be found at the furthest
reaches of "civilization," he spent much of his time in
'remote" and even "unexplored" territory. During these
years his life was often in the hands of Native guides and
the local inhabitants (see Illustration 8).
After years of collecting insects and pelts he began
in 1852 to get ready for his trip back to England. Upon
arriving dockside he found that most the the crates he had
sent from the forest to be shipped to London while he
continued his work in the wilds had been seized by
bureaucrats who figured he was up to no good, for they
could not fathom why anyone wanted dead bugs.
After what seemed like endless bureaucratic
maneuvering and bribe-taking he finally convinced the
authorities to let him load his cargo. Soon, however,
disaster struck: his boat, the Helen
,
caught fire and sunk.
He was lucky to escape with his life, having survived days
adrift on the open seas in a lifeboat, but his collections
and notebooks were lost to the fire and ocean. Luckily for
him his agent: Samuel Stevens (who had done the job of
selling the insects that had made it back to England)
had insured the cargo so Wallace did not return penniless.
Once in London Wallace wrote and self-publ ished his
first book. Palm Trees of the Amazon , (1853) , while
initiating contact with people in the scientific community.
Because he needed to establish himself, economically and
scientifically, and because he loved travel, he set out two
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Fig. 1. The Amazon Basin showing areas explored by de la
Gondamine 1735-1745, Humboldt 1799-1804 and Wallace
1848-1852.
Illustration 9: Maps of Wallace's route through the
Amazon. Also see Wilma George. [5]
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years later for the Malay Archipelago with the intention of
redeeming his fortunes. Like most biologists of the time,
he was always considering how what he saw might help
provide an insight into the mechanism of evolution.
During his travels in the South Pacific, reeling from
what was probably a bout of malaria, he recalled Malthus'
work and emerged with a new idea. In February 1858 he sent
a letter to the Royal Society, care of the committee on
biology, announcing the discovery of the principle of
speciation through descent with modification and survival
of the fittest, or what would become known as "The Theory
of Evolution" or "Natural Selection."
Darwin chaired that committee, and was urged by his
friends to publish before Wallace could return to England.
Darwin arranged to have two papers read before the Linnean
Society, his and Wallace's. (True to his usual form,
circumstances "prevented" Darwin from attending the
meeting.) Thus the theory of evolution was born, although
it caused little commotion at this point, probably due to a
failure of most listeners to grasp the enormity of what was
being proposed. Wallace, a shy and generally unknown
figure at this point, did not challenge Darwin's claim for
priority of discovery. He was happy to share Darwin's
glory and vowed to help Darwin establish evolutionary
£biology as an accepted scientific discipline.
Catching insects and the discovery and elucidation of
the theory of speciation were not the only matters that
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held Wallace's attention. During his eight years in
Malaysia, Wallace came to the conclusion that indigenous
peoples were being exploited by Europeans. The hypocrisy
of Empire became a major theme in his writings and
political work.
Wallace returned to London in 1862 to establish his
scientific career as author and entomologist. Although
reticent by nature and an outsider to the aristocratic
scientific circles of London in which Darwin moved freely,
he quickly made friends and was allowed to join the major
groups. His publication record grew to copious
proportions, as he contributed to journals and published
many books. His most famous book, The Malay Archipelago
(1869), went through more than a dozen editions, 7 and was
translated into many foreign languages. Having earned the
Victorian credentials to marry, he sought out a mate and
married 18 year old Miss Annie Mitten, settling down to the
life of an orchid-growing gentleman-scientist.
He was of course a recognized and principal expert in
theoretical biology, as well as a respected authority in
entomology. His insects found their way into major
collections within the scientific community. Following
general research practice, he saved the best specimens
for himself, so that his own "cabinet" was famous within
collecting circles. He was responsible for cataloging
thousands of new species, and helped further Bates' ideas
on defensive mimicry in insects. Wallace's scientific
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circle in London included: T.H. Huxley, Tyndall, Sir John
Lubbock, Dr. W.B. Carpenter, Sir William Crookes, Sir
Joseph Hooker, Mr. Francis Galton, Prof. Alfred Newton, Dr.
P.L. Slater, Mr. St George Mivart, Sir William Flower, Sir
Norman Lockyer and Prof. R. Meldola. 8 He frequented the
meetings of the scientific societies and was President of
the Biological Section of the British Association. 9
Although he had done well by insect collecting and
publishing, he eventually lost much of his money through
bad business dealings (a failed lead mine took quite a toll
on his savings). His friends at the societies, who had
contacts in government, tried unsuccessfully to obtain
various positions for him. Finally Darwin and a few others
used their influence to secure a government pension that
made his later years more comfortable. Wallace outlived
most of his contemporaries, and continued publishing right
up to the time of his death in 1913.
His successful publishing career included popular
books on biology, travel and politics, technical writings,
and articles. Even though at times outspoken, he was
regarded as one of the inner circle of mainstream
scientists. For example, Wallace wrote for the
Encyclopedia Britannica, and was approached by the
publisher of Darwin's work to edit the new edition of the
Origin . 1
8
He was sought out by Darwin's friend Sir Charles
Lyell for summaries of the theory of evolution because
Lyell thought Wallace more readable than Darwin. 11 In 1889
162
the University of Oxford awarded him the D.C.L., an
honorary Doctor of Civil Law degree. Towards the end of
his life he joked that he did not want any more medals, as
any addition to his collection would require remodeling his
crowded display case. All in all, he was a major presence
within the intellectual community of London and the world.
was also recognition gained for his unorthodox
politics and views on "non-scient if ic" matters, some of
which will be explored in this chapter. Wallace tells us:
In 1865, when Spencer was, I believe, one of the
editors of The Reader
,
he asked me to write an
article on the treatment of savage races, with
special reference to some cases of the barbarity
of settlers in Australia that had recently been
published. [12]
John Stuart Mill recruited Wallace to head up the Land
Nationalization Society, which was fighting the enclosure
of commons.^ In 1882 Wallace published Land
Nationalization
,
a political book aimed at helping the
lower classes. 14 This work was followed by others which
delved into social issues such as imperialism, capitalism,
and public health, in such books as: Bad Times (1885),
Studies
,
Scientific and Socia
1
(1900), The Wonderful
Century ( 1898) , Vaccination a Delusion (1901) , The World of
Life (1910), Social Environment and Mora 1 Progress (1913)
and The Revolt of Democracy (1913) . He wrote over two
hundred articles, reviews and letters which were published
in leading scientific and literary journals.
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out, the
Not only did individuals and groups seek him
government summoned his expertise for one of the
controversial topics of the day: vaccination. As a well
known scientist and social activist, he was asked to join
the commission, but he refused. He did offer testimony at
the hearings .
Even when some of his interests took a turn at odds
with those of most scientists of the biological community,
Wallace found support in other circles. For instance, his
interest in spiritualism was shared by F.W.H. Meyers, 16 who
wrote Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death
,
as well as Miss Wood, Miss Fairlamb, Professor Sidgwick,
Mr. Gurney, and Mr. Balfour.
Explorer, entomologist, evolutionary biologist, social
reformer, spiritualist and phrenologist, these descriptions
point to the extensive interests and accomplishments of a
major figure of the middle and late nineteenth century.
Let us turn now to an analysis of the work of this
scientist and critic of Victorian culture.
2. The politics of Victorian evolutionary science
By now it should be clear that Darwin was the the
first Social Darwinist. As the co-discoverer and (then)
well-known critic of the social aspects of the theory of
Natural Selection, Wallace should be considered one of the
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foremost scientific critics of Social Darwinism. In the
sections that follow, his views on Natives, capitalism,
imperialism, eugenics and "man's" place in the universe
provide a foil to the idea that Victorian science was
monolithic in its assumption of racist and sexist
evolutionary theory. Wallace's attack on Darwin's
materia list continuity thesis provides the basis for
rejecting the scientific justification of what was claimed
to be "value free" scientific policy. One of Wallace's
important contributions to the field of evolutionary
biology was his attempt to open up a discussion of the
scope, application, and justice of this science.
What little response Darwin mustered for Wallace
centered on two restricted, but key points. In the main,
Darwin claimed that biology was a "purely scientific"
enterprise, and so politics lay outside his domains of
expertise and concern. Secondly, he emphatically rejected
Wallace's suggestion that there are emergent qualities
which separate humans from the rest of the biological
world. Darwin, like Haeckel, held firmly to the belief
that an absolute continuity between humans and primates was
essential to the theory of evolution and its success. But
Wallace was equally sure about this point: evolutionary
theory need not be Social Darwinist. As a member of the
loyal opposition, Wallace attempted to keep the theory of
transmutation true to itself by restricting science to the
physiological and behavioral development of animals and
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humans up to the penultimate moment of the emergence of
human culture.
The class bias of the evolutionary biologists needs to
be addressed. After all, most of them were rather wealthy,
with the exception of Wallace and Hux ley--which more or
less substantiates this point--since they were, or ended up
in, opposition to Darwin's position on "man." Huxley's
status as an "outsider" is compromised by the fact that his
career was launched through the intercession of powerful
friends. As Huxley matured, however, his emphasis
shifted from a radical materialism to the non-biologica
1
status of "man."
It is well worth bearing in mind that at the same time
evolutionary biology was carving out its domain the
credentials for becoming a member of this scientific
community underwent particular changes. Whereas the
academic world and the overlapping universe of the
scientific societies were dominated by religious
1 8conformists
,
and the wealthy, two new elements were
entering the picture. On the one hand, nouveau riche
entrepreneurs and their professional technicians, were
making inroads into the scientific domain. On the other,
the practical advantages to systematic advances in
technology appealed to the interests of politicians.
Government funding for scientific research was
reaching new plateaus. Both Darwin's and Huxley's voyages
were underwritten by the Royal Navy, much in the same way
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that various scientific experiments are currently allowed
limited access to NASA shuttle shots--which tend to focus
on military and large-scale commercial research. Later the
Challenger, that is the HMS Challenger, not the space
shuttle, undertook the exploration and mapping of the seas
that would provide an obvious payoff to British security
and business interests. The middle class of entrepreneurs
was being serviced by government spending as its economic
power was translating into political clout. Thus upwardly
mobile middle class technicians and scientists worked to
find entry into the conservative societies and clubs of
science and government. If the professionalization of the
medical field can be taken as a model (see chapter 4), it
is not surprising that biology was headed in a conservative
direction
.
Even Wallace benefited from governmental largesse by
accepting free government passage to Asia. In later life
he began to see problems with government-driven science,
and campaigned against its presence. He feared that the
effect of such funding would erode the independence of
scientists, and silently tailor biological research to
government's concerns--when public money would be better
19
spent in eradicating poverty.
By 1864, he was already committed to the position that
2 0there was a radical split between man and beast. By
1869, disillusioned with empire, he was extolling the
virtues of savage life and attacking the failures of
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laissez faire imperialism. We now turn to the details of
his critique of Social Darwinism.
B. Natives and the Continuity Question
Like Darwin, Wallace spent a considerable time
exploring the geological, biological and sociological
facets of the "New World" and beyond—before conceiving a
mechanism for the evolutionary hypothesis. Despite this
initial overlap, the two came to remarkably different views
concerning the status of Natives. This can perhaps be
explained by the fact that Wallace, unlike Darwin or
Huxley, spent a good deal of his travel time living and
working with local inhabitants. Whereas both Darwin and
Huxley enjoyed the advantage of having fewer
responsibilities for taking care of themselves and no
concern for generating income as they went, Wallace had no
choice but to become intimate with Native cultures.
The most obvious difference lies, perhaps, in the
fact that Darwin was free from the thought of
having to "pay his way" by the immediate result
of his efforts, and likewise from all care and
anxiety regarding domestic concerns; the latter
being provided for him when on board the Beagle ,
or arranged by those who accompanied him on his
travels over land and by river. The elimination
of these minor cares tended to leave his mind
free and open to absorb and speculate at
comparative leisure upon all the strange
phenomena which presented themselves throughout
the long voyage.
A further point of interest in determining
the ultimate gain or loss lies in the fact that
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Darwin's private excursions had to be somewhat
subservient to the movements of the Beagle ... [211
Wallace was free to roam where he pleased, when he
pleased. See Illustrations 7, 8, 9 and 10. Darwin's
travel inland, however, was limited. Wallace's main
restriction was the presence of collectible insects or
other specimens. Since he made his living through the sale
of his insect collections, he was forced to abandon any
area that held scanty reserves of salable insects, plants
or animals. When collectible species were abundant he
could stay for extended periods of time--which encouraged
him to learn more about the local inhabitants.
In Brazil and elsewhere Natives guided Wallace, and
helped provide transport, food and labor for his daily
existence. He learned their languages, out of abstract
interest and outright necessity. For a goodly part of his
years abroad he lived with people who had little, and in
some cases no, experience with Europeans. He began with a
remarkably enthusiastic openness to their practices, and
eventually developed a respect for ways of life utterly
foreign to his own.
In his travelogues he often gives the benefit of the
doubt to the strange and sometimes repulsive ways of the
Native. When he found their practices odd or seemingly
irrational he would usually inform the reader that the
problem probably lay in his understanding, rather than in
Native practices.
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Illustration 10: Map of Wallace's routes through the
Malay Archipelago. [22] (See Wilma George for his
itinerary
.
)
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Illustration 11: Map of Darwin's voyage 23
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Illustration 12: Map of Darwin's inland travel from
August to December 1833. [24]
172
Illustration 13 : Map of Darwin's
March to July 1835 . 125 ]
inland travel front
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His stance contrasts markedly with the plethora of
anecdotes and attitudes alluded to by Darwin in reference
to savage and inarticulate brutes at the end of the
Descent
,
or by Huxley as expressed in his writings on the
mental capacities of negroes. Darwin was consistent: the
final passage of the Descent is taken directly from his
travel notebooks, which were written at a much earlier
time . 2 ^
Wallace develops a theoretical basis for this view of
human emergence through a multi-faceted approach. He
exposes the political nature of human social and
geopolitical activity, the failure of technology to yield
true progress, the evils of capitalism, and the ideology of
eugenics, in order to generate the claim that human
activities fall outside the domain of biology.
One can sense Darwin's discomfort and almost feel the
2 7
onset of debilitating symptoms as he surveyed Wallace's
attack. Wallace even had the poor judgement to refer to
angels in one explanation of emergence. The sad part of
this saga is that Darwin ignored the many substantial
arguments Wallace made. The following section sets forth
Wallace's development of a critique of European domination
of Natives. In this venture he offers what amounts to a
"proof" against Darwin's continuity thesis.
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1. Interaction with Natives
Wallace spent the years of 1848 to 1852 travelling in
South America. He lived, for the most part, in Native
villages hiring the locals to help him canoe up and down
the waterways and enter the jungle where he could collect
specimens. While Darwin painted pictures of barely
articulate paint bedaubed blood-thirsty beasts, ^ an(^
Huxley avoided contact with the Natives by remaining on
board the Ra t t lesnake or within major European outposts
such as Sydney, Australia, Wallace plunged into Native
culture. He was intrigued by the complexity and beauty of
the "savages' way of life." His first reaction to the
people so new to him was one of "surprise and delight."
His openness to the situation is marked by his enthusiasm
at "living with man in a state of nature--with absolute
8 n
uncontaminated savages!"
This enthusiasm deepened throughout his career, and
his travel journals are full of accounts of Native
practices. Here follows an account of an "Indian"
festiva 1
:
The Indians had a fiesta while I was here. [Tomo
on the Rio Negro.] They made abundance of
"shirac," and kept up their dancing for thirty
hours. The principle peculiarity of it was that
they mixed up their civilized dress and their
Indian decorations in a most extraordinary
manner. They all wore clean trousers and white
or striped shirts; but they had also feather
plumes, bead necklaces, and painted faces, which
made altogether a rather queer mixture. They
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also carried their hammocks like scarves over
their shoulders, and had generally hollow
cylinders in their hands, used to beat upon theground in time to the dancing. Others had
lances, bows, and wands, ornamented with
feathers, producing as they danced in the
moonlight a singular and wild appearance. [31]
From this rather neutral description, one can easily
sense the attempt to be "objective," yet also sympathetic,
in his description. But he also betrays a willingness to
offer a glimpse of his enthusiasm.
We prepared our supper rather early, and about
sunset... a messenger came to notify us that the
dance had begun [at Jauarite, along the Rio
Negro]... The paint with which they [the women]
decorate their whole bodies has a very neat
effect, and gives them almost the appearance of
being dressed, and as such they seem to regard
it; and however much those who have not witnessed
this strange scene may be disposed to differ from
me, I must record my opinion that there is far
more immodesty in the transparent and flesh
coloured garments of our stage-dancers, than in
the perfect nudity of these daughters of the
forest. [32]
Not only did the nubile ladies move him, but he often
compliments the men, for example, as "peaceful," 3 ^ or "fine
active fellows."^ 4 He finds them hard working, personable
3 S
and generous. When he runs afoul of the Natives— some of
them steal his gifts or abandon him to a potentially lethal
river ride-- he does impugn their situation or race rather
he looks for circumstantial and local ly-particular
explanations based upon the foibles human personality is so
liable to exhibit.
I had now only one man and one boy in each canoe,
to pass rapids which required six or eight good
paddlers to shoot with safety; but staying here
was useless, so we went on , --drift ing down the
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stream after Senhor Jesuine, who, no doubt,
rejoiced in the idea that I should probably lose
my canoes, if not my life, in the caxoeiras
[ rapids ] , and thought himself well revenged on
the stranger who had dared to buy the canoe he
had wanted to purchase. [36]
What needs to be borne in mind at this point is that
although Wallace had fully articulated his theory of
evolution five years after the first edition of Travels
,
the second edition (1895) includes no revisions that would
suggest that this theory would cause him to abandon, or
even modify his views concerning the Natives of the Amazon.
In fact, his point of view becomes more radical as he gets
older
.
In 1883, several years after Darwin is painting
savages as inarticulate beasts in the Descent
,
and Huxley
deprecates the status of "our prognathous relative,"^ 7
Wallace is still willing to make claims, however naive, for
idyllic life within pockets of savage existence. At
Pitcairn Island, near Easter Island, according to Wallace,
"They all lived as one united family, and crime, or even
3 Rdissension, was unknown."
Unlike Darwin, who is locked into a view that pigeon
holes various cultures within a vertical hierarchy, Wallace
discusses each Native group within two contexts which he
usually treats as distinct: biological and cultural. What
results is a complex and multifaceted gauge of
civilizations. The cultural superiority of one group over
another was not an absolute biological judgement concerning
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survival power, as Darwin would have it. That is to say
that even on Wallace's early view, so called "civilization"
was not better in every respect to the Native's situation,
though he certainly preferred to live with the comforts and
culture of Europe. To develop this point we shall look at
his views on slavery, cannialism, social development and
technology
.
2. Slaves, cannibals, society and technology
Wallace's views on slavery could be said to be more
consistent than Darwin's, but none the less they are not
any less complicated. While Darwin's Victorian scruples
pushed him to condemn slavery on moral grounds (via
sympathy)
,
his hierarchical view of the innate biological
worth of human races pulled him in an opposite direction.
That is, if one race is destined (i.e. due to biological
superiority given the environment) to displace another,
there is no reason why slavery or race-war should be
rationally opposed, however distasteful the process might
be. One wouldn't want to make arguments for liberating
aphids from ants. Darwin saw no essential difference
between ant and human social life, as we shall see in more
detail later, in an analysis of sexual selection in humans.
For Wallace, however, things were different. Given a
relatively non-hierarchical view of the biological and
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cultural worth of the social and racial groupings of
humans, he adopts a moral stance towards slavery,
independent of racial survival power. Whereas Darwin
focused on abuses, Wallace goes for a more encompassing
argument which goes to the core conception of racial
domination
.
For instance, Wallace first relates stories about
Senhor Calistro," a slave owner. The owner provides good
working conditions and recreation for the slaves, is
attentive to their health and takes good care of them in
their old age. According to Wallace, the best analogy
would be that Calistro treats the slaves as if they were
his own "large family of children.
At this point Wallace attacks. He points out that
without freedom, the slaves can never lead a full life--no
matter how "nice" the working conditions:
But looking at it in this, its most favorable
light, can we say that slavery is good or
justifiable? Can it be right to keep a number of
our fellow-creatures in a state of adult infancy,
--of unthinking childhood? It is the
responsibility and self-dependence of manhood
that calls forth the highest powers and energies
of our race ... [ 40
]
Furthermore, he points out that the worst thing that could
happen would be to provide educational opportunity for the
slave and yet withhold freedom, for it would "assuredly
embitter his life." 41 While Wallace was surely insensitive
to the complexities of slave life— its complicated duties
and struggles hidden from the view of this white male slave
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owner and himself, the advance over Darwin's argument based
on what amounts to pity is noteworthy.
Wallace recognized that the issue of slavery could be
further complicated by histor ica 1 /cul tura 1 circumstances.
In other passages he observes that some Native tribes have
a long-standing tradition of practicing slavery, which
became entangled with European exploits. Rather than
immediately labeling the enterprise a degrading spectacle
as he does in the case of solely-European-run slavery,
here he takes time to develop a more non- judgemental
and context-dependent stance:
There was hardly a male in the village, Messrs.
Jesuino and Chagas having taken all with them up
the river, to assist in an attack on an Indian
tribe, the "Cara-panas , " where they hoped to get
a lot of women, boys, and children, to take as
presents to Barra. There was scarcely anything
to be had to eat... [43]
In fact, it seems incredible that he can wedge this account
between complaints at not obtaining enough specimens and
the lack of food! Barra is the town which is the
administrative headquarters for the region. The European-
run government, he notes, encourages slavery by placing
orders for boys, girls and women with the Chiefs under
their jurisdiction. A complicating factor, however, is
that
:
There is something to said too in its favor, for
the Indians make war on each other, --
principally the natives of the margin of the
river on those on the more distant igar ipes , --f or
the sake of their weapons and ornaments, and for
revenge of any injury, real or imaginary, and
then kill all they can, reserving some young
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- Th e hope of selling them
o the traders, however, induces them to spare
many who would otherwise be murdered. [44]
Furthermore, he notes that although the captured people
would be happier if left alone, due to the bizarre nature
of the local social practice of slavery the captives become
free to leave their masters whenever they like, which,
however, they seldom do when taken very young.
What is intriguing in this account of complexities is
that Wallace doesn't resort to gasps of horror, as Darwin
does, but is willing to consider the various cultural
practices as intricate puzzles. Where Darwin sees evidence
of a depraved dead-end of evolution, Wallace sees cultural
difference which must be evaluated within a social, and
hence political and historical context. In order to
develop this aspect more fully, we shall turn to Wallace's
views on technology and social development.
Unlike Darwin, who explicitly ranks cultures according
to European standards of technological power, Wallace is
reticent to rank societies and sees no essential connection
between technology, survival or progress. As we saw above,
he tells us that the "civilized" government at Barra
provided the guns and ammunition for the slave trade, which
only made things worse. Furthermore, given the choice
between Native life in the forest and life in a
Europeanized town, Wallace recognizes the value of a
"savage" existence: "I much doubt if they [the captured
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natives] are better or happier than in their native
forests . " 4 ^
His enthusiasm takes several forms. He pokes holes in
the view that Europeans bring an uplifting influence, by
debunking the value of firearms or centralized government
while embracing an appreciation of the beauty and joy that
sometimes accompanies life in the jungle. This latter
view, although rather unigue among the evolutionary
biologists of Darwin's resonates with a longstanding
tradition in English literature, the "Noble Savage."
Examples of the first point, that European culture
is not necessarily uplifting, may be gleaned from his jibes
at the priests who tried to bring European culture to the
savage
Padre... Frei Jose dos Santos Innocentos was a
tall, thin, prematurely old man, thoroughly worn
out be every kind of debauchery ... and was
celebrated as the most original and amusing story
teller in the province of Para. Don Juan was an
innocent compared to Frei Jose; but he told us he
had a great respect for the cloth, and never did
anything disreputable--during the day
!
. . . There
are seven or eight distinct processes in the
Roman Catholic baptism, well calculated to
attract attention of the Indians: there is water
and holy oil, --and spittle rubbed on the eyes,
—
and crosses on the eyes, nose, mouth, and body,
—
and kneeling and prayers in between, which all
bear sufficient resemblance to the complicated
operations of their own "pages" (conjurers)
,
to
make them think they got something very good, in
return for the shilling they pay for the
ceremony
.
The next day there were a few weddings...
After it [one of the weddings] was over, Frei
Joze gave the newly married people a very good
and practical homily on the duties of the married
state, which might have done some good, had the
parties to whom it was addressed understood it;
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which, as it was in Portuguese, they did not. He
at all times strenuously exhorted the Indians toget married, and thus save their souls,
--and fillhis pocket. [47]
While he was amused by the vulgar priests, he takes special
delight in exposing the indiscretions of corrupt European
officials
.
Senhor Antonio Dias was rather notorious, even
in this country of loose morals, for his
Patriarchal propensities, his harem consisting of
a mother and daughter and two Indian girls, all
of whom he keeps employed at feather work. [48]
Although at times he qualifies his enthusiasm, his
subsequent publications continue to show appreciation for
Native ways of life over that of typical English existence.
Some of my dull and dreary evenings I occupied in
writing a description of the village and its
inhabitants, in what may probably be very dreary
blank verse; but it shows my ideas and thoughts
at the time, I may as well give it the reader in
place of the more sober and matter-of-fact view
of the matter I should probably take now. I give
it as I wrote it, in a state of excited
indignation against civilized life in general,
and not altogether as my views when writing in
London in 1853.
A DESCRIPTION OF JAVt TA
'Tis where the streams divide, to swell the floods...
There is an Indian village...
Here I dwelt awhile the one white man
Among perhaps two hundred living souls.
They pass a peaceful and contented life.
These black-hair ' d , red shin'd, handsome, half-wild men.
How they look's, save in their dusty skin.
To a fair group of English village maids!
Yet far superior in their graceful forms?
For their free growth no straps or bands impede,
But simple food, free air, and daily baths
And exercise, give all that Nature asks
To mould a beautiful and healthy frame.
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...The young girls carry water on their heads...And sport like mermaids in the sparkling wave.
...And thus these people pass their simple lives.They are a peaceful race; few serious crimes
Are known among them; they cannot rob or murder,
And all the complicated villainies
Of man called civilized are here unknown. [49]
It is interesting that from the vantage point of London,
even in 1853, Wallace doesn't want to claim that he prefers
life in the rough; "Yet think not that I would place, as
some would do. The civilized below the savage man," for in
his opinion the European culture of books and art are worth
knowing. But the fact that he felt torn in terms of
allegiance to both Native life and civilized life is
important for developing an understanding of his
perspect ive--which is vastly different from that of Darwin
or Huxley.
Wallace's reticence in allowing his appreciation for
Native life to overpower his praises of civilization must
also be interpreted in the context of Wallace's need to
establish his reputation within the conservative scientific
societies at this early date. Later, when he has gained
entry and recognition, his tendency to be flagrantly
outspoken can be understood in part as a public
manifestation of personality no longer suppressed.
In any case, at this early date (1853), in addition to
seeing some advantages to the Native way of life, he also
stresses the Native ability to adopt European culture, for
better or worse. This represents a serious departure from
Darwin's view that Natives are incapable of rising above
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their low status in any meaningful sense. (Although Darwin
is inconsistent on this point, as has been shown earlier.)
They are ingenious and skillful workmen, and
readily adopt any customs of civilized life that
may be introduced among them; and they seem
capable of being formed, by education and goodgovernment, into a peaceable and civilized
community. [51]
In one remarkable passage, Wallace attributes much
misunderstanding between Europeans and Natives to a
European ignorance of the Native's language and social
conventions. In the instance of the hunt for the Amazons
he blames European confusion on differences between
European standards of sexual demarcation in dress and the
conventions of the Natives. The Europeans think that
because this tribe's warriors wear beads, have no beards
and sport long hair, they must be women. 52 Other
contributing factors, such as the use of shields covering
the Native's breasts, and the secretive nature of some
tribes mislead the Europeans.
The Natives, when asked about a tribe of Amazon
warrior women, pretend to know what the Europeans are
talking about, and provide invented information to please
them. Wallace notes that the Natives do not "lie," but
rather are speaking in good faith to the foreigners.
Native practices include a prohibition of disagreement in
formal communications. Thus to behave in a civil manner,
they honor the intelligence of the Europeans by giving them
assurance that the Amazons of which they speak exist.
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Of this tradition [of the Native's assertion ofthe existence of a female Amazon warrior tribe],however, I was myself unable to obtain any trace,
and I can easily imagine it entirely to have
arisen from the suggestions and inquiries of
Europeans themselves. When the story of the
Amazons was first made known, it became of course
a point with all future travellers to verify it,
or if possible get a glimpse of these warlike
ladies. The Indians must no doubt have been
overwhelmed with questions and suggestions about
them, and they, thinking that the white man must
know best, would transmit to their descendants
and families the idea that such a nation did
exist in some distant part of the country.
Succeeding travellers, finding traces of this
idea among the Indians, would take it as proof of
the existence of the Amazons...
Furthermore, he concludes
,
53
In my communications and inquiries among the
Indians on various matters, I have always found
the greatest caution necessary, to prevent one's
arriving at wrong conclusions. They are always
apt to affirm that which they see you wish to
believe, and when they do not at all comprehend
your question, will unhesitantly answer "Yes."
Cannibalism presents an exotic practice of especial
interest. The very concept of consumption of human flesh
provoked intense reactions and raised moral questions for
Victorian scientists. Slavery, although much more widely
practiced, was not as stirring an issue because both
Natives and Englishmen shared in the practice.
Cannibalism, however, elicited a visceral and moral
response unimpeded by guilt. Thus the attribution of
cannibalism carried baggage which could be put to use in
demonstrating (without explicit argumentation) that the
anthropophagous Natives were beyond the pale of human
dignity
.
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In The Man-Eating Myth / Anthropology Anthropophagy
(1979) W. Arens makes the astounding claim that cannibalism
is so poorly documented that it is probable it never
existed. He claims that even if the practice had or has
adherents certainly there is a profound lack of evidence
that any credible person has ever witnessed such an event
other than in a rare case of starvation.
I have been unable to uncover adequate
documentation of cannibalism as a custom in any
form of society. Rumors, suspicions, fears and
accusations abound, but no satisfactory
first-hand accounts. [54]
While Arens' thesis has been met with opposition, few
examples of cannibalism have been offered up in refutation.
A quick look at Wallace's references to anthropophagy
reveal additional grist for Arens' mill. The Malay
Archipelago contains no references to the practice in its
index. Australasia has eight citations, but at these
locations ten references are made of which half contain no
evidence whatsoever: "undoubted cannibals" is one such
C. C
reference. Other cases send one to other works, thus the
book presents no first-hand evidence.
On the other hand, Wallace does refer to J.E.
Erskine's Journa 1 of a Cruise Among the Islands of the
Western Pacific in which claims of cannibalism are made.
However, again Arens' thesis rears its head. Of eleven
instances none are witnessed by the author. Most give
other sources, some vaguely pointing at unidentified
witnesses. However to Erskine's credit there are least
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several references to particular individuals who claim to
have witnessed cannibalism.
Of the evidence provided by Erskine, the most
compelling is provided in "Appendix A." At this point he
introduces John Jackson, an Englishman who spent two years
in the Feejeean Islands amongst the Natives just prior to
1850. Erskine reproduces a portion of Jackson's diary, in
which lurid and first-hand accounts of ritual consumption
of human flesh are given.
The dead bodies [of enemies killed in battle]
were set up in a row on their hinder parts, with
a pole rove through their legs, just under their
knees, to keep them in a sitting posture on thebows of the canoe. We then pushed off, our
natives singing out, "Satiko, satiko" (Good bye,
good bye); and telling the enemy that they should
call again on them shortly, as their place was
conveniently s i t uated . . . and take a few more...
that they should take them just in the same way a
man kills his pigs... so as to have the honor of
being eaten by the chief himself... as I had seen
so much of their dark ways, and knew my presence
would not affect their proceedings, I thought I
would witness all I could...
At last they hauled them up to a place used
purposely for the dressing, cooking, and eating
of human flesh .. .
The king being very impatient to begin, and
not choosing to wait till it was properly
prepared, told the butcher just to slice off the
end of their noses, and he would roast them while
he was getting the other parts ready... the first
he hardly let warm through, but while he was
eating it, the second got a little better done,
which he quickly demolished. While he had the
third in his hand, his eye caught mine looking at
him with surprise, which he misinterpreted into
another meaning, thinking that I was longing for
a taste... he offered me the last nose... He was
very much surprised that I would not accept what
to him seemed the best food imaginable... [56]
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Jackson tries to convince the chief that God did not
approve of cannibalism, but the chief responded: "different
countries, different fashions, and like manner, different
gods." 57 Shortly thereafter, the feast began in earnest.
The flesh was then put into this "lovo" (oven)
,
and when cooked, which was not until the next
morning, shared out according to rank,
distinction
, &c... Several invited me to partake
of their small allowance, and all were egually
surprised with Tui Mativata [his Native
appelation] at my refusal. [58]
Jackson goes on to describe several occasions of
cannibalism in detail. Thus Erskine and ultimately Wallace
could be said to possess some credible evidence of this
taboo social practice, regardless of our final appraisal of
Jackson's narrative. It is also worth keeping in mind that
of all of Wallace's works, Australasia should, of course,
be taken with a grain of salt, as he based the book on
Hellwald's work--which does not necessarily represent
Wallace's views. Thus the silence of the Ma lay on the
topic speaks loudly of Wallace's lack of experience with
anthropophagy along with a lack of credulity and/or
interest given to others' claims.
Unlike many other writers of the time Wallace treats
cannibalism neutrally, as if he were describing an unusual
hand-shaking practice. It is useful to consider the
ramifications of this attitude. Arens understands the
attribution of anthropophagy as part of the technology of
imperialism. By calling a tribe cannibals, the (imperial)
anthropologist places the particular "natives" into a
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special category "early man," since the assumption is that
the civilization process includes leaving such culinary
practices behind. Particularly interesting from our point
of view, Arens places cannibalism in a context of a racist
Victorian science which ultimately leads to contemporary
anthropology
.
Cannibals abound as western science pushes back
the frontiers of time. There are at least two
reasons for this. First, all the academic
branches which today are classed under the
heading of modern anthropology emerged as
organized inquiries at the same time, facing one
overriding question. The formative period
extended from the mid-nineteenth century to the
turn of the twentieth century, and the
intellectual puzzle, which remains unsolved and
is still debated, was the original human
condition. The industrializing western societies
were bringing the remainder of the globe under
European colonial domination in an almost
effortless, unchecked process of expansion. At
the apex of their power, intellectuals in an
institutionalized setting and systematic fashion
first began to ponder the historical path to this
assumed inevitable conclusion .. .an equation was
made between nineteenth-century primitives and
prehistoric man. Both creatures were assumed to
be almost devoid of culture as conceived by the
European mind of the last century; and in this
savage state, the worst could be expected. [59]
While Wallace participated in the practice of equating
cannibalism with primitivity, he attempted to decouple
moral condemnation from the effort of reconstructing
history. In this process Wallace both mirrored and went
beyond more recent efforts to re-evaluate the meaning of
cannibalism. Arens points out that while contemporary
attempts to understand anthropophagy in terms of dietary
strictures is an advance over treating the practice purely
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as a cultural monstrosity, it none the less serves to
preserve the anthropologically-created gulf between
"primitive man" and "normal" cultures.
One of the few bright spots, if it can be called
such, in the history of the cannibal complex
mythology has been the willingness ofintellectuals of the eras to rush forward todefend and absolve the man-eaters of their deeds.
In our age, instead of learned friars with their
mastery of cannon law and Aristotelian logic, we
encounter learned professors referring to caloric
tables and Levi Strauss's structuralism to
explain away cannibalism. [60]
Thus Wallace's attempt to treat Native cultures in
terms of his version of a non-imperial science demanded a
decoupling of European morals and European standards of
behavior from the description of what seemed to be
outrageous practices. His "scientific" stance can be
understood in terms of an attempt to promote understanding
without domination. Darwin, on the other hand, had been
quick to utilize "savage" practices in order to code and
promote domination.
In describing Natives who participate in a
cannibalistic funeral rite, Wallace notes that they are
polygamous—but without passing judgement as he did in the
case describing the Portuguese polygamist given above
(Antonio Dias). He then details a rite that comes close to
canniba 1 ism
:
The Tarianas and Tucanos, and some other tribes,
about a month after the funeral, disinter the
corpse, which is then much decomposed, and put it
into a great pan, or oven, over the fire, till
all the volatile parts are driven off with a most
horrible odour, leaving only a black carbonaceous
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mass, which is pounded into a fine powder, andnnxed in several large couches (vats made ofhollowed trees) of caxiri: this is drunk by the
assembled company till all is finished; theybelieve that thus the virtues of the deceased
will be transmitted to the drinkers. [ 61 ]
He tells us that the above example is not exactly
a case of cannibalism, and he goes on to provide what he
considers to be a more true example.
The Cobeus alone, in the Uaupes, are real
cannibals: they eat those of other tribes whom
they kill in battle, and even make war for the
express purpose of procuring human flesh forfood. When they have more than they can consume
at once, they smoke-dry the flesh over the fire,
and preserve it for food a long time. They burn
their dead, and drink the ashes in caxiri in the
same manner as described above. [ 62 ]
At another point he describes a tribe's cannibalism in
an aside when discussing their eating habits.
The Catauixis, though in the immediate
neighbourhood of the last, are very different...
They eat principally forest game, tapirs,
monkeys, and large birds; they are, however,
cannibals, killing and eating any Indians or
other tribes they can procure, and they preserve
the meat, smoked and dried. Senhor Domingos, a
Portuguese trader up the river Purus, informed me
that he once met a party of them, who felt his
belly and ribs, as a butcher would handle a
sheep, and talked much to each other, apparently
intimating that he was fat, and would be
excellent eating. [ 63 ]
The phrase "apparently intimating" only adds fuel to
Arens' argument, which simmers through the above quotes as
Wallace does not precisely state that he witnessed these
events of cannibalism. Furthermore, the implication of
"apparently intimating" is that Mr. Domingos did not speak
the language and that he guessed about the Native's
conversation or got it second hand from a trans lator--who
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might have misunderstood a joke, or perhaps was playing one
of his own. Wallace's following passage:
Of the Jamamar is we have no authentic
information, but that they much resemble the thelast [Catauixis] in their manners and customs,
and in their appearance... [64]
only adds to the suspicion that the attribution of
anthropophagy was based upon hearsay. Again, it is
difficult to evaluate his assertions and descriptions of
the Catauixis, despite the fact we know Wallace actually
visited them, as his words do not precisely state that he
himself witnessed what he relates.
In any case, the difference between Darwin and
Wallace could not be more clear, for where Darwin recoils
in a horror which results in a technology of domination
(through professional anthropology and assumptions of a
superior morality) Wallace provides a description that is
both detailed and contextual as well as humorous and
determinedly non- j udgementa 1 . A related case is that of
head-hunting. In the Malay Archipelago Wallace relates an
incident in which the house he sleeps in sports a bevy of
shrunken heads.
When entering Borneo he asked to witness the local
dancing rituals. The Borneonians obliged him, but clearly
he was not in any mood to appreciate the volume of the
proceedings at that particular time. (The later date of
publication— 1869, as compared to the Amazon
,
should also
be kept in mind for its evidence of a continuity in
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Wallace's unusual anthropological attitude.) His
description follows.
These [dances] were, like most savage
performances, very dull and ungraceful affairs-the men dressing themselves absurdly like women,
and the girls making themselves stiff and
ridiculous as possible. All the time six or
eight large Chinese gongs were being beaten bythe vigorous arms of as many young men, producing
such a deafening discord that I was glad to
escape to the round house, where I slept very
comfortable with a half dozen smokedried human
skulls over my head. [65]
Despite the bad humor and the perspective from London
(which perhaps contributes to the account's negative
overlay: dull, and "ungraceful")
,
he lets us know that
this strange and presumably threatening environment was to
his way of thinking rather unremarkable. Rather than a
written outburst on savage blood-thirstiness or moral
depravity, we get a "neutral" anthropological-insider's
account
:
A young Dyak could not marry, nor a parent or
widower leave off mourning, till a head was
obtained. These heads were carefully dried and
preserved in their houses. It was a custom, and
as a custom was observed, but it did not imply
any extraordinary barbarism or moral
delinquency. [66]
In the end, he concludes of these head-hunters:
Crimes of violence (other than head-hunting) are
almost unknown... In several other matters of
morality they rank above the most civilized, and
even above many civilized nations... [67]
By discussing culture without linking it to
biologically determined behavior, he allows for an
emergentist conception of human cultural activity. This
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gives him the conceptual room to criticize, independently,
both European and Native cultures in terms of their various
practices, without being forced at the same time to rank
one culture over the other in terms of an absolute scale of
morality or survival power.
3. "Necessary" extinction and progress
In Wallace's opinion Native cultures had their merits
and thus the conflict between Natives and Europeans had to
be considered problematic. This can be best shown by the
issues raised by the fact that Natives were being
exterminated. Alfred Crosby has greatly enlarged our
information about the decline of indigenous ecology caused
by contact with European germs, seeds and animals.
Using a model of "virgin soil" which corresponds with
aspects of Punctuated Equilibria theory Crosby points out
that long ago the overland migration to the Americas
cleansed humans and animals of many European diseases. Due
to the small density of groups and the culling effect of
severe conditions, migrating animals shed pests and so lost
built up immunities. In addition, the higher population
and specie densities of the "Old World" resulted in
multiplication and increasing vigor of pests during the
time the Americas were being first colonized by humans.
Thus when European
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smallpox, measles, chicken pox, whooping
cough... typhus, typhoid fever, bubonic plague,
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lnfluenza
' and undoubtedly several
diseases hit the Natives, their numbers crashed. Crosby
puts the decimation as high as 90%. 69 Added to this was
not only a crash in material culture— inabi 1 ity to plant,
tend and harvest—but similar problems for native plants
and animals, and insult to injury a hiatus in the ability
to care for the sick because old and young were struck
alike. To this account must be added the demoralizing
effect such hardships bring. 70
Although Victorian scientists did not possess this
understanding of the situation they were well aware of the
decline in Native numbers and reasonably enough linked the
success of European plants, animals and germs to biological
superiority. In the case of humans, biologists tended to
think superiority lay in vigor, culture and technology.
Given such a context it is small wonder that Wallace
did not at times lapse into endorsement of European
superiority despite his considered views to the contrary.
Some passages of his masterwork, The Malay Archipelago
(1869)
,
seem to stand in conflict with views one expects
from the author of savage critiques of capital's
degradation of the poor of London and Natives of the "New
World." For example, in his early work Wallace sometimes
falls into the widely promulgated view that savages
actually appreciate, or should appreciate, white man taking
196
He writes that the
on the "burden" of reforming them,
equation of Native as child
...is not merely an analogy ,
—there is in many
respects an identity of relation, between master
and pupil or parent and child on the one hand,
and an uncivilized race and its civilized rulers
on the other. We know (or think we know) that
the education and industry, and the common usages
of civilized man, are superior to those of savage
life; and, as he becomes acquainted with them,
the savage himself admits this. [71]
Although we see the seeds of nagging doubt in "or think we
know" and an appeal to Native approval, the overall thrust
is to validate the idea that Europeans are superior to
Natives in a way which entitles them to assume a dominant
role
.
Similarly, in another passage Wallace notes that in
Celebes Natives must carry a pass to travel or sell goods,
and this is for their "own good."^^ This type of comment
is intermixed with self-reflection on the problem of
domination
.
If we are satisfied that we are right in assuming
the government over a savage race, and occupying
their country ; and if we further consider it our
duty to do what we can to improve our rude
subjects and raise them up towards our own level,
we must not be too afraid of the cry "despotism"
and "slavery," but must use the authority we
possess to induce them to do work, which they may
not altogether like, but which we know to be an
indispensable step in their moral and physical
advancement. [73]
The advance over Darwin here is that Wallace does not
assume Europeans have the right to dominate, but that this
must be argued on a case by case basis. Also, the terms of
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power are described in reference to "helping" the Natives,
and not to necessary extermination.
The Dutch have shown much good policy in the
means by which they have done this. They have in
most cases upheld and strengthened the authority
of the native chiefs, to whom the people have
been accustomed to render a voluntary obedience;
and by acting on the intelligence and
self-interest of these chiefs, have brought about
changes in the manners and customs of the people,
which would have excited ill-feeling and perhaps
revolt had they been directly enforced by
foreigners. [74]
There is the problem of coercion here, of developing
instruments of domination that appear "kinder" but
manipulate and destroy local culture none the less.
He fails to recognize the incongruity of enforced self
interest, but his ideology represents an advance over
Darwin ' s
.
That Wallace takes the Native's point of view
seriously is shown in an amusing passage of a middle work,
Austra lasia (1879). He notes approvingly that Natives who
have lived in both Native and European contexts sometimes
opt for a return to Native practices. 75
Mr. F . A . Campbell, who has studied the returned
labourer in his native place, gives a very
different picture. He declares that the New
Hebrideans are not in the least improved but
rather injured, by their three years' labour.
[Forced labor away from their Native area.]
Whatever goods they bring home are at once
distributed among their friends and relations;
they throw off their clothes, paint themselves,
and resume with eager delight all the savage
practices they have so long been deprived of.
Wallace could not ignore the tendency of Native
populations to crash. In pessimistic passages Wallace
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states that competition "almost always terminates in the
destruction of one of..." 76 the competitors. Such demise
could come not only in the form of death, but also in terms
cultural destruction:
The only accomplishment they bring back, and of
which they are proud, is the facility of sweariin Eng 1 ish . .
. [ the Natives] have engrafted ontheir originally depraved nature the vices of
civilisation but none of its virtues ...[ 77
]
ng
Once the layers of destruction caused by disease and
unbridled (and unnecessary) competition are peeled away
Wallace finds a core of cultural interaction. Too often,
he thinks, Europeans fail to use reliable evidence and this
contributes to the view that destruction of the Native is
inevitable. The best data proceeds from first hand
knowledge, and that is only good if the investigator lives
among the Natives for a long period, rather than taking a
quick tour of the highlights of particular groups.
One must see the savage at home to know what he
really is... Writers on the races of mankind have
too often to trust to the information of
travellers who pass rapidly from country to
country, and thus have few opportunities of
becoming acquainted with peculiarities of
national character, or even of ascertaining what
is really the average physical conformation of
the people. [78]
Lack of good information, he thought, gave people the
wrong idea about possibilities for change. Central to the
debate over extinction of Natives is the question of
whether Natives could be vaulted up out of "savagery."
In some passages of his early work he puts forward the
view that the Native must climb the ladder of civilization,
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as it were, rung by rung. This view parallels Darwin's
hierarchical model, although the "rungs" are cultural and
not biological steps-- in some ways similar to ideas in
Hegel or Marx, and can be seen in reference to a comment by
Wallace on the failure of Christianity to "take" in some
Native cultures:
These peoples [of the ancient world] had already
gone through the long process of mental
development which the savage has not even begun.
The doctrines [of Christianity] grew among them,
as the do not grow among savages, because they
were adapted to the mental state on the one case,
but not in the other. [79]
Or:
There are certain stages through which society
must pass in its onward march from barbarism to
civilization ...[ Including despotism, which] we
have every reason to believe that it is not
possible for humanity to leap over this
transition epoch... [80]
Like Darwin, Wallace many times puts forward the idea
that the utter destruction of Native populations is an
unavoidable side effect of contact.
Whether he can be improved at all, except by a
process which leads to the not distant extinction
of his race, is very doubtful... [81]
Even in a later work of 1879, Australasia
,
he writes in
reference to the inhabitants of Celebes:
But it must be remembered that man is
pre-eminently a migrating and an aggressive
animal, the higher or more energetic races
constantly displacing the lower or less
physically powerful... [82]
Or, in the case of Fiji: "...the adoption of our religion
and government is leading to the extinction of the native
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race
.
83 (He talks about the measles epidemic of 1875
.)
Or
, the case of Polynesia:
. . . how sad it is
admirable qualit
our eyes by the
imperfect civili
that a people with so many
ies should be exterminated before
relentless march of our too
sation! [ 84 ]
It sometimes
pessimism on this
above passages is
convinced that ext
political choices:
seems like Wallace ha
point. However, juxt
a passage which shows
inction is necessary,
s settled into a
aposed with the
that Wallace is
but driven by
not
An agricultural mission established in an islandfrom which miscellaneous European settlers andtraders were strictly excluded, would be a mostinteresting experiment, and might possibly lead
us to the discovery of a method of elevating
savage races without necessarily extermina t inq
them. [ 85 ]
The problem of extinction was not just evident in the
New Hebrides, but also in New Zealand, indeed, in all the
South Sea Islands:
Missionaries of various denominations have been
at work in New Zealand for more than sixty years,
and have now converted the whole population,
except for a few of the older chiefs, to
Christianity. Cannibalism, tribal wars,
polygamy, slavery, and most of their
superstitious practices have been abolished; they
have become to a considerable extent educated and
civilized; many of them have farms and ships, or
are successful traders. But with this apparently
beneficial change, their old elasticity of spirit
and enjoyment of life seems to have left them.
They cannot as a body compete with Europeans,
our habits are not suited to them, our diseases
and vices decimate them... we seem to civilize and
Christianize only to destroy ... [Wa 1 lace notes the
statistics on population decreases for natives,
and is glad that recent data suggests that] the
rate of decrease has been checked, and that there
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is no immediate danger of the extinction of thisinteresting people.
The Maoris are said to be conscious of their
approaching fate, a fate in which not only thepeople themselves, but also the native fauna andflora seem involved. The inevitable process of
extinction is vividly described by Pesche 1 . .
.
[who
states that European plants] follow the white
man [and] soon displace the last feeble
survivors of former geological epochs. [86]
The above passage is especially interesting as it
shows Wallace pondering the relation between a strictly
biological competition between plants, and human
competition. The juxtaposition shows him approaching the
Darwinian view of the necessity for the destruction of
Native forms of life, especially given the references to
"former geological epochs."
In yet another context he discusses the Australian
gold rush of 1851 in terms of survival of the fittest.
The influx of men of all classes from the mother
country, and of almost all the races of the
world, together with numbers of released or
escaped convicts from neighboring colonies, led
to a struggle for existence, in which the most
hardy, the most energetic, the most patient, or
the most far-seeing, could alone succeed. [87]
The end result, according to Wallace, is progress:
"...Victoria now stands at a high level of colonial
O O
prosperity and civilization." Still other passages tend
O Q
to confirm this Hobbesian/Darwinian tendency:
Here we have a picture of true savage life; of
small isolated communities at war with all around
them... and no prospect of moral advancement.
But such a dark view fails to stay with him and
ultimately is secondary to an analysis in terms of an
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unnecessary imperialism. An understanding of this point in
part derives from an appreciation of the tradition of
Victorian gentleman scientists 1 writing habits. One of the
remarkable aspects of scientific works by these "semi
professional" enthusiasts is their informality and
ruminating nature. To the contemporary reader, the
anecdotes, digressions and contradictory passages suggest
that the writing was haphazard and therefore of less value
than today's highly polished and uni-directional
argumentation
.
A point well worth considering is that works such as
Darwin's Naturalist
' s Voyage Around the World and Wallace's
Australasia and The Malay Archipelago were not only
scientific works, but were also constructed to a large
extent in the form of diaries. Thus digressions, false
turns, and varied minutiae of travels on the frontier are
there to inform and amuse, but also to expose the personal
and scientific passage as a passage: a directed but
accident-prone movement through time, space, and ideas.
Thus it must be seen as a victory, albeit quietly
presented, of emergentism over Social Darwinism when
Wallace points out that the social experiment on Savage
Island has preserved the indigenous people:
They are now wholly converted to Christianity,
and are found to be a very intelligent, mild, and
interesting race, and by no means the dangerous
savages they were long supposed to be. Their
numbers, in 1864, were over 5000, and they are
said to increase at the rate of 2 1/2 per cent
annually. If this be true, we may probably
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When placed in the context of his metaphysical opinions and
his critique of Empire, it becomes clear that he feared the
worst, but thought that it did not have to be so. As his
career developed he lent more and more of his scientific
thority to fighting imperialism and discrediting the
value of Natural Selection in terms of human political
struggles
.
Decou P 1 ing Social Darwini sm: the emergence of politics
Another variable in the extinction equation is that
Wallace slowly comes to the conclusion that all colonialism
is flawed. in Australasia he criticizes the Dutch system
of colonial management, which he so often championed, for
being at bottom exploitive:
...it still remains substantially true that the
Dutch colonies are farmed for the benefit of the
mother country. The natives [still] feel the
yoke
— [91]
He comes to see colonial mismanagement not as an
anomaly, but as an inevitable outcome of capitalism, greed,
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and the unequal distribution of power
writes 9 2
Europeans, he
ope
!\
the «ay to greater commercial
activity, which will lead to the gradual
alienation of the land to capitalists, give anunnatural stimulus to the population, andinevitably introduce the evils of feverish
competition, pauperism, and crime, from which thecountry has hitherto been comparatively free.
He understands "freedom of trade" as an ideological
construct— a smokescreen behind which one class exploits
another. At this point he mixes commitment to the
patriarchal notion of "raising up" the savage with
criticism of economic exploitation, presenting a
complicated ideology which combines progressive elements of
self-determination with paternalism and unreflective
Eurocentric domination.
European rulers, imbued with ideas of freedom oflabour and of commerce, will not understand that
a child-like people can only be raised to
independence and national manhood by means of a
paternal government.
It may safely be predicted that if the Dutch
Government freely throws open Java to the world,
the result will be that many capitalists will
make fortunes, but the native inhabitants will
not be benefited. [93]
Implicit in his paternalism is a core dedicated to the idea
that Natives must be liberated so that they may achieve
their potential. The task of the European is:
...raising the depressed races, the formation of
free states, and the advancement of civilisation
...to save them from oppression, misrule, and
social misery, to educate them to self-
government, and so enable them to grow unfettered
to whatever degree of civilisation they are
capable of attaining... [94]
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Despite his insensitive moments, Wallace was very much
aware of this tendency in English politics to regard
superiority as a ticket for genocide. By the end of the
century, he sees the English colonists primarily as
murderers
:
If the Spaniards exterminated the natives of theWest Indies, we have done the same thing inTasmania, and almost the same in temperate
Australia. [95]
As we shall see in the next section, Wallace uses
Native practices as a foil to critique European society.
But here, through coming to see that alternative colonial
policies have different outcomes, the "necessity" of
extermination falls victim to the understanding of
colonial enterprise as an evil and politically-motivated
methodology for exploiting the wealth of the world for the
benefit of a few owners.
Ultimately he takes an even more radical position. He
claims in 1911 that not only is civilization flawed—but
that the view that civilization progresses is wrong.
...there is little if any evidence of advance in
character or in intellect from the earliest times
of which we have any record. [96]
Huxley held to a version of this thesis, claiming that
the physical and cultural nature of savages had not changed
since prehistoric times, and so fail to provide the
Q 7
"missing 1 ink"
:
In conclusion, I may say, that the fossil remains
of Man hitherto discovered do not seem to me to
take us appreciably nearer to that lower
pithecoid form, by the modification of which he
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has
,
probably
, become what he is. And
considering what is now known of the most ancient
lUl
5 n'e*' ^eing that they fashioned flintaxes and flint knives and bone-skewers, of muchthe same pattern as those fabricated by thelowest savages at the present day, and that wehave every reason to believe the habits and modesf living of such people to have remained the
same from the time of the Mammoth and the
^i
C
?°f!?
ine Rhinoceros till now, I do not knowthat this result is other than might be expected.
Huxley's view of progress for the civilized races was
also at variance from Darwin, for he claimed that although
there was an improvement in morals, there was also an
increase in immoral possibility. He asks:
•••[to] what extent modern progress in naturalknowledge
... especia 1 ly ... the ... progress in thedoctrine of evolution, is competent to help us in
the great work of helping one another ?.. .but asimmoral sentiments have no less been evolved,
there is, so far, as much natural sanction for
the one as the other. [98]
Huxley shared Wallace's view that human nature (at least
for the British) had not changed for over 400 or 500
99years
:
In my belief the innate qualities, physical,
intellectual, and moral, of our nation have
remained substantially the same for the last four
or five centuries. If the struggle for existence
has affected us to any serious extent (and I
doubt it) it has been, indirectly, through our
military and industrial wars with other nations.
In order to explain European dominance, Wallace turns
to an analysis of the effects
drugs. For Wallace it is not
conflicts, per se, that cause
economic weapons and cultural
mismanagement
.
of European religion and
biological or "natural"
Native extinction, but rather
implosion due to colonial
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ch ief cause, probably, of the decreasingnumber 3 of these people is the prevalence of
a its of intoxication in which they indulge as asubstitute for the dance, and song, and variedamusements, so injudiciously forbidden by the
missionaries. [100]
We witness Wallace's bias in this matter when he notes
that the Native's biological equivalency with Europeans
(which Darwin would never entertain), does not guarantee
surviva 1
:
The light type is, on the other hand, representedby the Malays and Polynesians, who in some
places, such as Samoa and the Marquesas, are in
no respects inferior to the average European,
either in their complexion, physical beauty, or
nobility of expression. Nevertheless, these
higher tribes are all disappearing under the
fatal contact of our much-vaunted civilization;
and nowhere is the steady process of extinction
developing on such a grand scale as amongst the
South Sea Islanders. [101]
Wallace s position is complex, however, for his focus
on cultural and economic conflict does not disallow a place
for Natural Selection to act at particular moments of human
history
.
Even these apparently trifling matters [the
Dyaks' interest in string games] may assist us to
form a truer estimate of the Dyak's character and
social condition. We learn thereby, that these
people have passed beyond that first stage of
savage life in which the struggle for existence
absorbs the whole faculties, and in which every
thought and idea is connected with war or
hunting, or the provision for their immediate
necessities. These amusements indicate a
capability of civilization, an aptitude to enjoy
other than mere sensual pleasures which might be
taken advantage of to elevate their whole
intellectual and social life. [102]
Thus we witness the wrinkle. He allows that
biological competition occurs at the "lowest levels" of
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human association, but that once this level is past, the
rest is political and cultural in nature. Wallace rejects
the idea that social "advancement" is powered by laws of
inheritance, in favor of transmission by learning within
the parameters of inherited abilities. This shift in
viewpoint allows him to think in terms of interacting
cultures rather than competing races/species. Such a
development also renders preconceived notions of
superiority and the necessity of domination open to
criticism.
Nowhere is Wallace's view on human evolution and
cultural development more illustrative of his development
than when he discusses the Aborigines of Australia. He
points out one reason why many Europeans dislike these
Natives :
The effluvium arising from the skin, in itself
peculiarly offensive to our sense of smell, is
rendered still more unendurable by the body being
greased with the oil of various large species of
fish. [103]
And he notes that these people are rapidly being
exterminated
:
Almost as peculiar and isolated as its flora and
fauna are the black aborigines of Australia, who
are now rapidly disappearing before the European
settler ... [ 104
]
Like many European commentators, he writes of the
"undeveloped" status of
culture ... [reca 1 Is ] the
1 0 Rthe human race." He
these Natives: their "low social
earliest stages in the history of
disparages their accomplishments in
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developing "higher faculties," writing that the aborigine
has a "low mental culture... no sense of number— that is of
abstract thought ...
"
10 6
But here the similarity ends, for Wallace, unlike many
other writers, shows sensitivity to contradictions of
culture. Ever interested in Native languages, he points
out that the Aborigine language is a "fully developed
10 7speech." Like Huxley, he admires the verbal abilities
of even the "lowest" savages. Huxley writes:
Few take duly into account the evidence which
exists as to the ease with which unlettered
savages gain or lose a language. [108]
Wallace gets double duty from the observation that
primitive" languages are fully as complex as those of
civilized" countries. First, he gains ammunition for his
contention that there a radical break between humans and
the rest of creation, therefore there is no "missing link"
between human and beast. (Huxley takes a similar stand,
writing that "Man... alone possesses the marvelous endowment
of intelligible and rational speech..." 109 )
Whereas non—emergent is t Darwinians point to savages as
the hinge between humanity and its progenitors, Wallace
sees no ultimate connection. The human race was "born"
with a fully developed faculty for speech, and so is unlike
any other species. At the birth of humanity biological
evolution ended and morality too was born:
...from the epoch when he became a living soul
conscious of good and evil there was little
actual selection except to ensure health and
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A second important characteristic of Wallace's
writings is that in the comparison of cultures, there is no
absolute scale for evaluation, despite occasional phrases,
such as: "advance to civilization." Some things improve
with "advance," others get worse. Speaking of the Fijians,
he says:
Their weapons are few and simple, and they neverdiscovered the art of making pottery; yet, as
they are undoubtedly in a far higher state of
civilisation, and far superior in mental capacity
to many savage races who possess that art, it isproof that we cannot measure the status of human
advancement merely by progress in the mechanical
arts. [112]
He notes that others agree with his assessment that
Aborigine s can display great intelligence and reasonable
behavior
.
Mr. Eyre found them to be frank, open, and
confiding, and easy to make friends with. He
declares that they have been greatly
misrepresented and traduced, and that much of
their assumed treachery and bloodthirstiness is
the result of cruelty and ill-treatment of the
settlers. [113]
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And at the same place he continues:
Sir Thomas
him in his
judgement
expedition
Mi tche 1 1 ... found those who accompaniedjourneys superior in penetration and
to the white men on the same
Wallace's "scale" of civilization allows cultures to
be ranked in regards to many respects, with the various
scales contradicting each other, whereas Darwinian scales
were absolute, because technological, moral, linguistic,
material, intellectual and physical attributes run
parallel and are ultimately reduced to the same material
base. Wallace split these things apart. Thus Tasmanian
Natives could be as "low" as Aborigines in terms of
material life, but superior in others:
Although so low in all the material indications
of civilization, there is reason to believe that
they were far higher than the Australians both
intellectually and morally. [114]
Another case of differential development occurs in the case
of the Dyaks:
Again, the Malays may be divided into two great
groups— the savage and the semicivi 1 ized peoples.
The Dyaks of Borneo are the best example of the
former. They have no writing or literature, no
regular government or religion, and they wear
only the scantiest clothing of the usual savage
type. But they are by no means a low class of
savages, for they build good houses, they
cultivate the ground, they make pottery and
canoes, they work in iron, and they even
construct roads and bridges... [115]
As we shall see, this decomposition of the univocal scale
of cultural rank leads directly to questioning the very
core notion so dear to many Victorian writers: progress.
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With the fall of progress comes the questioning of Imperial
venture. Wallace says one 116
...is led to ponder on the strange law of
whi^r-i^f
S
' Which looks so like retrogression, andich in so many distant parts of the world has
constructive
° r driVen °Ut 3 high1
^ artistic "d
far « wp n
t0 make r° 0ni for one wh ich, asas e can Dudge, is very far its inferior!
By 1913 Wallace has fully articulated his position on
the separation of technology from social/moral standing:
The great majority of educated persons hold theopinion that our wonderful discoveries andinventions in every department of art and scienceprove that we are really more intellectual and
wiser than the men of past ages--that our mentalfaculties have increased in power. But this ideais totally unfounded. We are the inheritors ofthe accumulated knowledge of all the ages; and itis quite possible, and even probable, that the
earliest steps taken in the accumulation of this
vast treasury required even more thought and ahigher intellectual power than any of those takenin our own era. [117]
Wallace even hints that the simple advances by savages
may have represented greater effort and achievement than
the more visible and apparently complex advances of the
nineteenth or twentieth centuries. This point of view
comes to no surprise for one familiar with Wallace's many
remarks praising local technologies. For instance, being
forced to use local transportation throughout his movements
over the Pacific, he comes to admire the Native boats,
constructed with techniques and materials that at first
glance seem far inferior to a European. The vines, used by
the Ke Islanders instead of nails, not only work as
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fasteners but they are cheaper and easier to replace. He
writes :
a vessel carefully built in this n
actually stronger and safer than cthe ordinary way with nails. [118]
manner is
one fastened in
All considered
,
he finds that he can heap praise on the
entire sea-faring adventure:
on the whole I was much delighted with the trip,
and was inclined to rate the luxuries of the
semi-barbarous prau as surpassing those of the
most magnificent screwsteamer
,
that highestproduct of civilization.
[ 119 ]
Another conceptual shift made possible by the
rejection of an absolute scale of culture is the
possibility that once culture and the biological
dissemination of a particular race are decoupled, a space
is left open for the transmission of ideas, customs and
technology through mere social contact. Thus the spread of
culture by means other than biological inheritance
following a struggle for existence is allowed. Wallace
writes that the Malays: 120
have spread their language ... [and ] customs widely
throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans, in many
instances to islands where they have effected no
sort of change in the physical or moral
characteristics of the indigenous inhabitants.
This type of transmission presents a problem for
Darwin, who wants to code advance only through genetic
modification and wants to place limits on the speed with
which Natives can be turned into Englishmen, while Wallace
is under no such constraint. In many cases Wallace
comments on how rapidly Natives pick up "civilized" habits
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For instance, when he
who were only yesterday "savages."
speaks of the Natives of Celebes, he says they are
...easily induced to learn and adopt the habits
°f civilized people. They are clever mechanics,
and seem capable of acquiring a considerable
amount of intellectual education. Up to a very
recent period these people were thorough
savages [121]
Despite his criticism of capitalism, Wallace says that
one of the motors of social change and anchors of stability
is commerce. However economic activity is placed within a
context of regulated commercial intercourse, and not in
terms of survival of the fittest of economic competitors.
Here we may behold in its simplest form the
genius of Commerce at the work of Civilization.
Trade is the magic that keeps all at peace...
I
walk daily unarmed in the jungle... I sleep in a
palm-leaf hut, which any one may enter, with as
little fear and as little danger as if I were
under the protection of the Metropolitan
police. [122]
While Wallace sometimes uses the concept as if it were a
neutral term, in other places he indicates that he
carefully spells out that the only forms of mercantile
venture that will benefit both Natives and Europeans are
ones that are thoughtfully controlled, and not forms which
develop from hidden regulat ion--so called "free trade."
It must be remembered too that our commerce is
not a purely natural growth. It has been ever
fostered by the legislature, and forced to an
unnatural luxuriance by the protection of our
fleets and armies. The wisdom and the justice of
this policy have already been doubted. So soon,
therefore, as it is seen that the further
extension of our manufactures and commerce would
be an evil, the remedy is not far to seek. [123]
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Where Darwin would see a biological conflict between
two races for territory, Wallace sees cultural difference,
and ultimately politics and political economy. it must be
stressed that Darwin was aware of this alternative view of
the world. In his letters to Wallace, Darwin pushes his
notion that the two disciplines are distinct.
I see that you are going to write on the mostdifficult political question, the land.
Something ought to be done, but what, is the rub.
I hope that you will (not) turn renegade to
natural history; but I suppose that politics are
very tempting. [124]
Wallace pushed back with humor, and gave Darwin a
nudge towards seeing the political and the biological as
linked. In a letter to Darwin (January 20, 1869) he says:
Really, what with the Torries passing Radical
Reform Bills and the Church periodicals
advocating Darwinianism
,
the millennium must be
at hand. [125]
There is no comment from Darwin.
We see Darwin's blinkers in full force in the case of
his comments upon reading The Malay Archipelago . Darwin's
only point about savages concerns the role of savage dress
in sexual selection. 126 Again, when on March 27, 1869
Wallace tries to make him deal with issues of imperialism
by suggesting he brush up on colonial theory, Darwin opts
1 y 7to plead no opinion:
I read all that you said about the Dutch
Government with much interest, but I do not feel
I know enough to form any opinion against yours.
In most cases Darwin acts as if he was unaware of the
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work. Perhaps Darwin felt
political dimension of Wallace's
he could wish it away. (November 19, 1873.)
I did not know that you had been writing on
except so far as your letter on the
coal question [Wallace suggests that England not
export cheap coal when many of the poor in
England could not afford it], which interested me
much and struck me as a capital letter... I hope
to Heaven that politics will not replace Natural
Science. [128]
The las
the rol
part icu
distrac
t point is very telling. Rather than arguing about
e of the scientist in society or the merits of the
lar debate, Darwin worries that Wallace is being
ted from scientific work.
Spencer went even further in this context, he tells
Wallace that politics is, in effect, epiphenomenal to
biology. Spencer vocalizes what Darwin leaves unsaid,
namely, that all human suffering, including the fallout
from the Land Nationalization Act, reflects the struggle
i o Qfor existence.
Darwin has to dodge and duck the issue, again and
again because Wallace kept bringing the topic up. Finding
a kindred spirit in George's book Progress and Poverty
,
Wallace recommends it in such a way that Darwin is forced,
out of friendship and professional solidarity, to respond.
First, Wallace's letter of July 9, 1881. 130
My dear Darwin, --I am just doing, what I rarely
if ever have done before--reading a book through
a second time immediately after the first
perusal. I do not think I have ever been so
attracted by a book, with perhaps the exception
of your "Origin of Species" and Spencer's "First
Principles" and "Social Statics." I wish
therefore to call your attention to it, in case
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you care about books on social and political
subjects, but here there is also an elaboratediscussion of Malthus's "Principles of
Population" to which both you and I have
acknowledged ourselves indebted. The present
writer, Mr. George, while admitting the mainprinciple as self-evident and as actually
operating in the case of animals and plants,denies that it ever has operated or can operatein the case of man, still less that it has anybearing whatever on the vast social and political
questions which have supported reference to it.
He then goes on to praise the book's wealth of facts and
argument
:
The title of the book is "Progress and
Poverty ."... It is the most startling novel and
original book of the last twenty years, and if I
mistake not will in the future rank as making an
advance in political and social science equal to
that made by Adam Smith a century ago. [131]
Darwin's answer is instructive. He affirms that there
is a serious issue to be addressed, but then he undercuts
the whole matter by questioning the possibility of a
resolution
.
My dear Wallace,— I have been heartily glad to
get your note and hear some news of you. I will
certainly order "Progress and Poverty," for the
subject is a most interesting one. But I read
many years ago some books on political economy,
and they produced a disastrous effect on my mind,
viz. utterly to distrust my own judgement on the
subject and to doubt much everyone else's
judgement! So I feel pretty sure Mr. George's
book will only make my mind worse confounded than
it is at present. [132]
Darwin, out of fear of failing to honor Wallace's
judgement, says he will order a copy of the book. Then,
unable to contain himself any longer, he attacks the
topic's validity and makes what can only be called an
insult directed at Wallace. It is doubtful that he had any
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intention of reading the book. Darwin's attempt to keep
science "pure" or separate from social and political
matters is fraught with difficulty, as it is faced with the
problem that his Natural Selection is saturated with such
political topics as the Poor Laws, morals, marriage
restrictions and Empire and race.
So much for Wallace's attempts to make Darwin more
aware of the political dimension of his work. Wallace
remained committed to his emergentist viewpoint and by 1905
he articulates differences between evolution and politics
with precision, while at the same time he overturns his
and more positive, views about paternalistic
colonialism. Although he is speaking to the Irish
question, the principle applied equally to the case of
indigenous peoples.
But to my mind, the question of good or bad, fit
or not fit for self-government, is not the point.
It is a question of fundamental justice, and the
just is always the expedient, as well as the
right. It is a crime against humanity for one
nation to govern another against its will
. [133]
C. Capital, Imperialism and Race
Perhaps
because of a
to the Mecha
of social pr
because of his working class background, or
flowering of ideas picked up from his visits
nic's Institute, or because of the variety
actices he witnessed in his extensive travels /
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or maybe because he took the ideals hieLa la i of his age too much to
heart, Wallace became disillusioned with conservative
Victorian culture in 3 j t • r-m general, and laissez faire capitalism
in particular.
This is not so say that Wallace was not proud of the
developing technology of the nineteenth century. Great
strides had been made in mechanizing productive forces and
prying wealth out of raw materials. He saw before him a
"tenfold increase of real wealth" generated by the
harnessing of steam power, and he liked what this implied
for the human condition
.
^4
On the other hand, he recognized, as did the flood of
social reformers during the eighteen-seventies, eighties
and beyond, that although technology was progressing by
leaps and bounds, social existence for the majority of
people in Britain was becoming worse.
Being a self-made man," he was constantly aware of
the difficulty of securing a living. During his late
teens, he was sent to work with his brother as a land
surveyor. He tramped through the countryside, primarily
engaged in doing the leg-work for the construction of the
newest high-tech innovation of the times, the railroads.
While he was impressed with the possibilities of this new
mode of transport, he also was exposed to the difficult
living conditions faced by the people of rural England.
When his work ran out, and he and his brother parted, he
was on his own. Although Darwin's worries over financial
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security appeared real enough to himself, he never had to
work to earn a living but rather made do with an ever
Illustration 14: Engraving of Robert Owen. 137
Another possible source of Wallace's sensitivity was
exposure to the utopian socialist movement through contact
with Robert Owen's ideas. At the "Hall of Science" he
became familiar with social experiments such as Owen's New
Lanark community. Owen bought and ran a spinning mill at
New Lanark, successfully incorporating child-care,
education, better working and living conditions with a form
of benevolently-managed capitalism. He also played a part
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Perhaps the seeds
in passing the Factory Act of 1819. 138
of Wallace's politics were sewn at these points of contact
with utopian socialism.
Illustration 15: Engraving of New Lanark. 138
Of course immersion within Native cultures which
utilized less sophisticated technologies but yet captured
his imagination through attractive living conditions and
alternative political arrangements must have driven him to
reconsider the necessity of capitalism.
As his life progressed, Wallace became more and more
vocal on the topic of social reform through socialism.
During his trip to the United States in 1886-7 he delivered
lectures on many topics, including political economy, in
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order to bolster his sagging finances and spread the word
about Natural Selection and social reform. He met
President Cleveland, but found him boring. 139
Wallace's lectures were sometimes a bit radical for
his audiences:
The other paper [read at a meeting of the Women's
Anthropological Society of Washington, D.C.] was
on "Social Economy versus Political Economy,"
...It was an attempt to show how and why the old
"political economy" was effete and useless, in
view of modern civilization and modern
accumulations of wealth. Its one end, aim, and
the measure of its success, was the accumulation
of wealth, without considering who got the
wealth, or how many of the producers of the
wealth starved. [140]
He felt that the reception after this talk was chilly, but
he knew he had displayed a truth: capitalism produced
injustice. He put the point another way by asking whether
capitalism had succeeded in providing the fundamental
necessities for society: basic physical and mental
well-being for all.
The only doctrine on this matter worthy of an
evolutionist, or of a believer in God, is that
health of body and of mind are the only natural
safeguards against disease; and that securing the
conditions for such health for every individual
is the one and only true test of a true
civilization. [141]
His argument is double pronged. He exhorts the scientist
and the evolutionist to consider the implications of
biology's first principle. Evolution, applied to social
animals, Wallace seems to be saying here, demands that a
group must maximize survival for its members. How excess
wealth (i.e. wealth over and above that needed to assure
223
gets divided up is not
the survival of individuals)
Wallace's point, but rather the focus is on the notion that
if evolutionary success is measured by the health of
individuals, then slums in the cities make no sense. Other
socialists were making this suggestion in terms of moral
arguments, but like Kropotkin—who argued that Natural
Selection was driven by cooperation, Wallace harnesses the
biological argument for his own purposes— turning Darwin on
his head, as it were.
Wallace also slips a moral prescription into an
equation which is calculated to catch materialists out: "is
the one and only true test of a true civilization." Even
Darwin, the arch-materialist, wants to place British
culture above the rest of the world's. Thus the
implications of 'true civilization" force the scientist to
allow that social justice has a place in the biological
equation, even if that admission is powered by sheer vanity
for empire. Implicit in this argument is the point against
continuity: unlike other animals, humans can decide to
shape their social groups after their desires or moral
beliefs .
On the other prong, Wallace hangs the the religious
man who may not go along with the theory of evolution.
Broad considerations of Christian morals force one to admit
that the meek ought to be provided for--or at least
given enough to eat. Wallace turns the pride of the
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century against its realities, and then asks one to
consider dividing an over-abundance according to needs.
In order to illustrate his point, Wallace suggested
that if the tenfold increase of real wealth generated by
the harnessing of steam power had been so distributed that
all were equally benefited, then every worker would have
had ten times as much of the necessaries and comforts of
including a greater amount of leisure and
14 9enjoyment
.
The usual rejoinder to such thoughts on equality
typically takes the form of: it is the fault of the poor
that they are destitute— they do not want to work, they
drink, or they are dirty and weak with self-inflicted
disease. Wallace responded by taking up the position dear
to Marxists and many other social critics, namely that the
poor are not poor because they are bad, but rather because
of economic forces which are beyond their control as
individua 1 s
.
...the horrible gulf of extreme poverty in which
more than a quarter of a million of the people of
London constantly live... [is caused by]
conditions over which the sufferers have no
control ... [ 143
]
During the nineteenth century statistics on morbidity
became a hot topic, what with the vaccination debate and
concerns over working and living conditions in the slums of
London and other manufacturing centers. He took a
controversial stand on the vaccination issue, opposing the
new technique. There is not space here to delve into this
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interesting debate, but a few comments are relevant to
developing an understanding of his point of view.
Wallace was asked by the government to serve on the
committee formed to study vaccination. Although he refused
to be impanelled, he did testify, and what is interesting
for us here is that Wallace felt it more important to go to
the cause of the problem, than to treat symptoms. He
believed that the major contributing factor to the outbreak
of disease in the slums was not the mere presence of germs,
as germs could be found anywhere, but rather somatic misery
resulted from the weakened condition of people placed in an
unhealthy environment; in other words: poverty was the
culprit
.
...under our present social economy it
[overcrowding] is . . . universa 1 ly associated with
various causes of disease--impure air, bad
drainage, bad water supply .. overwork ..
.
[144]
Wallace worked hard for reform of working conditions--
through lectures, writing and using his influence on
government. He was scandalized by the laborers' situation,
the more so because there was no need for conditions to be
so bad. 14 ^ He tied the lack of resources for ending
poverty to the waste of funds on the military. 14 ^
These great armies are continually being equipped
with new and more deadly weapons, at a cost which
strains the resources even of the most wealthy
nations, and by the constant increase of taxation
and of debt impoverishes the mass of the people.
He felt that the exploits of the Empire, such as
the Crimean War in 1854-55, forced on by private
interests, with no rational object in view...
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[had] no relation whatever to the well-being ofthe communities which were engaged in them. [147]
In looking for the culprits, Wallace takes a
surprising turn. He claims that science was "seized upon
by the spirit of militarism" and dedicated itself to
furthering militaristic ends. He sees the interests of the
owning classes directing the path of science into socially
unproductive avenues. 148
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A few years before his much-lamented death, that
acute yet cautious thinker, the late Professor
Huxley, was forced to adopt the conclusions of
Professor Cairnes, and those here set forth, that
our modern system of landlordism and capitalistic
competition tends to increase rather than to
diminish poverty... [149]
It must be born in mind that Wallace was not acting alone,
he felt himself part of a movement, in the scientific,
literary and even governmental realms, towards reform.
When criticizing the Empire he appealed to a variety of
sources, his travel diaries, the growing literature of
dissent, and even government report s--such as those on the
ISOproblems in India.
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1 . Workers and Natives
Turning from particular abuses of capitalism Wallace
considers the structure which allows a small class to reap
the economic fruits of a society (1898)
:
...these Christian government s ... exist ... for the
aggrandizement and greed and lust of power of the
ruling classes. • .the true vampires of our
civilization Witness their struggle in Africa
and Asia
,
where millions of savage or
semicivilized peoples may be enslaved and bled
for the benefit of their new rulers .. .Great
vested interests are at stake; and ever-growing
pressure is brought to bear upon the too-willing
governments in the name of the greatness or
safety of the Empire, the extension of commerce,
or the advance of civilization. Anything to
distract attention from the starvation and
wretchedness and death-dealing trades at home,
and the thinly veiled slavery in many of our
tropical or subtropical colonies. [151]
Two themes become linked here: progress and Empire.
Wallace conceptualizes exploitation of Native and worker as
symmetrical events within the class struggle played out in
the mercantile ventures of this period. What is explicitly
condemned in Wallace goes unremarked in and tacitly
approved by Darwin: the lower class European and the Native
must perish in the struggle for existence and it is foolish
to think one can influence this "law of nature."
In The Wonderful Century he sings praises of the age
for the first half of the book. The second half turns to
the failures of the period, and by the time one is done
reading any attempt to utter the word "progress" becomes
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strangled with thoughts about the more sinister elements of
the changes taking place.
Taking account of these various groups of
undoubted facts/ many of which are so gross
, soterrible, that they cannot be overstated, it is
not too much to say that our whole system of
society is so rotten from top to bottom, and the
Social Environment as a whole, in relation to our
possibilities and our claims, is the worst that
the world has ever seen. [152]
This passage should cause the reader to recall the
structure of the Malay Archipelago . Wallace, throughout
his publishing career, seems to have made a point of
initially catering to mainstream ideas he opposes but then
by offering alternative views he reveals criticisms of
commonly held prejudices.
Furthermore, his writings take on the quality of
critique. In our period we have opaque buzzwords which
upon analysis turn into symbols for repression, such as:
"democracy," "national security," "free markets," and "high
technology," just as the nineteenth century had
counterparts for these in "Empire," "safety of the Empire,"
"extension of commerce," and "progress and advance of
civilization," all of which Wallace explodes.
He links the situation of Native and worker. He
thinks that if we ask for whose benefit these Natives are
"civi 1 ized ,
"
...it would be found more difficult to answer
than had been imagined. The advantages, even to
the few who reap them, would be seen to be mostly
physical, while the widespread moral and
intellectual evils resulting from unceasing
labour, low wages, crowded dwellings, and
monotonous occupations, to perhaps as large anumber as those who gain real advantage, might beheld to show a balance of evil so great, as tolead the greatest admirers of our manufactures
and commerce to doubt the advisability of theirfurther development. [153]
By decoupling the "high technology" flash of new
manufacturing techniques from nationalism and re-coupling
it with poverty and class bias, Wallace attempts to call
into question the ultimate value of capitalism and even
science itself. He proclaims that the "advances of science
curses..." his society. 154 The evidence, he knew, was born
out by the Government's own statistics.
...accompanying our enormous increase of wealth,
there has been a corresponding increase of
poverty, of insanity, of suicide, and probably
even crime, together with other indications of
moral and physical deterioration. [155]
While Darwin might concur with this description, the
reasons and solutions to this problem that Wallace proposes
fly in the face of what Darwin stood for.
By praising Natives for this or that, he decouples
"savage" and "barbarian" from "bad" or "lower." Speaking
of the Samoans, he says:
...they carry their habits of cleanliness and
decency to a higher point than the most
fastidious of civilized nations. Their public
meetings are carried on with a dignity and
forbearance which Europeans never equal, while
even in the heat of war they have shown
themselves amenable to the influences of reason
and religion. [156]
He often uses this tact to elevate Native cultures in the
estimation of his readers and thus bring into question the
assumed authority of Europeans which allows them to
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dominate Natives through overpowering technology. In many
instances he praises local Native political arrangements,
when appropriate, whether they be in distinction to
European rule, or under benevolent European rule:
Many savage tribes, many barbarian peoples are
really better governed today than the majority ofthe self-styled civilized nations. [157]
Thus reality of Empire is set against the pretensions
of the times:
And what a horrible mockery is all this when
viewed in the light of either Christianity or
advancing civilization! [158]
In addition to giving consciences a prick, Wallace
explicitly develops a theory of morality that differs
radically from Darwin's. Whereas Darwin would tie morality
to material existence through genetically inherited modes
of behavior, Wallace cuts this link. Wallace says morals
are not inherited, and are "...largely a matter of
convent ion ... a product of the environment ... loca 1 and
temporary." Darwin could agree with the specifics of
this quote, but he sees morals as an evolutionary strategy
common to animals and "man." Wallace stresses the human
capacity to adjust the world to fit moral concerns
regardless of the dictates of Malthusian materialism. This
decoupling of morality from Natural Selection has another
result, for it takes the implicit hierarchy of culturally
specific ethical codes into the open. Thus the question as
to the value of Native practices becomes a matter of
debate, rather than a settled issue.
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Wallace, as should be realized by now, had not
abandoned the idea that evolution did apply to aspects of
human behavior. The break with Darwin here is not total.
Wallace allows that evolution would have generated
faculties which held an evolutionary benefit.
The mental faculties which go to form the
character of each man or woman are very
numerous, a large proportion of them being such
as are required for the preservation of the
individual and of the race... [160]
He acknowledges the animal aspect of humans, but he is free
to downplay the importance of these faculties for the
matters at hand by proposing a radical break between human
and beast. He continues the above passage by writing that
other faculties
are pre-eminently social or ethical. These
latter, which impel us to truth, to justice, and
to benevolence, when in due proportion to all the
other mental faculties, go to form what we
distinguish as a good or moral character ...[ 16 1
]
With this addition Wallace allows politics and justice to
escape a biological basis. He is then free to examine
capitalism in terms of morality as well as in biological
terms when he considers the first steps towards humanity.
Darwin was horrified, as we shall see in the last section
of this chapter, at Wallace's attempt.
Perhaps the earliest statement that Wallace made
criticizing the status of Natives under capitalism came in
I C O
his master work: The Malay Archipelago . This was his
most widely read book, going through many editions and
translated into many languages, and his attack on the
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assumed superiority of civilization was read by many
thousands. Given the harsh conclusion he intends to draw,
he gently asks the reader to consider what the savage has
to offer. Soon he points out the contradiction between
what Victorian civilization stood for: personal freedom,
equality, justice, and adequate material existence; with
the reality of living conditions for the British working
class and "savages:"
I have now concluded my task ... Before
bidd ing . . . f a rewe 1 1 , I wish to make a few
observations on a subject of yet higher interest
and deeper importance, which the contemplation of
savage life has suggested, and on which I believe
that the civilized can learn something from the
savage man.
We most of us believe that we, the higher
races, have progressed and are progressing. If
so, there must be some state of perfection, some
ultimate goal, which we may never reach, but to
which all true progress must bring us nearer...
Our best thinkers maintain that it is a state of
individual freedom and self-government ... in such
a state every man... would require no other motive
but the free impulses of his own nature to obey
that law [i.e. a just law]. [163]
He claims to have witnessed, first hand. Natives who
actually live in the harmony that the utopian socialists
were striving for, and the classical Marxists predicted
would occur after the revolution had moved to its
conclusion
.
Now it is very remarkable that among people in a
very low stage of civilization we find some
approach to such a perfect social state. I have
lived in communities of savages in South America
and in the East, who have no laws or law courts
but the public opinion of the village freely
expressed ... In such a community, all are nearly
equal. There are none of those wide
distinctions, of education and ignorance, wealth,
233
Drodnr^nf7,
master
1
and servant, which are thep cdnct ° f our civilization; there is none ofthat wide-spread division of labour, which, whileit increases wealth, produces also conflictinginterests; there is not that severe competition
and struggle for existence, or for wealth, whichthe dense population of civilized countriesinevitably creates. All incitements to great
crimes are thus wanting, and petty ones
repressed, partly by the influence of public
opinion, but chiefly by that natural sense ofjustice and of his neighbor's right which seemsto be, in some degree, inherent in every race of
man. [164]
Next he tries to put technological and cultural
achievements of Europeans in perspective with what should
be more important, the achievement of a just, or moral,
life
.
Now, although we have progressed vastly
beyond the savage state in intellectual
achievements, we have not advanced equally in
morals... But is it not too much to say, that the
mass of our populations have not advanced beyond
the savage code of morals, and have in many cases
sunk below it. A deficient morality is the great
blot of modern civilization, and the greatest
hindrance to true progress ... Our mastery over the
forces of nature has led to a rapid growth of
population, and a vast accumulation of wealth;
but these have brought with them such an amount
of poverty and crime— that it may well be
questioned, whether the mental and moral status
of our population has not on the average been
lowered, and whether evil has not overbalanced
the good ... Compared with our wonderous progress
in physical science and its practical
applications, our system of government, of
administering justice, of national education, and
our whole social and moral organization, remains
in a state of barbarism. And if we continue to
devote our chief energies to utilizing our
knowledge of the laws of nature with the view to
still further extending our commerce and our
wealth, the evils which necessarily accompany
these when too eagerly pursued, may increase to
such gigantic dimensions as to be beyond our
power to alleviate. [165]
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The final twist comes to rest with class warfare.
Although he does not directly appeal to Marxism, the
suggestion is obvious.
We should now clearly recognize the fact,that the wealth and knowledge and culture of thefew do not constitute civilization, and do not
—
of themselves advance us towards the "perfect
social state." Our vast manufacturing system,
our gigantic commerce, our crowded towns and
cities, support and continually renew a mass ofhuman misery and crime absolutely greater than
has ever existed before. They create and
maintain in life-long labour an ever-increasing
army, whose lot is the more hard to bear by
contrast with the pleasures, the comforts, and
the luxury which they see everywhere around them,
but which they can never hope to enjoy; and who,
in this respect, are worse off than the savage in
the midst of his tribe. [166]
He closes with an appeal for reform. Change was
manifesting itself during this period in the form of labor
and sanitation laws, but improvements for the worker and
savage under the Empire was partial at best, and painfully
slow
.
This is not a result to boast of, or the be
satisfied with; and, until there is a more
general recognition of this failure of our
civilizat ion--resul t ing mainly from our neglect
to train and develop more thoroughly the
sympathetic feelings and moral faculties of our
nature, and to allow them a larger share of
influence in our legislation, our commerce, and
our whole social organization—we shall never, as
regards the whole community, attain to any real
or important superiority over the better class of
savages
.
This is the lesson I have been taught by my
observation of uncivilized man. I now bid my
readers— Farewel 1 ! [167]
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In his late works he embraces socialism directly. 168
And in 1889 he met the anarchist French geographer Elisee
Rec lus
, whose radical politics fit nicely with his own.
We agreed that almost all social evils—allpoverty, misery, crime—were the creation ofgovernments and of bad social sys terns ...[ it wouldbe best if there were] no central governments[except for voluntary coalitions]
.
[169]
Wallace then takes yet another step away from hierarchy, a
step which parallels his movement away from assumed
superiority over Natives. He embraces cultural diversity
for its own sake, debunking the "melting pot" ideal.
There is one point. . .which I do not think has
ever been much considered or discussed. It is,
the undoubted benefit to all the members of a
society of the greatest possible diversity of
character
,
as a means both towards the greatest
enjoyment and interest of association, and to the
highest ultimate development of the race. [170]
Such a claim is of course no surprise, as Wallace's
impetus tends towards breaking assumptions about cultural
hierarchy, and replacing them with core notions of social
justice based upon equality and tolerance for alternative
forms of life. Furthermore, appeal to diversity accords
with Darwinian theory in that it is diversity that allows
Natural Evolution to go forward. A similar argument is
used by John Stuart Mill, in terms of the need to avoid
censorship. Wallace's argument is subversive to Darwin's
ideas on hierarchy—which rely on a culling of social class
diversity in favor of a more homogeneous "superior" segment
of society. The same applies for racial considerations, or
in Mill's case--for unpopular ideas.
236
2. Eugenics
Whereas Darwin wants to claim that evolutionary
pressure continues to operate on humans in every phase of
life, Wallace comes to the view that for humans, Natural
Selection (except in minor instances) has ceased to act.
Thus reproductive policy becomes a political matter for
Wallace, and not a biological/scientific subtopic. By 1913
he articulates a concern over the potential abuse Darwin's
position entails.
These misconceptions [about heredity, i.e.
whether culture is inherited biologica 1 ly ] . . . are
the more important and dangerous because their
promulgators are able to quote Herbert Spencer,
and to a less extent Darwin, as holding similar
views. [171]
Darwin and Wallace had already gone head to head on the
issue of human emergence in 1890, when Darwin read
Wallace's article in the Fortnightly Review titled "Human
Selection." Wallace thought this article was
the most important contribution I have made to
the science of sociology and the cause of human
progress. The article was written with two
objects in view. The first and most important
was to show that the various proposals of Grant
Allen, Mr. Francis Galton, and some American
writers, to attempt the direct improvement of the
human race by forms of artificial elimination and
selection, are both unscientific and unnecessary
;
I also wished to show that the great bugbear of
the opponents of social reform— too rapid
increase in population— is entirely imaginary,
and that the very same agencies which, under
improved social conditions, will bring about a
real and effective selection of the physically,
mentally, and morally best, will also tend
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towards a diminution of the rate of increase ofthe population. [172]
He suggests that eugenics is unnatural, thus demonstrating
that the eugenicists are practicing politics, not just
advocating "sound scientific policy." Of critical
importance here is that others shared his view that
evolutionary pressure had ceased to work on humans, for
example George Eliot or even Huxley.
It is important to our evaluation of Darwin and the
other Social Darwinists that Wallace considered himself
within the mainstream of an expanding movement, even if
some of his colleagues within the scientific biology
community resisted these ideas through denial and silence.
The flowing tide is with us. We have great
poets, great writers, great thinkers, to cheer
and guide us, and and ever-increasing band of
earnest workers to spread the light and help in
the good time coming. [173]
Thus he had little patience with Spencer and Darwin
when they advocated letting the poor die because of their
supposed inferiority , or insisted on instituting eugenic
policies to limit the reproduction of the poor /Natives
.
In the first place, I have shown that modern
ideas as to the necessity of dealing directly
with some of our glaring social evils, such as
race degeneration and the various forms of sexual
immorality, are fundamentally wrong and are
doomed to failure so long as their fundamental
cause—wide-spread poverty, destitution, and
starvat ion--are not greatly diminished and
ultimately abol ished ... reasonably just and equal
economic conditions will automatically abolish
all these evils.
In the second place, I have shown that the
dread of over-population as the result of the
abolition of poverty is wholly and utterly
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fallacious— a mere bugbear created by ignorance
of natural laws and of presumption in thinking we
can cure social evils while leaving the man-made
causes which produce them unaltered. [175]
Some of his animosity to increasing government power
originated in an 1870 dispute between himself and John
Hampden. 176 in this legal altercation Wallace undertook to
attack an obnoxious character who tried to promote the flat
earth theory.
In one of the bizarre but instructive chapters of
western science Wallace devised an apparatus to show that
the earth was not flat by measuring the curvature of the
planet along a canal waterway. Even though he won the bet
for 500 pounds
,
and subseguently won libel suit after libel
suit against Hampden, legal technicalities resulted in
Wallace losing hundreds of pounds in legal fees and fines.
Reflecting on the events, he felt that the
...English law
,
which leaves the honest man in
the power of the dishonest one... is the very
antithesis of justice
. [177]
In the end, Wallace saw this as an example of how
justice in England was operative in proportion to the
1 7 R
wealth of the individual. His experiences only
reinforced his opinion that progress was a suspect notion,
that increasing national wealth was not obviously a good
179thing, and that governments were indifferent to justice.
Thus he reacts strongly to the opinions of Malthus,
Darwin and Spencer, who advocate "scientific" and
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government-run eugenics programs in one form or another.
Malthus traced the origins of eugenics to Galton:
The total cessation of the action of natural
selection as a cause of improvement in our race,
either physical or mental, led to the proposal of
the late Sir F. Galton to establish a new
science, which he termed Eugenics. [ 180 ]
Galton proposed a very mild form of direct reproductive
regulation, as he made it "limited to giving prizes" for
good efforts towards that end. Darwin, Malthus and Spencer
wished to impose more aggressive policies. But Darwin and
Malthus cannot have it both ways, for if evolutionary
pressure results in a demise of aristocrats and the wealthy
in favor of the proliferation of the poor—on their own
terms that is an indication of which individuals or classes
are the most fit. On the other hand, if selection has
ceased, then social conflict must be evaluated on some
criteria other than evolutionary confrontations based on
large craniums, light skin color, class of birth, or sex.
Wallace was well aware of the potential abuses of
eugenics
:
But there is great danger in such a process of
artificial selection by experts... We have
already had proposals made for the segregation of
the feeble-minded, [while the] sterilization of
the unfit and of some classes of criminals is
already being discussed. [ 181 ]
Given his ideas on social change such "experts" had to be
viewed as potential agents of oppression.
Furthermore, he felt that those pushing for eugenics
were suppressing evidence that indicated class warfare
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played a large role in the motivation of those seeking to
control the reproduction of the lower classes. Even
Spencer acknowledged that fertility decreases as class
status increases. 182 We have already seen that Darwin
worried about this, too. Wallace thought that the
information did not have to be taken as fuel for the
argument that the poor should be discouraged from breeding.
Rather, he thought this proved that raising the poor out of
poverty would decrease population growth and so solve the
"problem" of overpopulation.
Ending poverty would trigger an automatic restriction
of population growth because it would change the social
practices of women (more on this later)
.
When poverty is abolished and neither economic
nor social advantages will be gained by early
marriage, there can be no doubt it will be
generally deferred to a later age. [183]
This would have the effect of cutting the birth rate for
two reasons: shortening of the reproductive phase for
women, and altering the fertility rate. He was not
striking out on his own with these ideas, but merely
developing things noted by the advocates of eugenics.
Galton himself noted a decrease of fertility with
184increasing age in women.
In terms of imperial conflict, Wallace finds that an
examination of human reproductive practices yields another
attack on the theory that evolutionary forces alone mold
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human culture. He points out that while he agrees with
Darwin and others that war leads to
...a rather severe process of selection [in
which] the strongest physically, the mostingenious in the use of weapons, and the best
organized for war did survive... [185]
he thinks his opponents should also take note that history
indicates that wars, because they operate on groups and to
a lesser extent on individuals, also ensure the survival of
slaves, prostitutes, and other so-called "less, fit"
characters
.
But in the human race the conditions are
altogether different; for while... the kind of
natural selection which through all the ages had
molded the infinitely varied animal forms into
harmony with their environment ceased to act upon
man s body and only for a limited time upon his
lower mental faculties, sexual selection tended
to act, if at all prejudicially, through
polygamy, prostitution, and slavery, though it
possess the potentiality of acting in the future
so as to ensure intellectual and moral
progress . .
. [ 186
]
Rather than the "most fit" sharing their genetic
heritage with each other, "inferiors" are selected by the
"higher" individuals for partners. This contradiction
shows that humans select in ways incompatible with what one
would expect of strict Natural Selection. While it might
be possible to wiggle around this point by invoking
formulae of selective advantage, or even disadvantage,
derived from such practices, the more direct and obvious
solution is to admit that evolution has ceased to act, and
that a non-biologica 1 or "cultural evolution" has begun.
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Another aspect of this concerns the magnitude of
selective pressure on humans. Many of the professional
biologists of the time held that Malthusian precepts made
it a priori that Natural Selection must eliminate a very
high percentage of offspring. Britain was in that phase of
development of the social sciences and politics in which
statistics became important for formulation of theory and
even legislative practice. Yet the statistics showed that
in "civilized" countries about one-half of the general
population died before reaching the age of twenty-five. 187
While this appalling figure makes one cringe, it was to
Wallace an indication that selection had ceased to act, and
that political action was required to reduce early
mortality even further. He held that the figures for
survival to maturity in nature started at 20%, and went as
low as 1/10 of 1%. 188
The magnitude of selective pressure on Natives was
also an impetus for Wallace's views. Like all biologists,
he tried to apply Malthus' principles to local populations.
Since he lived with Native peoples for extended periods, he
was able to examine first hand the lack of selective
pressure, which should have been much higher according to
Malthus and Darwin.
During my residence among the Hill Dyaks, I was
much struck by the apparent absence of those
causes which are generally supposed to check the
increase of population [for they have plenty of
food]. Of all the checks to population among
savage nations mentioned by Ma 1 thus--s tarva t ion,
disease, war, infanticide, immorality, and
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eems to me capable of
of the population among
“the last is that which
st important .. .and yet
As we shall see shortly, this idea that women could control
population growth, either unconsciously through imposed
and adverse conditions or consciously through the power of
selecting mates and the timing of reproduction, became an
important one for Wallace in his arguments for sexual
equality
.
3. Power to women
Wallace became a champion for women's rights, out of
moral concerns for equality certainly, but also out of an
appreciation of the political position of the poor/Native.
By giving women real power he thought that women could
reform society through regulating human reproduction.
The details of how he came to this view are quite
fascinating. From his earliest writings we see him
wrestling with a conundrum: if Native women control
reproductive rates (in this case involuntarily through
lower fertility)
,
and Europeans help them lead a less
stressful life by introducing superior technology, a
problematic population explosion would result. Thus
European efforts aimed at a better life would lead to
disastrous consequences. He speculates that it is women's
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hard working conditions that historically have kept
reproductive rates down. If modernizing the Native
improves living conditions, population, competition and
misery will increase.
But, with the sharper struggle for existence that
will then occur, will the happiness of the people
as a whole be increased or diminished? Will not
evil passions be aroused by the spirit of
competition, and crimes and vices, now unknown or
dormant, be called into active existence? These
are problems that time alone can solve; but it is
to be hoped that education and a high-class
European example may obviate much of the evil
that too often arises in analogous cases, and
that we may at length be able to point to one
instance of an uncivilized people who have not
become demoralized and finally exterminated by
contact with European civilization. [190]
The tragic logic of European actions demonstrates
human ability to transcend evolutionary strictures and
but paradoxically results in a sharpening of constraints on
the Native.
Yet Wallace finds evidence for hope. His optimism is
generated from an intriguing reworking of Victorian ideals.
The conservative Victorian's ideas of "degeneration" and
"women as a source of moral values" are turned on their
heads by the proposal of giving women real power over
reproduction. By implication there ought also be a raising
of suppressed classes and cultures through a transfer of
power from owners to workers, from colonists to Natives.
In Wallace's reasoning women's delay in marriage would
have the result of decreasing the reproductive rate,
allowing wealth to be conserved and the "bugbear" of
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overpopulation would be overcome. He had a second reason
to think that a decrease in social and economic pressure
for early marriage would result in lowered reproductive
rates. A lowering of pressure to marry would promote a new
phenomenon : celibacy out of choice.
In a state of society in which all women were
economically independent, were all fully occupied
with public duties and social or intellectual
pleasures, and had nothing to gain by marriage as
regards material well-being or social position,
it is highly probable that the numbers of the
unmarried from choice would increase. It would
probably come to be considered a degradation for
any woman to marry a man whom she could not love
and esteem, and this reason would tend at least
to delay marriage until a worthy and sympathetic
partner was encountered. [191]
More unusual yet, Wallace proposed that giving women a
truly free choice over mates would result in a partial
restoration of some of the positive aspects of Natural
Selection. The humorous aspect of this claim is that it
restores Darwin's claim that sexual selection is an
important factor in human evolution by turning Darwin's
view inside out. Wallace writes:
...under rational conditions of civilization
...the position of woman... will be far higher and
more important than any which has been claimed
for or by her in the past.
While she will be conceded full political
and social rights on an equality with man, she
will be placed in a position of responsibility
and power which will render her his superior,
since the future moral progress of the race will
so largely depend upon her free choice in
marriage. As time goes on, and she acquires more
and more economic independence, that alone will
give her an effective choice which she has never
had before. [192]
246
may go
He allows that within this reformed society men
unselected because of female choice. Thus actual
alterations in reproductive pathways could be effected by
the conscious choices of women.
This development of sexual selection's powers includes
a humorous subtext. Michael Ruse claims that Darwin created
Sexual Selection to counter Wallace's ideas about cultural
selection and the unique status of "man."
To counter Wallace, although undoubtedly also as
a natural development of ideas which he had had
previously, Darwin included in the Descent a very
large general discussion of sexual selection
,
and
then he argued that many of the differences
between humans, both between the sexes and
between the different races, are due to this kind
of selection: men struggle for the women they
want, women are attracted to the dominant men,
and so forth. Thus, something like human
hairlessness can be explained as a function of
early men finding hairy mates distasteful. [193]
Although it is unclear why men would also become less hairy
(and apparently women prefer "somewhat" hairy men as many
prefer beards (especially at that time)), Ruse is correct
in claiming that Darwin was absolutely opposed to Wallace's
ideas on group selection and on the unique status of "man."
Furthermore, an inventory of characteristics of Darwin's
and Wallace's view of sexual selection reveals how the
ideological and the scientific are intertwined.
Consider Darwin's version of sexual selection. In
terms of female choice--which turns on the male's power to
drive that "choice" through vigor, a conservative Victorian
bias towards a "natural" male dominance helps validate the
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theory. On Wallace's side a bias to support human sexual
equality drives the scientific view that color
characteristics in animals are equally distributed in males
and females. An exception proving the rule resides in the
case of female birds whose nests are "open" or exposed.
Such females will lose their brilliant color in favor of
more protective coloring--in cases where the female does
the sitting on the nest . 1 ^ 4 Thus on Darwin's view the more
beautiful coloring of the male is one more demonstration of
male superiority, while on Wallace's view the male's
coloring is not something the female lacks out of
inferiority, but rather is something given up because it is
inappropriate to the behavior of the species.
Second, Darwin's emphasis on the aesthetic nature of
animal choice in sexual selection is driven by the needs of
the continuity thesis. By demonstrating that animals share
an appreciation of the beautiful the continuity of
psychological faculties and abilities is "confirmed."
Recent work on sexual selection has reinvigorated a
moribund field and has resuscitated appreciation for the
. .
i oc;
aesthetic ability of animals:
Bateson therefore concludes ... that quail may be
following a highly abstract aesthetic rule--
prefer intermediary degrees of familiarity...
The idea is that quail shun mates that are too familiar or
too strange and so avoid incest. Similarly, the female
swordtail fish discussed earlier in the chapter on Darwin
are selecting according to a rule. The female choice is
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not always benef icia 1— for in some environments there are
strict limits on size. Due to accidents of the perceptual
apparatus and the particular cue utilized for size, the
female winds up selecting sword length as opposed to
overall size and thus the "aesthetic" preference for large
mates leads to a non functional adaptation: the sword. 196
Despite attempts to produce an incest aesthetic that
applies equally to animals and humans 197 the question of
whether such rules are equivalent to appreciation of the
beautiful by humans remains. Whereas the particulars of
the perceptual apparatus can be used to elucidate a uniform
choice pattern within animals, any such investigation into
human behaviour seems doomed from the start. Analogously
it is difficult to understand how one could demonstrate the
aesthetic sense in animals--if one means more than "bigger
is better" (as in the case of the swordtails) or "just say
no to strange" (despite Bateson's terminology). To put the
matter the other way around, what would dolphinic Cubism or
zebrine Abstract Expressionism look like? Furthermore,
even if animals only demonstrate an ability in terms of
"early" aesthetic theory:
There is no case on record where the female of an
established pair has rejected the male because he
turned out not to be beautiful enough when the
time came for coition. [198]
Wilma George points out that Wallace explicitly argues
along these lines in his Darwinism :
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The conferment of an aesthetic sense on female
animals was to him an unjustified assumption.Wallace maintained that is was not possible toprove a sense of beauty, of appreciation ofpatterns of artistic merits, in birds andinsects. It was not even likely that insects
would see in the same way that man does,
considering the differences in structures of
their eye and brain... "it appears to me, inimputing to insects and birds the same love of
colour for its own sake and the same aesthetic
tastes as we ourselves possess we may be as farfrom the truth as were the writers who held that
the bee was a good mathematician, and that the
honeycomb was constructed throughout to satisfy
its refined mathematical instincts." [199]
While Darwin sent biology on a productive research
path with sexual selection, Wallace's point about the
specifics of neural anatomy is correct. For example, in
the case of mating calls the utilization of two frequencies
by the Tungara frog is directly related to the particular
structure of the animal's ear—which is divided into two
receptors: one maximizing at 500 Hz, the other at 2100
Hz. 200 However it is preposterous to claim that any
meaningful understanding of the sociology of popular music
genres, for example, is going to be explained by an appeal
to the structure of the human ear or the perceptual
apparatus
.
Third, whereas Darwin emphasizes individual choice,
Wallace emphasizes group, or emergent, behavior. For
Wallace, distinctive markings helped a species identify
itself. George points out that
in Darwinism he now extended his theory. To
those recognition colours that he had already
defined, colours for recognition between the
sexes and of parents by the young, he added
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r®c°9 nition and species recognition.Recognition marks during flight are veryimportant for all birds which congregate inflocks or which migrate together..." [201]
Fourth, the historical record shows the trouble the
theory had in getting off the ground. Even as late as the
1940's there was little evidence that mate selection could
be linked to survival-enhancing characteristics.
In one area occupied by robins Lack found thatin any one breeding season about one fifth of the
cock robins failed to get mates. Here was a
situation where sexual selection might be
thought to come into play. But, in fact, it was
observed that a cock robin deserted by his mate
often found and kept another, and one that had no
mate in one season had one the next season and
Vice versa
. [202]
Yet biologists endorsed Darwin's view, despite problems
with evidence and/or theory and the availability of an
alternative in Wallace's view.
Romanes (1892)
,
and with him the majority of
biologists, accepted Darwin's sexual selection
theory unconditionally, and by the end of the
century it was firmly established. [203]
Darwins' new view of male "adornments," (such as antlers in
deer) in terms of male rivalry for mates has been
particularly successful. Yet even here the ideological
component resurfaces. Whereas his view the antlers
function as weapons, a more Wallacian or Kropotkinian
interpretation is possible. Gould points to a view that
emphasizes a "peaceful" or more "cooperative" solution to
male r iva lry--based upon behavior.
But what if antlers do not function primarily as
weapons? Modern studies of animal behavior have
generated an exciting concept of great importance
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to evolutionary biology: many structures
previously judged as actual weapons or devicesfor display to females are actually used for
ritualized combat among males. Their function isto prevent actual battle (with consequentinjuries and loss of life) by establishing
hierarchies of dominance that males can easily
recognize and obey. [204]
An evolutionary argument lying below the surface of Gould's
appraisal of behavior-driven sexual selection is the
suggestion that the destruction of those lower in the
mating hierarchy would be a bad thing. For example, an
animal that has smaller antlers this year may have larger
ones next year thus there is no benefit to the species in
destroying what Darwin would call the "less fit." Given
the lack of evidence available to late nineteenth century
biologists it seems clear that acceptance of Darwin's
version was driven primarily y a bias for continuity and
conservative ideological/scientific values.
For Wallace any human sexual selection worth talking
about would be conscious and deliberate. This selective
process would be ultimate proof and expression of the
radical gulf between humans and animals as reproductive
success and survival concerns need not figure in the
equation. A woman could choose a man who had fine
character or a clever pentameter rather than bulky biceps,
vigorous health or wealth.
During 1877 Wallace and Darwin engaged in a heated
exchange of letters on this very matter. Darwin wanted to
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stress the subconscious nature of sexual selection, which
betrays his desire to make such selection more animalistic:
...I doubt whether the term voluntary in relation
to sexual selection ought to be employed: when a
man is fascinated by a pretty girl it can hardlybe called voluntary, and I suppose that female
animals are charmed or excited in nearly the same
manner by the gaudy males. [ 205 ]
Notice that Darwin wishes to equalize or even accentuate
male power in this relationship by describing the female
animal decision process in terms of a human male's power to
influence a female. It is the male animal's qualities that
drive the female animal to act.
Concerning the aspect of will, or rather lack of will,
in humans, Darwin's reductive psychology demands this
construction, as he wants continuity for female choice
between humans and other animals. Wallace can more easily
present a view with greater flexibility, for on his terms
choice by humans is far more complex. On the one hand, he
can maintain his theoretical stance on emergence and still
accept that there is a biological basis for sexual
attraction, even for humans, while he can reject the idea
that this is the ultimate and complete explanation for
human mating behavior. He writes:
The word "voluntary" was inserted in m^_ proofs
only
,
in order to distinguish clearly between two
radically distinct kinds of "sexual selection."
Perhaps "conscious" would be a better word...
I
lay no stress on the word "voluntary." [ 206 ]
Wallace draws the line before accepting the point of view
that humans choose their mates in ways no different than do
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ants or peacocks, and one might add: atoms. While he might
allow that there are unconscious drives (and thus his lack
of quibbles with Darwin over the phrase "voluntary") he may
allow that this is a minor and ultimately meaningless
aspect of human behavior—even if it might be biologically
based. At the core of this issue is a metaphysical
difference between Wallace and Darwin. It is to this topic
that we now turn.
D. "Man's" Place in Nature
The savage, writes Wallace,
. . .actually possesses. . .a brain. . . but very
little inferior to that of the average members of
our learned societies. [207]
By now it should be obvious that central to the
conflict between Darwin and Wallace is disagreement over
the position of humans with respect to evolutionary
biology. The results of Darwin giving Natural Selection
the widest possible scope are: (1) universal application,
(2) a thoroughly reductive and materialist metaphysics, and
(3) a continuous and dense line of descent. Natural
Selection is universal in the sense of application to the
activities of all living things, materialist in the sense
of postulating that the ultimate nature of reality is
resolvable into matter and motion, and continuous in terms
of allowing no breaks, sui generis starts, or emergence
254
The lack ofanywhere in the system once it gets going,
breaks requires that any quality found in any component of
the living world is found in all other components--
dif ference is in quantity only. Although Darwin strove for
a systematic approach, as we have seen in Chapter Two his
ambivalences complicated and at points disrupted the neat
system he strove to manifest.
Wallace took as basic the principle that humans enjoy
a special status amongst living things. He saw no
contradiction in holding that the body and some aspects of
the mind were produced by evolution, but that in other
aspects the mind, even though parasitic on the body, is not
selected and functions independently of evolutionary
struggle. He allowed for emergent qualities, and so
jettisonned universality, materialism and continuity. His
challenge was to motivate this position, which on Darwin's
terms smacked of metaphysics and religion, when most
professional biologists eschewed discussion of these topics
in favor of "scientific purity." Professional resistance
may also be understood in terms of the adversarial
relationship between Natural Selection and the established
2 0 8theological/scientific order.
In part, Wallace took an end-run around the question.
As we have seen throughout this chapter, his analysis of
human relations and geopolitical events, particularly
within the anthropological details of his scientific work,
pointed out ways in which the world could be made more
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just . The appeal to social justice, to the exclusion of
socia 1
-Darwinian arguments, was the basis of Wallace's
attempt to shift the grounds of the debate.
Once the focus shifts to justice, the Social Darwinist
is put in an awkward position. Although Darwin argues for
a noblest" status for moral qualities, it is unclear what
the evolutionary status of "noblest" is. Darwin himself
acknowledges that moral constraints lead to degeneration
and irrational social constructs. If morals are only
valuable in terms of survival value, "noblest" seems hardly
to be the appropriate term-- "practical" would seem more
accurate, even if the practicality is two-edged. On the
other hand, if morality is outside the evolutionary domain,
then the Darwinian is arguing for a break in continuity,
and hence an emergentist position—which runs counter to
the Darwinian program.
Furthermore, evolutionary arguments for particular
geopolitical events would be no small undertaking; it is
far simpler (and traditional) to describe the events as if
humans affect world events through interactions of their
wills, even if such is not the case. In the more common
view of things agents can be thought to express opinions
molded at least to some degree by arguments and social
ideals--in short, to act within a cultural context. Thus
Wallace's approach puts pressure on the Darwinist to
produce particular arguments that are going to be very
2 0 9difficult, indeed, to manufacture.
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Wallace did not rest with the tactic of bringing
political argumentation to bear. He assembled a mass of
reasoning which directly supported the emergentist
hypothesis. One series of arguments worked off the idea of
the "imponderable." There were fundamental questions which
evolutionary biology of the time was ill equipped to
handle
,
such as the ultimate origin of life, the details of
heredity and cellular processes, and the nature of
consciousness. He hoped to turn these problems to account
for his point of view. He advocated utilizing the
phrenology and spiritualism in order to demonstrate the
special nature of human existence. This gamble did not,
ultimately, work to his advantage.
In the main he argued for emergentism on the basis of
finding practices unique to humans, ranging from
theoretical mathematics to art. He communicated these
ideas to Darwin whose response was to say little in reply.
1. Wallace's break with Darwin
Darwin attempted to render the idea of "man's" special
status null by chipping away, piece by piece, the bedrock
supporting human uniqueness. He did this despite the fact
that on some level he would have rather avoided the whole
issue: "To avoid stating how far, I believe, in
Materialism..." 21 ^ It is an interesting fact that Darwin
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gathered much of his evidence for Natural Selection from
attributes of domesticated organisms. In particular, one
of the primary motors for evolution— descent with
variation—was demonstrated through appeal to the domestic
breeding of pigeons and farm animals. Many guestioned
Darwin's methodology, and asked why "nature" should
function as domesticated life does.
It has always been considered a weakness in
Darwin's work that he based his theory,
primarily, on the evidence of variation in
domesticated animals and domesticated plants.
I [Wallace] have endeavored to secure a firm
footing for the theory in the variations of
organisms in a state of nature... [211]
In fact this job was particularly suited to Wallace,
since he ultimately wanted to maintain the split between
the natural and the human domain. He points out that when
people select breeding animals the aim is entirely
unnatura 1
:
...man has considered only utility to himself...
[or] the satisfaction of his love of beauty, [or]
novelty, or merely of something strange and
amusing ... [ 212
]
Overt notions of beauty, novelty, strangeness and humor are
arguably purely human considerations.
Up to 1857 Darwin wished the whole issue of "Man's"
place could remain undiscussed. In a letter to Wallace,
Darwin admits his discomfort with the inevitable topic.
You ask whether I shall discuss Man; I think I
shall avoid the whole subject, as so surrounded
with prejudices, though I fully admit that it is
the highest and most interesting for the
naturalist. My work [the Origin ] , on which I
have now been at work more or less for twenty
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years, will not fix or settle
hope it will aid by giving a
facts with one definite end.
anything; but I
large collection
[213]
of
But discuss it he did. His Descent broke the subject
wide open. Wallace agreed with the main conclusion.
Th® Descent of^ Man ... proved ... that the physical
structure of man was in all its parts and organs
so extremely similar to that of the anthropoid
apes as to demonstrate the descent of both from
some common ancestor. [214]
Even before the Descent was published, Wallace had
pioneered the position that evolution applied to human
behavior
.
The view above expounded of the transference of
the action of natural selection from the bodily
structure to the mind of early man was my first
original modification of that theory, having been
communicated to the Anthropologica
1
Review in
1864. It received the approval both of Darwin
himself and of Herbert Spencer... [215]
Beyond the basics, however, he and Darwin parted ways,
for Wallace opted for a radical break between humans and
beasts :
1. The Origin of Man a s an Intel lec t ua 1 and Moral
Being .—On this great problem the belief and
teaching of Darwin was, that man's whole nature
—
physical, mental, intellectual, and moral--was
developed from the lower animals by means of the
same laws of variation and survival; and, as a
consequence of this belief, that there was no
difference in kind between man's nature and
animal nature, but only one of degree. My view,
on the other hand, was, and is, that there is a
difference in kind, intellectually and morally,
between man and other animals ...[ 216
]
When Darwin first heard of what was coming from Wallace, he
let out an involuntary screech (1869);
259
I shall be intensely curious to read theQuarterly ; I hope you have not murdered too
completely your own and my child. [217]
And when he read the article, he was not pleased.
I presume that your remarks on Man are those to
which you alluded in your note If you had not
told me I should have thought that they had been
added by someone else. As you expected, I differ
grievously from you, and I am very sorry for
it... I can see no necessity for calling in an
additional proximate cause in regard to Man. But
the subject is too long for a letter... I havebeen particularly glad to read your discussion,because I am now writing and thinking much about
Man. [218]
And again, nine months later he iterates his displeasure.
But I groan over Man
—
you write like a
metamorphosed (in retrograde direction)
naturalist, and you the author of the best paper
that ever appeared in the Anthropological Review!
Eheu! Eheu ! Eheu!—Your miserable friend, C.
Darwin. [219]
In Darwin's letter of Nov. 22, 1870, which came ten
months after the one above, he wrote that he hoped his
differences with Wallace over man would not "kill me in
your [Wallace's] good estimation." Here Darwin projects
his extreme displeasure onto his friend and colleague.
Wallace nowhere talked of killing anything. He dealt with
this exchange with typical good-naturedness and deference
to Darwin. He thought the issue complicated enough to
warrant agreements to disagree without rancor. Darwin's
emotional involvement with the argument struck Wallace as
overblown
:
The above remark, "kill me in your good
estimation," refers to his views on the mental
and moral nature of man being very different from
mine, this being the first important question as
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to which our views had diverged. But I never hadthe slightest feeling of the kind he supposed,
^°an
9J?°\ the difference ^ one which did not
h .
affect our general agreement, and also asbeing one on which no one could dogmatize, thereemg much to be said on both sides. [220]
Luckily, this grave difficulty did not prevent Darwin
from continuing his friendship and debate with Wallace.
Even though the issue was highly charged, Darwin had
earlier missed some clues that indicated Wallace was
splitting off from the radical-materialist camp. in a
letter of 1864, Darwin muses over Wallace's "The Origin of
Human Races..." article:
But now for your Man paper, about which I shouldlike to write more than I can. The great leadingidea is quite new to me, viz. that during late
ages the mind will have been modified more than
the body; yet I had got as far as to see with you
the struggle between races of man depended
entirely on intellectual and mora
1
qualities.
The latter part of the paper I can designate only
as grand and most eloquently done. I have shown
your paper to two or three persons who have been
here, and they have been equally struck with it.
I am not sure that I go with you on all
minor points. When reading Sir G. Grey's account
of the constant battles of Australian savages, I
remember thinking that Natural Selection would
come in, and likewise with the Esquimaux, with
whom the art of fishing and managing canoes is
said to be hereditary. I rather differ on the
rank under the c lass if icatory point of view which
you assign to Man: I do not think any character
simply in excess ought ever be used for the
higher division. Ants would not be separated
from other hymenopterous insects, however high
the instinct of the one and however low the
instincts of the other.
...Secondly, I suspect that a sort of sexual
selection has been the most powerful means of
changing the races of man. I can show that the
different races have a widely different standard
of beauty. Among savages the most powerful men
will have the pick of the women, and they will
generally leave the most descendents.
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I have collected a few notes on Man, but I donot suppose I shall ever use them would youike at some future time to have... my notes?
I am sure I hardly know whether they are ofany value, and the are at present in a state of
chaos.
. . .Our aristocracy is handsomer? (morehideous according to a Chinese or negro) than
middle classes, from pick of women; but oh what ascheme is primogeniture for destroying Natural
Selection. I fear my letter will be barelyintelligible to you. [221]
This letter provides a plethora of entry points to our
topic. In paragraph one, Darwin senses Wallace's drift
away from a radically reductive materialism. Darwin allows
that race-struggle revolves around the issue of mental
abilities, but cannot see why these mental abilities should
be separated from physical selection. Whereas Darwin wants
to unite the two, and looks to craniometries for a
quantification and index of intelligence and survivability,
Wallace developes the idea that physical development has
given out and emergent cultural factors have begun.
In paragraph two, Darwin implies that humans differ
from primates in the same way ants differ from gall-flies.
He argues that there are no qualitative differences.
In paragraph three we get an oddity of Darwin's
thought. Since he is willing to use evolutionary arguments
for almost any human quality, the invocation of sexual
selection as the "most powerful" agent of change is
astonishing. His motive is unclear. I will return to this
topic later.
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The fourth through sixth paragraphs reveal another of
Darwin's ambivalences. On the one hand, he would like to
turn the whole enterprise over to Wallace--by letting
Wallace take his notes. Yet doubts linger, for he would
rather the whole topic would vanish—hence the claims of
valuelessness, and chaos. Perhaps, too, he fears what
Wallace would write—both in terms of anticipating his own
work and in offering an alternative view.
Buried within the last section is the key to the
debate. Darwin, to illustrate the chaos and perhaps the
uselessness" of his notes, supplies a sample. Let us dig
and then turn our spade over. Under a few lines of earth
lies a cryptic comment about primogeniture. But how can
primogeniture "destroy" Natural Selection?
The problem with primogeniture is twofold. On the one
hand, it subverts the natural order by favoring the first
born who is not necessarily the more fit than subseguent
offspring. On the other hand it is a complex social
practice which ties into an infinite web of social
relations. Despite Darwin's reductive contentions,
primogeniture implicates the existence of cultural factors
that influence "man's" behavior in ways that are not
readily explainable in terms of his biology. This is so
despite the possibility of appeal to a conservation of
resources (i.e. focus on one child) or social stability (a
settled successional custom to prevent political upheaval).
Any comparison with primate correlates of primogeniture
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falls short. Where are the chimp inheritance laws,
barristers or clerics? Primogeniture touches on too much.
Unhappy with the way things are going, Darwin ceases.
The degree of distress is evident in the degeneration of
grammar and the conflicted nature of the message he sends
his friend. Rather than admit to the seriousness of the
disagreement, and debate the specifics, he offers his
notes, intimating that he would like Wallace to continue
the debate in place of himself. But Darwin's offer is made
in such a way that it is clear Wallace is not to ask for
them; they're useless and chaotic, after all.
It is too bad Wallace did not respond to the
primogeniture comment, for then perhaps Darwin would have
been motivated to expand on the topic. In any case,
Wallace thought that Natural Selection's culling of
physical and mental qualities gave out rather early in
"man's" history;
I... no doubt overlook a few smaller points in
which Natural Selection may still act on men and
brutes alike. Colour is one of them... [222]
He not only attacks the conceptual core of Darwin's racism:
radical materialism, but he brings the topic to the fore by
calling differences of race, such as color, a "smaller
point." He held that human body color was developed for
survival, even though it was relatively unimportant in
other respects. He also believed that the original color
2 2 3
was that of the Mongolian, or American Indian.
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We may well suppose it to be due to its being
more or less correlated with constitutional
characters favourable to life... white and black
^
f^^ions from this ["original warmbrown of the American Indian], and are probably
C
K
rr
K
1
?
ted With mental or Physical peculiarities
which have been favourable to the increase and
maintenance of the particular race. [ 224 ]
Furthermore, Wallace didn't accept Darwin's idea that
sexual selection replaced Natural Selection as the motor
for human adaptation
.
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With regard to the constant battles of savagesleading to selection of physical superiority, I
think it would be very imperfect, and subject to
so many exceptions and irregularities, that it
could produce no definite result. For instance,
the strongest and bravest men would lead, and
expose themselves most, and would therefore be
most subject to wounds and death. And the
physical energy which led to any one tribe
delighting in war might lead to its extermination
by inducing quarrels with all surrounding tribes
and leading them to combine against it...
Moreover, this kind of more or less perpetual war
goes on among all savage peoples. It could lead
therefore to no differential characters, but
merely to the keeping up of a certain average
standard of bodily and mental health and vigour.
Even in this early document Wallace is already drawing
the line between selection, whether sexual or natural, and
culture. Given the demands of bravery, it is to be
expected, according to Wallace, that there would be a high
mortality for leaders. Thus the coward, or at least the
prudent coward, would live to see another day and therefore
be able to leave more children than the leader. More
importantly, the selective pressure of warfare would not
simply act in favor of the "strongest."
265
Politics, in the form of alliances against aggressive
neighbors, would soon take over. Thus selective pressure
would favor the tribes (here we have suggestion of group
selection) that promoted the right mix of physical prowess
and political savvy. Therefore sexual selection, according
to Wallace, could do but little in this context.
...the sexual selection you allude to will also,
I think, have been equally uncertain in its
results. In the very lowest tribes there is
rarely much polygamy, and women are more or less
a matter of purchase. There is also little
difference of social condition, and I think it
rarely happens that any healthy and undeformed
man remains without wife and children. I very
much doubt the often-repeated assertion that our
aristocracy are more beautiful than the middle
c lasses ... and besides, we unavoidably combine in
our idea of beauty, intellectual expression and
refinement of manner, which often make the less
appear the more beautiful. [226]
He noticed a fundamental error on the part of Darwin
and the eugenicists. In order to claim that selection of
any kind affects humans, differential reproductive and
survival rates must be established. Wallace points out
that the first, differential reproductive rates, are
doubtful. Do leaders leave more children? Do they
live longer?
Both Darwin and Malthus bring up the fact that
reproductive rates decrease with advancement in social
class. Rather than attempting to force corr igibi 1 ity from
this evidence, Wallace draws the obvious conclusion:
reproductive success in humans depends at least in part
upon cultural factors which are artificial.
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In the case of homo sapiens
, Wallace believes, there
is a factor of intent iona 1 ity which is lacking in the rest
of the animal kingdom. Thus daughters of aristocracy
appear more beautiful because they are rich and linked to a
powerful father. The possibility of a Prince and the
—
uper is lin,ited to human culture not just because
nobility is a human concept. He need not go into details
here—as Darwin must be aware of the use of make-up,
jewelry, finery, wills of inheritance and the masked-ball.
As the debate goes on the difference becomes more and
more clear. Darwin is willing to equate, without
modification, sexual selection by a pea hen with selection
by a woman!
In regard to sexual selection. A girl sees a
handsome man, and without observing whether his
nose or whiskers are the tenth of an inch longer
or shorter than in some other man, admires his
appearance and says she will marry him. So, I
suppose, with the pea-hen [227]
In Wallace's view this approach is simply off the wall. He
may admit that humans experience what we might call "animal
attraction
' but the selection of a mate goes beyond this
consideration. Social class, ambitions, and all the
accidents and aspects of culture and human complication
attenuate mere mating by "rutting instinct." Also, what
an odd example for Darwin to pick—whiskers— these are
trimmed by barbers, and are not particularly biologically
determined traits! Do women really select barbers, at
bottom?
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Darwin's appeal to the continuity thesis extended the
domain of biology between the extremes of atomic forces and
all human activity. For him imponderables were limited to
the origin of life. He hoped that spontaneous generation,
or archebiosis, would lay the problem of the origin of life
to rest. 228
I should like to live to see archebiosis proved
true, for it would be a discovery of transcendent
importance; or if false I should like to see itdisproved, and the facts otherwise explained...
But the beginning was opaque: 220
Looking to the first dawn of life, when all
organic beings presented the simplest structure,
how, it may be asked, could the first steps in
the advancement or differentiation of the parts
arisen? .. .But as we have no facts to guide us,
speculation on the subject is almost useless...
As we saw earlier in the case of atomic forces, he felt it
best to avoid the topic in public. Wallace, however, was
not so shy.
By 1864 Wallace (in "The Origin of Human Races..." 230 )
had decided that mind could not be derived from
evolutionary forces alone, but offered no explicit
explanation. In 1868 he had attempted to motivate his
emergentist position by invoking the action of a generic
deity in "The Limits of Natural Selection Applied to Man."
His letters of approximately 1886 had mind producing
matter and by 1889 in Darwinism he spoke of "Spirit" as
the power creating uniquely human attributes. At the end
of his life he had "infinite grades of being" directing
emergent events.
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Retracing his steps, we see that during his "middle
period" (around 1869), Wallace argued for a non-pantheist,
non-teleological
, and non-homocentr ic view of physical
reality. in the Malay he mentioned Durian fruit, which are
quite large and spiked, as proof that the world was not
designed for humans—because the Durian reproductive
apparatus sometimes falls from great heights and injures
people
.
From this we learn two things: first, not to drawgeneral conclusions from a very partial view of
nature, and secondly, that trees and fruits, noless than the varied productions of the animal
kingdom, do not appear to be organized with
exclusive reference to the use and convenience of
man. [232]
In another passage Wallace broods on the "melancholy" fact
that some recesses of the world are better off without man,
so that some radical gulfs between humans and nature ought
never be crossed:
I thought of the long ages of the past, during
which the successive generations of this little
creature [King Bird Of Paradise] had run their
course
—
year by year being born, and living and
dying amid these dark and gloomy woods, with no
intelligent eye to gaze upon their loveliness; to
all appearance such a wanton waste of beauty.
Such ideas excite a feeling of melancholy .. .while
on the other hand, should civilized man ever
reach these distant lands, and bring moral,
intellectual, and physical light into the
recesses of these virgin forests, we may be sure
that he will so disturb the nicely-balanced
relations of organic and inorganic nature as to
cause the disappearance, and finally the
extinction, of these very beings whose wonderful
structure and beauty he alone is fitted to
appreciate and enjoy. This consideration must
surely tell us that all living things were not
made for man. Many of them have no relation to
him. They cycle of their existence has gone on
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independently of his, and
by every advance in man's
development...
[ 233 ]
is disturbed or broken
intel lectua 1
Later he emphasizes emergence through appeal to
Vitalism:
The first stage is the change from inorganic toorganic ... This is often imputed to a mereincrease of complexity of chemical compounds; butincrease of complexity .. .could certainly not haveproduced living protoplasm ... Here
,
then, we haveindications of a new power at work, which we mayterm vitality
, since it gives to certain forms of
matter all those characters and properties which
constitute Life. [234]
Huxley also supported this idea in an early work (1854):
On the other hand, systematic teaching in Biology
cannot be attempted with success until the
student has attained to a certain knowledge of
physics and chemistry: for though the phaenomena
of life are dependent neither on physical nor on
chemical, but on vital forces, yet they result in
all sorts of physical and chemical changes, which
can only be judged by their own laws. [235]
But as time passes Wallace begins to explain emergence
in terms of spiritual forces:
...all life development—all organic forces—are
due to mind-action, we must postulate not only
forces but guidance... [236]
By 1911 he is writing:
...hardly one of my critics (I think absolutely
not one) has noticed the distinction I have tried
and intended to draw between Evolut ion . . . and the
fundamental powers of Life
—
growth, assimilation,
reproduction, heredity But this [i.e.
evolution]
,
as Darwin, Weismann, Kerner, Lloyd
Morgan, and even Huxley have seen, has nothing to
do with the basic mysteries of life. [237]
Wallace was, of course, underestimating the progress
to be made in cellular biology and genetics, and failed to
appreciate the fact that science must often operate as if
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it will be able to locate the machinery for events it
cannot explain despite lack of success or even direction at
any particular time. Whereas Darwin was attempting to
"materialize" the spiritual, Wallace could be said to
"spiritualize the material." Even late in his life,
Wallace could point to the failure of biology to account
for cellular processes. Thus Wallace scored a direct hit,
even if to no avail, in attacking Max Verworn, 238 author of
-
eneral Physiology, because Verworn could not produce any
explanation of how hereditary information was passed from
cel 1 to cel 1
.
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Although Wallace was attacked with what Darwin, Huxley
and others saw as adequate refutations, an underlying
discomfort and dissatisfaction with their own arguments
plagued Wallace's critics. 240 But after the dawn of the
new century Mr. Thiselton-Dyer sets Wallace straight on Feb
12, 1911, by telling him that science does not admit a
"directive power."
One interesting aspect of Wallace's attempts to
motivate emergence was that he never appeals to concepts
current in the universities, such as Idealist critiques of
radical-materialism. Of course in this he parallels Darwin
and most of the British biologists, who also ignored
developments in academic spheres relating to issues in
biology and created their theories on their own terms.
Worse yet, Wallace argued, a la Leibniz, or Voltaire's
Pangloss, that this is the best of all possible worlds
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(1889). 241 He even reversed his earlier agnostic/atheistic
opinions and argued for a "dual purpose" in nature. He
claimed that flowers, for instance, are given color by
Spirit in order both to lure insects and to please
humans. 242 Another implausible passage argued that
carnivores have such efficient teeth because they spare
their victims pain that way. 243 m 1913, at the very end
of his life, he summarizes his development in a letter to
James Marchant:
The completely materialistic mind of my youth and
early manhood has been slowly moulded into the
socialistic, spiritualistic, and theistic mind I
now exhibit a mind which is, as my scientificfriends think, so weak and credulous in itsdeclining years, as to believe that fruit andflowers, domestic animals, glorious birds and
insects, wool, cotton, sugar and rubber, metals
and gems, were all foreseen and foreordained for
the education and enjoyment of man. The whole
cumulative argument of my 'World of Life' is that
in its every detail it calls for the agency of a
mind ... enormous ly above and beyond any human
mind ... whet her this Unknown Reality is a single
Being and acts everywhere in the universe as
direct creator, organizer, and director of every
minutest motion... or through 'infinite grades of
beings,' as I suggest, comes to much the same
thing. Mine seems a more clear and intelligible
supposition. . .and it is the teaching of the
Bible, of Swedenborg, and of Milton. [244]
He says his solution to the imponderable question of "why
this world is," is that it is
...for the development of life culminating in
man; secondly, as a vast schoolhouse for the
higher education of the human race in preparation
for the enduring spiritual life to which it is
destined. [245]
He reminds us that Edgar Allen Poe put forward the same
2 4 .
view in Farewe 1 1 to Earth . Despite the literary
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support for such a view, the professional biologists were
not tempted by this option.
2. Human qualities
The
program
latest f
when a "
speech
.
most important emergentist aspect to Wallace's
concerned the unique status of humans. In its
orm (1913), he argued that Natural Selection ended
spiritual influx" allowed the acquisition of
The fundamental diversities we find seem to
accord better with the conception that when, as a
mere animal, his material organism had reached
the required degree of perfection, there occurred
the spiritual influx which alone enabled him tobegin that course of intellectual and moral
development, and that marvelous power over the
forces of Nature, in which speech and writing,
followed by printing, have been such important
factors. [247]
This was not a new idea for him, for he hinted at it in
his 1870 Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection .
Some, such as Darwin and T.H. Huxley, were appalled. But
others, for example Mivart ( Genesis of the Species
, 1871)
agreed with the conclusion of "man's" special status, even
if they did not accept spiritual "influxes." Huxley
reviewed Mivart 's and Wallace's objection to the continuity
thesis and attacked both. His assault was typically
sharp-tongued
:
Mr. Wallace thinks it necessary to call in an
intelligent agent— a sort of supernatural Sir
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John Sebright
— to produce the animal frame of
man; while Mr. Mivart requires no Divine essencetill he comes to man's soul. [248]
The reference to the animal frame concerns Wallace's
various arguments that the hand, hairlessness and color
were not deducible from the process of Natural Selection.
Despite Huxley's ridicule, Darwin found these objections
difficult to repel. 249
While
"spiritual
Huxley held nothing but contempt
influx," he responded tactfully:
for Wallace's
The several publications of Mr. Wallace and Mr.
Mivart contain discussions of some of Mr.
Darwin's views, which are worthy of particular
attention, not only on account of the
acknowledged scientific competence of these
writers, but because they exhibit an attention to
those philosophical questions which underlie all
physical science, which is rare as it is
needful. [250]
Huxley was at this point, however, not ruling out emergence.
There is every reason to believe that
consciousness is a function of nervous matter,
when that nervous matter has attained a certain
degree of organizat ion . . . As I have ventured to
state .. .elsewhere
,
"our thoughts are the
expression of molecular changes in that matter of
life which is the source of our other vital
phenomena." [251]
Wallace objected, writing that without a theory and
evidence of how organization produces new qualities, Huxley
was, in effect, begging the question. Huxley thought that
Wallace misunderstood the issue, and that no such theory or
evidence was needed.
With all respect for Mr. Wallace, it appears to
me that his remarks are entirely beside the
question. I really know nothing whatever, and
never hope to know anything, of the steps by
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which the passage from molecular movement to
Lan%°L C °nSCi?USneSS iS effected... Whether weshall ever be able to express consciousness in
to°say°
Und
^ 2 5 2 ^
^ ' 1S n'°re than 1 wil1 venture
In order to render Wallace's view intelligible one
might conceptualize "spiritual influx" not in terms of a
deity pouring spiritual juice into humans, as it were, but
rather as a metaphor or heuristic device for coming to
grips with the sudden appearance of qualities which cannot
be derived from previous levels of organization. The
appeal to religious concepts was especially problematic due
to the antipathy it generated. Whereas Wallace offers an
explanation, be it of whatever value, Darwin denies the
existence of discontinuity but finds ruptures a plenty.
The problem of emergent qualities has remained
intractable. A difficulty of similar structure has
attached itself to contemporary evolutionary biology.
Gould and Eldridge have attacked the idea that speciation
is a slow process by suggesting that major changes may
occur in an essentially quick and discontinuous fashion.
In their theory of "punctuated equilibria" organisms
speciate rapidly and then maintain lengthy periods of
stabi 1 ity--during which time the Darwinian descent with
modification fine-tunes the new organism. The idea is that
a minor genetic change produces a cascade of effects which
result in major morphological discontinuity with previous
forms, thus creating a new organism (new species) which
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then is modified only incrementally by evolution in the
traditional Darwinian manner.
Punctuated equilibria flies in the face of traditional
ideas about environmental uniformity (i.e. the down-playing
of catastrophic events), slow change and the step by step
approach to alterations in physiology. However it neatly
explains the incoherent fossil record, as "transitional"
organisms exist only momentarily, if at all. Similarly,
suggestions have been made in other fields, such as
linguistics, that language formation emerges suddenly and
discont inuously from earlier forms. Derek Bickerton, in
Language & Spec i es (1990) argues, in an echo of Huxley's
ideas, that a minor genetic change is responsible for the
sudden appearance of language abi lities
.
Thus it would be a mistake to view the Darwin/Wallace
debate over emergent qualities as one of science versus
pseudo-science. The reason this must be stressed is that
it is all too easy to think of Darwin as a precursor of
contemporary biology and Wallace as a throw-back to
theistic "prescience" by ignoring the particulars of each
theory which make both Darwinian and Wallacistic evolution
very unlike contemporary theories of change. It is
imperative that the reader keep in mind that Wallace was
not alone in his point of view, for a
...considerable number of renowned scientists
were favorably disposed toward such psychical
phenomena as telepathy, clairvoyance,
precognition, and spirit photography ... during the
second half of the nineteenth century. [254]
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In any case Wallace's appeal to the sudden emergence
of language had the advantage in that it removed the need
for a search for "transitional" humans, and thus limited
the motivation to see "savages" as links to the animal
kingdom. This helped to deprive racists of evolutionary
fodder for their eugenic arguments.
...we should not expect to find any living
examples of the unspiritualized man, since the
assumption is that the whole race received theinflux which started them on their course ofpurely human development within a strictlylimited period, perhaps of a very few
generations, or even one generation. [255]
This argument must be seen in the context of traditional
appeals to the divine nature of all men for countering
slavery and colonialism. The strongest evidence lay in
human linguistic ability:
If this were not so we should expect to find someisolated groups of speechless man on the
contrary, the lowest of existing races are found
to possess languages which are often of extreme
complexity in grammatical structure and in no way
suggestive of the primitive man-animal of which
they are supposed to be surviving relics. So
long as we got our knowledge respecting them from
low class Europeans who captured them for slaves
or shot them down as wild beasts, we could not
possibly acquire any real knowledge of them as
human beings... we have... ample evidence ... that
they possess human qualities of the same kind as
our own. [256]
Oddly enough, Huxley agreed:
and the man who risks his life by even a short
visit to the malarious shores of those regions
may well be excused if he shrinks from facing the
dangers of the interior; if he contents himself
with stimulating the industry of the better
seasoned natives and collecting the more or less
mythical reports and traditions with they are
too ready to supply him.
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In such a manner most of
accounts of the habits of the
originated... [257]
the earlier
man-like Apes
Wallace throws the burden of providing evidence back
onto those who would claim savages are the missing link.
His extensive travels gave him great authority in this
matter—he had provided ample evidence that even the lowest
of the low— the aborigine of Australia, had a complex
language far exceeding the expectations and lore of those
who never visited the continent or relied on the accounts
of those who had spent but little time living amongst the
indigenous people of that continent.
Additionally, these passages strike at the evidence
provided by those who use an assumption of superiority to
prove the wider claim that their higher status rests on
scientific fact. Even though Darwin ends the Descent with
a depiction of inarticulate brutes as the ancestors of
"man," such beasts are chimeras.
Unlike any other creature humans modify the
environment in unnatural ways, he thinks:
But so soon as man appeared upon the earth, even
in the earliest periods at which we have any
proofs of his existence, or in the lowest state
of barbarism in which we are now able to study
him, we find him able to use and act upon the
forces of Nature, and to modify his environment,
both inorganic and organic, in ways which formed
a completely new departure in the entire organic
world. [258]
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The key to this debate is
racist utilization of "savages
writes that:
of course a scientific and
as cusp creatures. Darwin
• . . turning f
in the lowes
very little
they appear
rom animals to man, it is shown that
t savages many of these faculties are
advanced from the condition in whichin the higher animals... [259]
But Wallace would have little to do with this.
Although he allows some selective force for Natives, for
the most part he sees cultural factors disrupting the
natural state of affairs. Wallace:
The less fit [humans] are therefore not
eliminated as among all other anima Is . . . for thefirst time... the great law of natural selectionby the survival only of "the fittest" to some
extent neutral ized ... But this is only the first
and least important of the effects... [260]
He writes:
...one in five, one in ten, often only one in a
hundred or even one in a thousand [261]
survive in the short run (reach maturity)
. In the case of
humans, however, overall mortality rarely met these levels;
Wallace put mortality around fifty percent for those up to
age twenty. 262
Furthermore the idea that even the "savage"
demonstrates advanced linguistic abilities was based on his
earlier contact with Natives and fit well with his earlier
published views. This can even be said of the Australian
bush people:
Indeed the comparative perfection of their
speech, standing in such striking contrast to
their degraded state, has occasioned some
surprise. [263]
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Wallace saw such evidenrp a nla ce all around him: "But the
phenomenon is far fro, rare
... (witness the, rich Hottentot
declension..." 64 He attacks those whQ through ignorance
claim that Natives are inarticulate by quoting B. Smythe,
who was well aware of the complexity of Native tongues:
The illusion of those who believe that thelanguage of savages is simple would be rudely
examination' addressed themselves ™ Inof any of the dialects of Australia
the^sentenceq
lY lnflected
' complex, and many of'
translation ?
are s ° c°n s tructed as to makeimpossible.
[ 265 ]
Still
the desire
that there
art. 266
another emergent quality
to create art. Wallace
is no "missing link," as
of human behavior is
uses this point to show
even savages make
He continues
.
2^
^
curious that a rudimenta 1 love of artshould co exist with such a very low state ofcivilization. The people of Dorey are greatcarvers and painters .. .of ten of very tasteful
We n0t already know that such taste
^ ^
Con,Patible with ^ter barbarism, wecould hardly believe that the same people are, inother matters, entirely wanting in all sense oforder, comfort, or decency. Yet such is the case.
f these people are not savages, where shall wefind any? Yet they have all a decided love forthe fine arts, and spend their leisure time in
executing works whose good taste and elegance
would often be admired in our schools of design!
Such admiration would have to wait until the next century.
Wallace concludes: 2 ^®
.. .certain physical modifications and mental
faculties in man could not have been acquired
through the preservation of useful variations,
because there is some direct evidence to show
that they were not and are not useful in the
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ordinary sense, or, as Professor Lloyd Morganwe puts it, not of "life-preserving value"...
Furthermore he claimed that history showed that all
peoples have had relatively similar capacities for
intellectual and moral development. This means, according
to Wallace, that there was a radical break and then
relative stability of physical endowment.
The long course of human history leads us the theconclusion that this higher nature of man arose
at some far distant epoch, and through it hasdeveloped in various directions, does not seemyet to have elevated the whole race much aboveits earliest condition, at the time when, by theinflux of some portion of the spirit of the
Deity, man became "a living soul." [269]
Huxley made similar arguments at times for language
and art.
I said almost all," for a reason. Among the
many distinctions which have been drawn between
the lower creatures and ourselves, there is one
which is hardly ever insisted on ["I think that
my friend, Professor Allman, was the first todraw attention to it." in footnote to text], but
which may be very fitly be spoken of in a place
so largely devoted to Art as that in which we are
assembled [South Kensington Museum]. It is this,
that while, among various kinds of animals, it
is possible to discover traces of all the other
faculties of man... yet that particular form of
mimicry which shows itself in the imitation of
form, either by modelling or by drawing, is not
to be met with. [270]
As we saw earlier, Huxley also plugs for rational speech as
a defining characteristic of "man." He makes the human
ability of language acquisition universal: even savages can
2 71learn any language, thus separating humans from all
other animals absolutely. Wallace was not alone in the
circle of biologists in his argument for a unique status
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for humans, and the linkage to the issue of racial worth
was also made by others-surprisingly enough, by Huxley
himself, who at other places had harsh things to say of the
"lower" races.
...it has been my fate to know many lands and
climates
, and to be familiar, by personal
experience, with almost every form of society,from the uncivilized savage of Papua andAustraira and the civilized savages of the slumsand dens of the poverty-stricken parts of great
cities, to those who perhaps, are occasionallythe somewhat over-civilized members of our
upper ten thousand. And I have never found, in
any of these conditions of life, a deficiency of
something that was attractive. Savagery has itspleasures, I assure you, as well as
civilization [272]
Stephen Jay Gould points out that the unintended (to
use a psychologized form of argument) results of selection
provide a cornucopia of opportunity for the organism:
A potentially minor genetic change— a rise of
androgen level in this case [which produces a
male-like genetalia in the female Hyena] —entails
a host of complex, nonadaptive consequences. The
primary flexibility of evolution may arise from
nonadaptive by-products that occasionally permit
organisms to strike out in new and unpredictable
directions. [273]
Indeed, if this "mechanism" were not available, things
would be far less flexible, and evolution would have a much
harder time of it:
What "play" would evolution have if each
structure were built for a restricted purpose and
could be used for nothing else? How could humans
learn to write if our brain had evolved for
hunting, social cohesion, or whatever, and could
not transcend the adaptive boundaries of its
original purpose? [274]
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Thus Darwin's work contains the
"transcendence
,
"
his metaphysics.
germ of emergence
even if he cannot justify such a
or
leap with
Another factor in human activity not present in
animals
novelty
anima 1
s
Wallace is free to bring almost any aspect of culture
into this fray. In the cases of metaphysics, humor, and
wit, there are few obvious arguments for "utility." Also,
he points out, in terms of wit, the faculty to create
a good line is quite unusual:
...the majority [of people] being, as is well
known, totally unable to say a witty thing or
make a pun even to save their lives. [276]
I guess this would give humorists special survival
advantages, even if they rarely got the chance to use them.
Wallace concludes:
is lack of uniformity. Whereas humans like
and present a range of interests and pursuits,
tend to perform things by rote, as it were:
Every wren makes a fairly good nest like itsfel lows .. .but in those specially developedfaculties of civilized man... the case is verydifforent. They exist only in a small proportion
of individuals, while the difference of capacitybetween these favored individuals and the averaqe
of mankind is enormous. [275]
...the f acts ... compel us to recognize some
origin .. .whol ly distinct from that which has
served to account for the animal characteristics
--whether bodily or mental—of man. [277]
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Spiritualism, phrenology and craniometries
Alluding in a general way to "Spirit," "unseen
agency, or grades of beings," Wallace presents a
heterodox 278 but popular position, even if most scientists
debunked the new movement. At various times he offers
vague references to an Aristotelian-like prime mover,
angels, and proof through seances. Wallace attempted to
convince his friends to join him in this pursuit.
In the two years 1867-1868 Wallace tried to
interest Huxley, W.B. Carpenter, Tyndall, and
G.H. Lewes in psychical phenomena but failed.
Though he received encouragement from other
scientist friends (H. Bates, E.B. Tylor, A. De
Motgan, and R. Chambers) and willingly gave
advice to interested scientists when they
approached him (St. G. Mivart, and a decade
Ister, G.J. Romanes)
,
Wallace abandoned the role
of missionary and the hope of introducing his
spiritualist evidence into his scientific
discussions of the origin of man. [279]
He also worked on Darwin, as we shall see. Darwin's
cousin, Francis Galton was unfavorably disposed towards the
new enterprise, calling it "rubbish," although he "was
convinced the affair [was] no matter of vulgar legerdemain
and [believed] it well worth going into..." 288
Despite their reluctance, Darwin, Huxley and others
eventually attended seances. Typical to form, Darwin left
his seance before things started to happen, leaving Francis
(his cousin), Lewes, and George Eliot along with others to
keep vigil. Wallace's views on Spiritualism upset several
of his colleagues immensely. Although sessions of spirit
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manifestation with Miss Florrie Cook were witnessed by both
Wallace and Sir William Crookes, a prestigious scientist
and president of the Royal Society, the vast majority of
scientists remained skeptical.
While Wallace gave undue credulity to the
performances, and it may be true that Crookes was
blackmailed into endorsing the events
,
281 his insistence
that the spiritual life of humans be investigated
scientifically demonstrated his disenchantment with
Darwin's materialism. An analysis of Spiritualism in terms
of feminism and psychoanalytic theory provides reasons to
finesse the easy argument that Wallace and others were
"duped," even if that is what "actually" happened.
Older scholarship, such as that of Kottler's I sis
article
, focuses upon the the fraudulent nature of the
enterprise, although even Kottler argues that Wallace had
good scientific motivations for his point of view.
Newer work takes another tack. Concentrating on the
social and political context of Spiritualism, Ann Braude
and Alex Owen simultaneously (their books come out almost
back to back) arrive at a feminist interpretation of
Spiritualism in terms of a complex movement born of
unstable subjectivities: Victorian females of upper-working
and middle class. Thus attention to proof of spirits'
existence may be considered only a small facet of the
larger project of understanding Spiritualism, and a
restricted focus upon this represents by implication the
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narrow interests of males, then and now, at maintaining
hegemony. In this context Wallace's fervent belief in
mediumship reflect feminist credentials and his anomalous
stance within male-dominated Victorian science.
During this time many people in England, the Continent
and the United States were experimenting with "new"
Phenomenon that challenged traditional secular and
religious ideas and as well as newly developing scientific
views on human nature. The origins of Victorian
Spiritualism are traced to Friedrich Mesmer 282 (17337-1815;
birth date uncertain). Mesmerism, or "animal magnetism,"
sought to explain the phenomenon of what would later be
called hypnosis through appeal to a transfer of "fluid" or
energy from the hypnotist to patient.
Popular with artists and literati of London in the
1840's, the new science was taken up by such people as the
distinguished physician" Dr. John El liotson--the doctor of
Charles Dickens and other well known writers. 282 Despite
impending demise at the middle of the century—with the
invention of ether and chloroform. Mesmerism was to have a
long-reaching legacy. In addition to paving the way for
Spiritualism, through Charcot mesmerism reached Freud and
played a crucial role in development of psychoanalysis.
Introduced to Mesmerism by Spencer Hall in 1844,
Wallace and his brother Herbert (who died of yellow fever
in Brazil) tested the technique within a unique
environment; the rain forests of the Amazon. Much later,
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while in the Pacific, he witnessed "trance mediums" of the
Sarawaks—who piqued his interest in this topic . 28 But it
was not until 1865 2 85 (a key date in the development Qf
Idealism in England, with the publication of J.H.
Stirling's The Secret of Hegej.) that Wallace began to get
interested in Spiritualism to a larger extent. The topic
286 He
became a significant part of his correspondence,
joined groups interested in exploring psychic events and
tried to interest his scientific friends in the matter. 287
He remained committed to the cause throughout his
life. When in the United States (1886-7), 288 he had many
more people to talk to on this topic, as interest ran
higher there. 289 Back in London Sir W. Huggins, like
Crookes a president of the Royal Society, shared this
enthusiasm. 298 Although many scientists resisted the
enterprise, Wallace brought the topic up with his friends.
He even gave Darwin a try.
I can quite comprehend your feelings with regard
to my "unscientific" opinions as to Man, because
a few years back I should myself have looked at
them as equally wild and uncalled for... My
opinions on the subject have been modified solely
by the consideration of a series of remarkable
phenomena, physical and mental, which I have now
had every opportunity of fully testing, and which
demonstrate the existence of forces and
influences not yet recognized by science. This
will, I know, seem to you like some mental
hallucination, but as I can assure you from
personal communication with them, that Robert
Chambers, Dr. Norris of Birmingham, the well
known physiologist, and C.F. Varley, the well
known electrician, who have all investigated the
subject for years, agree with me both as to the
facts and as to the main inferences to be drawn
from them, I am in hopes that you will suspend
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corrohnr^
ment f ° r 3 time tin we exhibit someoborative symptoms of insanity.
[ 291 ]
A more logical choice (even if absurd— as will be
discussed below in terms of medical opposition to
Spiritualism) for sharing this topic lay with T.H. Huxley.
Huxley at least espoused an emergentist conception of
ethics and physiology (vitalism)
,
292 He attempted to
display a tolerant response to Wallace's interest, telling
him not to worry so much about what more skeptical members
of their circle might think, although his lack of
enthusiasm was evident in this diplomatic response.
I am neither shocked nor disposed to issue aCommission of lunacy against you. It may be alltrue, for anything I know to the contrary, but
really I cannot get up any interest in the
subject... [293]
This comment about lunacy touched upon the fact that up
until 1882 Spiritualists were in real danger of being
involuntarily incarcerated for merely admitting to
Spiritualist beliefs. He was in no real danger, being
male, but Huxley's joke must have stung a little even
though Wallace was the one to bring it up first.
Actually, his solicitation of Darwin and Huxley was
doomed from the start—only his naive faith in friendship
with these two men coupled to his enthusiasm could have
enabled him to broach the topic. In addition to an
emergentist metaphysics anathema to Darwin, and a view of
the soul that would make both Huxley (the coiner of the
phrase "agnostic") and Darwin (an atheist) cringe.
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Spiritualism was th e social
, political and professional foe
of the likes of Darwin and to a lesser extent, Huxley.
For starters, Darwin and Huxley were trained as
allopathic physicians. Far from focusing on "spirit
manifestations,"
"rappings," or the "planchette" (Ouija
board)
, which make Spiritualism appear so outrageous within
the scientific context, the doctrine's central tenets
revolved around medical and feminist concerns. The first
item concerns us here.
Spiritualist medicine promoted vegetarianism, loose
clothing for women (this was a time of corsets, stays and
laces)
, homeopathy, the water cure, and non-invasive
treatment of disease, all of which offended allopathic
physicians. Not the least of physicians' worries
concerned loss of their monopoly. Since the metaphysics of
Spiritualism was essentially democratic and based upon the
idea that the body was inherently self-healing, the
doctors' very premises for existence: a hierarchy based
upon expertise, a necessity of invasive techniques
(leaches, surgery, opiates and purges)
,
and the naturally
disease-prone female constitution came into question.
Given the state of Victorian medicine allopathic medicine
was not obviously more effective than these alternative
measures. Worse yet. Spiritualists promoted the idea that
women were inherently more suited to give medical treatment
than men--and to add insult to injury this view was a
289
logical extension of the Drpvsion*-p e alent ideology promulgated by
men . 29 6
UndoubtrecJly democratic healing, the alternative
a ltion, and its practitioners represented a
relied on
0rthodo* med i=ine. Alternative methodsl principles which allopathy could not
a ford to recognize and embraced a heterodoxpractice which was anathema to the league ofprofessional gentlemen. [297]
The threat was met by lobbying for tighter legal
restrictions on the practice of medicine—and new laws were
passed in 1878 to amend the 1858 law giving allopathic
medicine a monopoly. 298 Furthermore, in efforts to
undercut the claim that women were constitutionally suited
for doctoring because of "natural" nurturing powers,
doctors further developed a competing view of women as
congenitally weak and prone to disease:
Male doctors attacked women in general during
this period as unfit to practice medicine, or any
other profession, because of an anatomical
proclivity to hyster ia ... Doctor s who viewed the
female organization as inherently pathological
saw mediums, who exemplified so many female
qualities, as prime examples of pathology. Not
coincidentally, mediums also constituted a highly
visible and vocal case of the assertion of the
rights and the wisdom of women practicing healing
and using heterodox methods [299]
This was the rub: coming from activism within the
Anti-Corn Law League, anti-slavery movement, ancj
feminism, women began to assert themselves and improve
their lot. Much needed to be done. For unmarried middle
class women there were no significant careers available
except that of wife; before 1882 married women could not
own property and had no legal status— they could not
290
execute legal documents, have debts nor could they sue or
be sued. They had no right to refuse or resist their
husband s sexual advances, and could be imprisoned under
the Lunacy laws without any recourse whatsoever—except an
appeal to their husband, which was useless as he was
usually the one to sign the documents for imprisonment.
...prior to the... 1882 Married Women's Property
Act, married women were effectively placed in the
same category as criminals, lunatics, and minors
--they were held to be legally incompetent and
irresponsible. This meant that a woman who
wished to fight or contest her incarceration in
an asylum would be unable to do so without her
husband's active support, and she was at an
obvious disadvantage if it was her husband who
had been instrumental in the committal. [301]
Spiritualist women attempted a strategy of using
weakness as a springboard to power. Defined by Victorian
mores as naturally nurturing, they claimed medicine as
their logical calling. Thought to be more spiritual than
men, they developed an ability to let the spiritual world
speak through them--all the while asserting that as mediums
they could not be held responsible for what they said
during trance. In this way patriarchal ideology enabled
them to assume more power within the family, forge careers
outside the home, and indulge unconscious desires or vent
frustrations through automatic writing, seances, and spirit
manifestations. 202
The reaction of male doctors to female assertiveness
was to categorize Spiritualism, and assertiveness itself,
as disease. Whether arguing that women would become
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diseased if they attempted education, or that independent
thought was a symptom of sexual dysfunction, the medical
community was united in the view that any woman with strong
views was dangerous, and should be sent to the asylum.
Professor R. Frederick Marvin put it bluntly:
Utromania frequently results in mediomania
. . . The
angle at which the womb is suspended frequently
settles the whole question of sanity or insanity.
the organ a little forward— introvert it,
and immediately the patient forsakes her home,
embraces some strong ultraism—Mormonism,
Mesmerism, Fourierism, Socialism, oftener
Spiritualism. She becomes possessed by the idea
that she has some startling mission in the world.
She forsakes her home, her children, her duty, to
mount the rostrum and proclaim the peculiar
virtues of free-love, elective affinity, or the
reincarnation of souls. [303]
Thus any woman with political views was mentally deranged
due to a physical problem with her uterus. Criticism of
"free love" deserves explanation. As part of the feminist
platform, free love was taken by its supporters to mean
that divorce should be allowed if a woman desired it, a
married woman should have the right to refuse sex with her
husband and to control the timing of births, and that
marriage and sexual relations should be premised on a
mutually loving relationship between man and woman. To
critics, free love meant immoral indulgence of the sexual
appetite, adultery and a subverting of man's God-given
right to control weak females. 304
Doctors had more than just the threat of socialism on
their minds, for Spiritualists also resisted vaccination
—
as did Wallace, for its anti-democratic aspects. The
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vaccination laws of 1853-71 coerced people to comply
threat of fines. This particularly bothered the
pir i tua 1 is t s , as it was an invasive procedure using
substances foreign to the human body, was of disputed
efficacy and spent huge amounts of capital which went
the pockets of allopathic doctors and those of their
cohorts--the pharmacists
.
306
by
into
Needless to say, as doctors, Huxley and Darwin were
unlikely to be impressed with Wallace's views on these
matters. Spiritualist emphasis on diet, vegetarianism and
antivivisection, as aspects of an ethics of non-domination,
did not suit the doctors either: they force fed
incarcerated women the meat they refused through their
noses. 306 But Wallace fought for the new ideas, even
within the unfriendly community of male scientists.
In 1876, Alfred Russel Wallace's defense of
Spiritualism from the chair of the
Anthropological Section of the British
Association made it an issue in the transatlantic
scientific community. [307]
He had witnessed what he thought was more than enough
physical evidence necessary to convince anyone who was not
overly biased against the powers of female mediums:
...both Florence Cook and Mrs Guppy claimed to
have had experiences of levitation and
transportation by spirit hands, and Mrs Guppy was
a demon with her spirit 'apports'. When Dr
Alfred Russel Wallace requested a sunflower at
one seance a six-foot specimen complete with
clods of earth fell at his feet. [308]
Although the fraudulent nature of this event and the
manifestations of spirits is clear to most everyone today
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and was probably self-evident to many scientists of his
time, it would be a mistake to dismiss Spiritualism as
simply ridiculous.
First
, it must be understood that excesses were driven
by the market place and restricted career possibilities for
women. Before market forces intervened, the progression
from mediumship based on auditory and visual hallucinations
to rapping and the planchette was natural enough.
'Possession" by spirits of the dear departed also has ready
explanations in psychological principles not too difficult
to apply especially when one takes into account that women
of the time were primary caretakers of the sick and watched
many of their children die in their early years even if
they survived birth.
Spiritual gifts were visited upon working and
middle-class girls and women alike.
Interestingly, cross cultural studies have
indicated that major factors in determining the
recipients of spirit possession are low status
and its accompanying powerlessness, combined with
a sense of personal deprivation—the lack of any
meaningful satisfaction or fulfillment. [ 309 ]
Add to these elements the Victorian view that women
were more spiritual than men, and that a medium who
"manifested" objects or the dead could create a career
outside the home--al lowing access to money, fame and the
attentions of wealthy men, and an irresistible logic is
formed. Each medium strove to out-perform the next.
The pressures on mediums were enormous. In order
to retain a profitable or influential following
it was essential to keep up a high standard of
impressive manifestations, and this involved risk
294
and innovation,
plenty of critic
fraud... [310]
At the same time there were
s eager to expose a medium as a
Not surprisingly
, as women’s lot changed towards the end of
the century--what with the new laws and the creation of
career opportunities in teaching and nursing, and as the
theater became more spectacular and thus a better
competitor, and scandals erupted time and time again within
Spiritualist camps, mediumship tended to wane as a form of
popular public entertainment
.
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Using a mix of Foucault, feminism and Lacan, Alex Owen
demonstrates why Spiritualism cannot be dismissed as merely
a fraud. From Foucault, Owen constructs the view that
women used the position of the medium to exploit conflicted
Victorian gender ideology in order to out-maneuver
patriarchy for power. 312 Thus the medium exploited the
view of women as more spiritual, more nurturing and weak-
willed to its logical conclusions—and in so doing turned
the gender role on its head, transforming debits into
credits. "Passivity became, in the spiritualist vocabulary,
synonymous with power." 313
The problem inherent in the contradictory schema of
Victorian femininity was that although a passive medium
could speak with the authority of the another world, she
could not ultimately claim the new voice as her own.
Female passivity, the leit-motif of powerful
mediumship, also positioned women as individuals
without social power. [314]
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From feminism
, Owen takes the idea that Spiritualism was
motivated from the democratic principle of equality—which
fostered the idea of self-determination and therefore
questioned male-dominated hierarchy—and hence was a step
in the struggle over gender construction.
Lacan
, according to Owen, provides psychoanalytic
concepts m the form of desire and the symbolic order,
which enable us to appreciate the immense power of
Spiritualism to subvert the female gender role and
fascinate men. Given the fragility of subjectivity, the
license of mediumship creates a social situation in which
the desire of both males and females is signified through
fantasy
.
For the female medium, giving up her normal and
conscious state gave a new freedom and power which shocked
and titillated men who although they could not articulate
it this way—were struck by a fascination with an "other"
who was their equal or even superior and yet, contra the
possible, a woman:
When Cora Tappan mounted a public platform, a
great hush fell over her audience. Respectable
Victorians familiar with the religious diatribe,
and with male propounders of The Word; they were
less familiar with the spectacle of lovely women
taking the stage in order to 'speak spirit'. As
Mrs Tappan discoursed on the meaning of Easter or
the need for greater spiritual harmony in the
world, her listeners underwent an emotional
response that perhaps bore little relation to
what she actually said. In fact, inspirational
discourses were rarely innovative and often
obscure, rambling and repetitive. It was a
woman's presence, a combination of the theatrical
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and spiritual, which held the audiencehours at a time. [ 316 ]
rapt for
Furthermore, this dissociation of personalities within the
possessed speaker" allowed the medium to say things that
would not be tolerated from her ordinarily:
Cora Tappan could move without apparent
contradiction from the spiritual to the social,linking an attack on the materialist ethic to an
outright condemnation of the London slums. As a
colleague of the American feminist, Susan B.
Anthony, she also spoke of spiritualism as an
essential component in the liberation and
fulfillment of women. [ 317 ]
As Owen puts it:
...spirit and sitters were involved in a complex
exchange which can be understood as devolving,
as in the original fantasies, on positions of
desire: active or passive, feminine or masculine,
mother or son, father or daughter'. As in day
dreams and fantasies, these positions were
interchangeable and could involve endless
computations on a particular theme or scene.
Possession and the seance experience, therefore,
bore witness not to the emergence of particular
sexual drives or needs as in a binary model of
sexual difference, but erratic, eccentric, even
scandalous' nature of desire--and its enactment.
The materialization seance, like a theatrical or
fantasied scene, established the conventions
which made possible the staging of desire. [ 318 ]
Furthermore, since the players were engaged on a
subconscious level with intricacies of the social
construction of sexual roles, their fascination with or
belief in the project of Spiritualism is not best
understood in terms of fraud and gullability:
It was not a matter of being deliberately duped,
hoodwinked, tricked, or gulled, although that
sometimes came into it. Nor was it the case of
mass hallucination or "epidemic Delusion '... If
medium and sitters were involved in a complex
interchange of desire, the spirits can be seen as
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j #7 • • , . u *»**.*. w * * w a o ydefinition unmeasurable and unobtainable: thetantalizing Other of the unconscious. [319]
In this context
, the hostility of allopathic doctors and
scientists to their foe must be understood as
must add male fear of assertive women. Furthermore,
the bizarre nature of Victorian science: Newton's ether and
Darwin's atomic psychology represent clear examples of
absolutely unverifiable and in contemporary terms:
imaginary, entities. In this light, claims for spiritual
fluid do not seem so far-fetched if one grants a wider
perspective
.
Wallace's adherence to Spiritualism must also be
understood in terms of his dedication to women's rights.
Ann Braude emphasizes the need to take Spiritualism's
social and political impact seriously:
Historians have judged nineteenth-century
reformers harshly for bowing to expediency in
order to gain implementation of the measure they
proposed. The woman's suffrage movement,
especially, has been criticized for making the
ideological concessions necessary to create the
broad coalition that led to its eventual victory.
In contrast. Spiritualists' staunch refusal to
compromise their convictions for any reason won
them the title "fanatic" both from their
contemporaries and from twentieth-century
authors. To dismiss Spiritualists as a "lunatic
fringe" is to ignore the significant way in which
their faith reflected the values of Victorian
overdetermined
.
In addition to professional jealousy, one
charges of "unscientific claims" must be weighed against
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V EVery practice or i^a developed withinSpiritualism was an extreme idea already afloatin American culture. Ever uncompromising,
Spiritualists asked other Americans to make
consistent application of their beliefs about thecontinuity of the personality after death, the
natural piety of women, the reunion of familiesin heaven, the sacrality of the marriage bond,
and the autonomy of the individual conscience.
By the end of the century, the success of the
moderate versions of the Spiritualist program
would be evident in the abolition of slavery, thetriumph of liberal theology, drastically
transformed attitudes toward death and mourning,
the "feminization of American religion," and the
emergence of a popular movement for women's
rights. By aggressively asserting radical
positions on the spectrum of contemporary
cultural trends, Spiritualism dislodged the
center of public opinion from traditional views
and contributed to the success of religious and
social liberalism. [320]
Although aimed at the history of the U.S., Braude's
comments apply to the situation in England. Given two
complimentary poles of Spiritualism, a symbolic order of
discourse, and the social/political struggle, the need of
male-dominated sciences to debunk and destroy becomes clear
and not surprisingly is itself a focus of Owen's work:
Whether male psychical researchers were motivated
by anything more than enjoyment of a pretty
girl's company and an interest in psychical
phenomena is open to question. . .Psychical
research (as opposed to mediumship) was a male
enterprise; the investigators were on the whole
considerably older than the subjects of their
experiments, and came from a different social
class. Arthur Balfour, for example, was of
aristocratic 1 ineage ... together with Henry
Sidgwick and Walter Leaf, were all Oxbridge
men ... [ 321
]
Wallace objected to the machinations of his colleagues:
Wallace became very much concerned about the
skepticism of many of the society's members. He
was also dissatisfied with the manner in which
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they conducted their investigations,
treated mediums as if they were on tr
applied their own conditions from the
of the investigations... [322]
They
ial and
beginnings
Owen points out that unequal power dynamics was in itself a
stimulant to erotic encounter, and that the other "lower"
forms of humanity were part and parcel of the visual
display caught by, pandering to, and exploiting, the male
gaze
:
Themes of difference, particularly as it
related to sex, class, and race, were to be foundin the spiritualist world. In an elaboration ofVictorian hierarchical ordering, working-classfemale mediums were often debased, and their
spirit familiars sometimes vividly presented
themselves as blackened or besmirched these
working-class young women
... [were ] 'secured'inside the cabinet ^by a complex web of tape and
knots... The test seances at which these
arrangements were deemed necessary were held by
the so-called Sidgwick group the class
dissonance in this case was particularly clear
and the degree of sexual fantasy involved that
much more apparent. Here, the motif of male
mastery surfaced around the relationship between
the psychical researchers and the lower-class
mediums in an expression of sexual and class
difference. Female powerlessness was especially
evident in these bondage rituals and it is
possible that male spirit aggression was a
part ia 1 response to this enforced
denigration. [323]
In the light of the complicating factors of sexual
politics and gender construction the "purity" of sciences
that would discredit a female enterprise that included a
medical record on a par or perhaps superior to allopathic
medicine deserves much scrutiny. It is worth considering
that it was "probably a health advantage during this
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period" to avoid the examining room of allopathic
physicians. 2 ^ Owen states:
Of ali the aspects of spiritualist phenomena,
mediumistic healing was perhaps the most reveredby believers and sympathetically attested to by
non-spiritua 1 ist s . . . the process often looked
remarkably like either hypnotism, or therapeutictouch... The efficacy of what is now often
referred to as 'alternative 1 healing is
notoriously difficult to quant if y .. .Nonetheless
,
current medical research on both sides of the
Atlantic suggests that it can achieve remarkably
positive results [325]
Thus even from a conservative view of science there
are aspects of Spiritualist practice worth investigation,
and Wallace's interest cannot be summarily dismissed, 326
despite efforts by some of his contemporaries to do so.
Lack of support from the inner circle of biologists did not
trouble him much. He liked to recall Huxley's quip to
Spencer, who Huxley thought had made a bit much of the
scientific" nature of his project; 32 ^ "Given the molecular
forces in a mutton chop, deduce Hamlet and Faust
therefrom." This comment could equally well apply to all
of the radical-materialists, who were large on claims but
short on theory and evidence when it came to explaining
"man's" qualities.
Wallace appreciated Huxley's sense of perspective,
although Darwin would not have felt the joke's humor. But
for (the later) Huxley and Wallace, the emergence of new
and unpredictable qualities was obvious. Explanations
might be tenuous, but the fact of emergence was "obvious"
to many prominent people of the time. It did not do any
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good to claim that ultimately there was a "logical" or
"mathematically certain" and "calculable" essence to the
material world, for no one was in any position to prove
this claim. Wallace quotes Mill:
J.S. Mill wrote that mental phenomena do not
admit of being deduced from the physiologicallaws of our nervous organization. [328]
Wallace was aware that others made similar claims:
Have you seen Mivart
' s book, "Genesis of theSpecies "?... The arguments against Natural
Selection as the exclusive mode of development
are some of them exceedingly strong, and very
well put, and it is altogether a most readable
and interesting book. [329]
And Professor Othniel Charles Marsh (1831-99) writes:
In most groups of mammals the brain has gradually
become more convoluted, and thus increased in
quality as well as quantity. [330]
Help came from contemporary philosophers, too; George Lewes
had recently coined the term "emergent" for qualities that
arose systemicly but were not represented in the parts. 331
Lewes saw a gulf between the natural and the human: "We
f ind . . . anima 1 s having senses like those of man, but not
having the faculties of man." 332 The link to Vitalism is
obvious, if left unsaid until the end of his book on the
history of philosophy. 333
Organized bodies manifest all the phenomena of
the inorganized, whether chemical or mechanical;
but they also manifest the phenomena named vital
,
which are never manifested by inorganized bodies.
Thus this ontological insight required adjustments in the
structure of knowledge.
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g-^ nic Physics requires a similar division intoBiology and Sociology. The phenomena relating to
mankind are obviously more complex than those
relating to the individual man, and depend uponthem... It would be manifestly as impossible totreat the study of the collective species as apure deduction from the study of the individual,
as it would be to treat Physiology as a purededuction from chemistry. [334]
While the basis of Lewes' views was compatible with
Wallace's ideas, Lewes was unimpressed with Spiritualism.
Wallace also took no notice of Hegel. Maurice Mandelbaum
points out how Lewes' moves from difference between human
and animal psychology to elaboration of "World Spirit."
First, his quote from Lewes:
Biology furnishes both method and data in the
elucidation of the relations of the organism and
the external medium; and so far as Animal
Psychology is concerned this is enough. But
Human Psychology has a wider reach, includes
another important factor, the influence of the
social medium. This is not simply an
addit ion . . . it is a factor which permeates the
whole composition of mind. [335]
Mandelbaum concludes that:
Thus Lewes' psychology was wedded to an
historical consideration of man's nature, and the
psychology of the individual became in effect a
psychology of the General Mind. [336]
Auguste Comte, from whom Lewes takes much, also argued for
emergence--in terms of a human collective: "Humanity,"
which was not reducible to individuals or, of course,
3 3 7biology. Thus distinctions between animal and human
were in the air, supported by mainstream academics and
scientists, as well as Spiritualists. Mandelbaum provides
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a useful description of the concept of emergence, even if
he misses the connection to Wallace, Huxley and Darwin: 338
There are two points concerning the doctrine ofemergence to which I should here like to call
attention: first, that it can be associated with
a vast variety of otherwise very differentphilosophic positions, and second, that it is not
a doctrine which was new in the twentieth
century, as has often been espoused by those who
^ the thought of Samuel Alexander
and C. Lloyd Morgan.
One finds idealists such as Hegel,
materialists such as Marx and Engels, positivists
such as Lovejoy and Broad, all holding doctrines
of emergence which (with the exception of
Hegel's) were remarkably similar. Thus it is a
mistake to treat the concept of emergence as ifit were necessarily associated with an interestin metaphysics, or with a particular metaphysical
position, or with the denial of mind-body
dua 1 ism
.
The foregoing remark should also be
sufficient to suggest that an acceptance of the
doctrine was prevalent in all schools of thought
in the nineteenth century. It is of special
interest to note that in Book III, Chapter V of
his System of Logic Mill gave the first careful
analysis of the difference between the principle
of the "Composition of Causes" and what he called
chemical causes." G. H. Lewes developed the
first full-fledged natural philosophy which is
based upon the principle of emergence in his
Problems of Life and Mind (especially in Volume
II)
,
which appeared in 1874-75; and it is said
that it is to him that we owe this use of the
term "emergence." Among the many other instances
of an acceptance of emergence in the nineteenth
century one further example may be noted, for it
serves to illustrate the way in which the
doctrine migrated freely from system to system.
Claude Bernard accepted a doctrine of emergence,
holding that the living was not reducible to the
non-living, and it was this doctrine—and not his
positivism, nor his arguments for an experimental
science of medicine—that was the primary
influence on the next generation of philosophers,
most of whom used this aspect of his thought in
support of some form of idealist metaphysics.
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Although he did not do so, Wallace could also point to
another biologist who supported a general concept of
"Spirit," George Romanes. (See Mind, Motion and Monism. I
Romanes, like others, was friendlier than he would admit to
Spiritualism:
Romanes had obtained, in fact, much more evidence
concerning psychical phenomena and had been much
more impressed than he admitted to Wallace. Intwo letters to Darwin four years before (1876)Romanes had discussed his experiences with and
without a paid medium. He had received a
communication from what he believed had to be a
nonhuman intelligence, from which he concluded
there were spiritual intelligences, minds withoutbrains. He also described physical phenomena at
a seance with the medium Williams. Thus Romanes
like several other of Wallace's acquaintances hadbeen extremely reluctant to admit private
thoughts on the heretical subject of
spiritualism. Besides Mivart, Wallace knew the
same to be true of the geologists W. Pengelly and
D. T. Ansted. [339]
But rather than framing his argument in terms of
academic philosophy or Huxley's minima 1 ly—emergent biology,
Wallace took an approach guaranteed to upset both Darwin
and Huxley: a combination of Mesmerism, Phrenology, and
Spiritualism. The lack of connection between Darwin and
Wallace on the one hand, and new developments in philosophy
on the other is interesting for what it says about the
structure of Victorian science. Huxley, being the most
philosophically inclined of the biologists, makes no
mention to emergence or spiritualism in terms of
contemporaneous philosophy. When Huxley relates biological
matters to philosophy, he sticks to comments on Kant, Hume
and Descartes.
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Wallace, too, may thus be seen to be running parallel
to a tradition which he nonetheless ignores. In his middle
period he turns to an ontology that makes his special
version of "Spirit" primary.
I was limited to urging the inherent and absolutedifferences between matter and mind... [and
although we cannot conceive of matter producing
mind] we certainly can conceive mind as producinq
matter. [340]
Furthermore, all along Wallace pointed to craniometric
and physiological data which he thought showed the gap
between man and ape was greater than that between ape and
ape, or man and man.^^ As we have seen, even in his
earliest mature work, the Malay Archipelago (1869), he was
already attacking craniometries as generally useless for
ranking races. After attesting to the lack of superiority
of Europeans over Natives, he appends a section on
craniometries
.
No approach to a theory of the excessive
variations of the cranium has been put forth, and
no intelligible classification of races has been
founded upon it. [342]
He adds that Huxley debunks the whole enterprise of
measuring heads:
Professor Huxley has boldly stated his views to
this effect; and in a proposed new classification
of mankind has given scarcely any weight to
characters derived from the cranium. [343]
Although Wallace proceeds to accept the idea that cranial
capacity and intelligence are correlated, he uneasily notes
that the wide variations within any group preclude any
meaningful comparison.^ 44 He tells us that Malays vary
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from 60-91 cubic inches, Negroes 66-87 in? His more
complete rejection of the value of craniometries does not
take hold until he makes his notions of emergence even more
dominant within his work. Wallace's ambivalence to
craniometries can be understood in terms of appreciation
for quantitative data, his waffling on the status of
European moral development and technology, and interest in
Phrenology. On the one hand Wallace will reject the idea
that the "savage" brain is inferior to that of the
European, but on the other he seeks to show "moral
advancement in terms of faculties understood within a
phrenological framework of physical manifestations.
While Spiritualism and emergentism make a likely pair,
the third leg, phrenology, appears an odd addition. The
science of cranial topography is more logically associated
with craniometries and the worst of a radical materialism
which Darwin and others adopted. Yet Wallace defended
phrenology from its critics with much enthusiasm. One way
to come to terms with this is to see that although he makes
Spirit ontological ly prior to matter in a metaphysical
argument, a desire for quantitative and materially
verifiable evidence tugs him in an opposing direction.
Thus Wallace and Darwin can be seen as reacting to similar
needs, each waffling and ambivalently adjusting theory and
evidence
.
307
In Ma lay Wallace takes pains to praise Natives over
Englishmen, but then takes up the matter of craniometric
data
.
The only conclusions that we can draw from thistable [of craniometric data] are, that the
Australians have the smallest crania, and the
Polynesians the largest; the Negroes, the Malays,
and Papuans not differing perceptibly in size.
And this accords very well with what we know of
their mental activity and capacity for
civilization. [345]
Here Wallace refers to civilization as if it were a
ladder to be climbed, indeed he expects the Native to find
his "natural" place. Quotes like these show Wallace caught
between his emergentist and craniometric/phrenological
conceptual schemes. His ambivalence over European "moral
superiority" is interesting in this regard, and allows
him to hold both the view that Natives should be left
on their own (due to European corruption) and the view that
they should be dominated by a paternalistic European
colonial system (due to the superiority to European
morals) . He did not escape racist/imperialist ideology,
although his affliction was very different from that of
Darwin as the more pernicious aspects were temporary and
fleeting
.
In discussing the failures of the nineteenth century,
one of the most disturbing for Wallace was neglect of
O/ C
phrenology. In order to more fully appreciate the
situation, let us turn to Wallace's list of the tenets of
Phrenology
.
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i! c
he brain is the organ of the mind.
^
)
Size is. ..a measure of power
•
3) The brain is a congeries of organs, each
naving its appropriate faculty
4) The front of the brain is the seat of ourperceptive and reflective faculties; the top, ofour higher sentiments; and the back and sides, ofour animal instincts.
5) The form of the skull during life corresponds
so closely to that of the brain that it ispossible to determine the proportionate
development of various parts of the latter by an
examination of the former. [347]
In what looks like a fit of reductive materialism he
even attacked the "metaphysicians," such as William
Hamilton (in 1898), because "They recognized no connection
between the mind and the organism. 1,348 Furthermore, Wallace
took the leap to linking phrenological traits to racial
character
.
3
4
^ Given its materialist assumptions, it is odd
that more of the evolutionary biologists did not adopt the
doctrine. Of course Darwin and Huxley, as trained
physicians, would resist this science which challenged
traditional medical hegemony. Even so, Phrenology had its
defenders in high places. Prof. George M. Humphrey of
Cambridge University complained of critics:
The arguments against phrenology must be of a
deeper kind... to convince anyone who has
carefully considered the subject. [350]
But the new science fizzled out after 1845, 351 according to
Wallace, due to its association with mesmerism, which was
made obsolete (but not discredited) by the introduction of
anesthesia— in the form of ether and chloroform.
In what appears to be an echo of Darwin, Wallace even
^ ?
claims that "Character ... is very strongly hereditary..."
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And yet he has not converted to a racist and radically
reductive materialism. He thought that craniometric ranges
for the various races were so large that racial averages
had little significance. He noted that the data cited in
-
lay
' taken fron > Dr. Joseph B. Davis' Thesaurus Craniorium
showed that the largest English skull barely edged out the
largest Malay skull, with 92.5 cubic inches to 91. Given
that these were extremes in any case, he felt that "no
intelligible classification of races" had come from this
data. Here Wallace's ambivalence, driven by a competition
between Phrenology and Spiritualism, comes to the fore.
Whereas all Natives are inferior, according to the
recapitulationists, Wallace sees no such generalization.
Speaking of Polynesians, he agrees that these Natives are
physically every bit the equal, if not the superior of
3 5 3Europeans. He writes that Lord George Cambell can
corroborate his own view:
The Mahoris or Brown Polynesians, according to
the universal testimony of travellers and
residents, are one of the very finest races on
the globe. A recent writer says--"There are no
people in the world who strike one at first as
these Friendly Is landers ... a novel and splendid
picture of the genus homo ; and, as far as
physique and appearance goes, they gave one
certainly an impression of being a superior race
to ours. [354]
Turning to the question of mental faculties, Wallace
sees the limitations of inheritance as no impediment to
moral worth, thus undercutting any normative component of
phrenology, and by extension, of craniometries.
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u t l a t er on, as I came to see the banefulinfluence of our wrong system of education and
of society, I began to realize that people who
could talk of nothing but the trivial amusements
of an empty mind were the victims of these social
errors, and were often in themselves quite
estimable characters.
Later on, when the teachings of spiritualism
combined with those of phrenology led me to the
conclusion that there were no absolutely bad men
or women, that is, none who, by a rational and
sympathetic training and a social system which
gave to all absolute equality of opportunity,
might not become useful, contented, and happy
members of society... [355]
For Darwin and the others, equal opportunity has nothing to
do with anything. The limitations of inheritance would
confirm the thief for a thief, and the beggar for a beggar.
For Wallace Phrenology provides a gauge for assessing the
capacity for various mental characteristics, but these
capacities do not prevent achievement of a worthy position
within society. The notion that there is a war of each
against each to be settled according to cranial merit has
no grip here.
Even early on, Wallace uses emergentism to claim that
humans occupy a place removed from the animal world, thus
he is able to claim that there has been no advance in human
capacities since man's inception, despite the claims of
Darwin and Vogt. Different people manifest different mixes
O C £
of abilities and varied access to technology and
culture, and he warns us to be careful when evaluating
societies to separate the hereditary from the accumulated
3 5 7(the cultural). Thus an Englishmen might be "higher" on
the ladder of civilization, be more cultured and have more
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a robber barren he
technology at his disposa l--but if he be
would rank below the Native who lived an honest, low-tech
lif e
.
Ultimately phrenology functions for Wallace roughly in
the same way as diagnostic tests are supposed to in
contemporary culture. Phrenology allows insight into the
abilities of individuals, but it does not indicate moral
worth or have meaningful relation to survival status.
Therefore he feels free to title a chapter of his last
book: "Savages not morally inferior to civilized races.
When he speaks of "capacity for civilization," he
ambivalently uses an idea he will refine, alter, and in the
end reject. In the early work he is torn between the
notion that intelligence and "high" civilization go
together and the idea that general capacities are
irrelevant to achievement of a worthwhile life. By the end
he says :
Many other illustrations of both intelligence and
morality are met with among savage races in all
parts of the world; and these, taken as a whole,
show a substantial identity of human character,
both moral and emotional, with no marked
superiority in any race or country. [359]
E. Conclusion to Chapter Three
To those who would excuse Darwin's justification of
race war with the claim: "But all Victorian men held
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similar views," one can respond: "Not Wallace." Wallace
presents a counter example to assumptions that the theory
of Natural Selection had to be racist because of its social
context. Being the co-discoverer of the theory that
transformed biological sciences and the cultural milieu
forever, he presents an alternative world view which
demonstrates the lack of homogeneity of Victorian science
and society. This chapter has shown that a diversity of
scientific, philosophical, social and political beliefs
must be taken into account if Darwinism or late nineteenth
century science is to be fully appreciated.
The reasons for Wallace's divergence from the Social
Darwinism of Darwin are many. A respect for Natives
generated by years of living amongst indigenous peoples of
several continents, a witnessing of the horrors of laissez
faire capitalist imperialism—both in England and
throughout the British Empire, a desire for obtaining
social and political equality for women, and an interest in
a metaphysics of Spiritualism as opposed to reductive
materialism: all these things prompted Wallace's differing
view of biology, metaphysics and politics.
All of Wallace's motivations against reductive
materialism share a core idea: the emergence of unique
human qualities. He was not alone in this view; others
believed there are some human aspects which can not be
reduced to movements of atoms. George Henry Lewes
pioneered a concept of emergence and despite the fact that
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the times were right to appeal to developments within the
universities or the intellectual community, Wallace rarely
referred to academics or others that could help motivate
his own view.
George Eliot and even others outside Lewes' circle,
such as T.H. Huxley (despite his materialistic leanings)
also wrote in favor of human qualities beyond the domain of
biological explanation. Wallace's independence of thought
might be seen as a result of the fact that he moved from
the working to the professional classes and was self-
educated. Whatever his motivation or the etiology of his
views, most professional biologists who by and large were
wealthy or at least solid middle class did not take
Wallace's ideas on emergence seriously, but moved ahead
with a Social Darwinist program. Explanation of this
plunge into racism is overdetermined and may be made in
terms of the radical materialist bias and class/gender
position of most biologists.
The unfortunate result was that Darwinism promulgated
an imperialist, racist, sexist and Social Darwinist version
of Natural Selection. The reasons for the rapid spread of
Social Darwinism within British science and even European
science deserve recognition and further investigation.
An unlikely-looking source of proof for the resistance
value of emergentism comes from Wallace's adherence to
phrenology. Even though phrenology by its very nature
pushes for description of mind in terms of crude physical
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measurement, Wallace turns the science on its head, as it
were, by uncoupling values and genetics. By starting with
assumptions about the moral equality of all humans, he
created a relatively non-racist materially-based phrenology
that was not reductive in the last analysis because of his
emergentist bias, even if this bias in the end contradicts
the central tenets of phrenology.
This brings us back to the uncomfortable topic of
scientific racism. In order to make the charge against
Darwin
,
it must be shown that he should have been aware or
was aware of alternative views. This is easy to show, and
has been demonstrated in this chapter by simply contrasting
Wallace s work with that of Darwin. Yet even Wallace at
times shared in the view that Natives were "children."
Even though he dropped this view, during the period we are
discussing (1859-1890) he sometimes used the vocabulary of
social recapitulationists. The discussion has to be
somewhat complicated because he did not tie "lower" status
to genetics in a way that precluded Natives vaulting out of
an "inferior" position or even restrict any particular
group to a unique status on the "ladder of civilization,"
and "higher" status did not mean that Wallace eschewed
damning criticism of his own country and culture.
Furthermore he presents an ambivalent attitude towards
social hierarchy, sometimes endorsing it, sometimes
declaring it bankrupt. But the fact remains that for the
period so crucial to us, because that is when Social
315
Darwinism got its impetus, Wallace was not free of the
racist virus—even if his particular and sporadic
affliction was of a much-attenuated form.
One mitigating factor on Wallace's side is that his
version was much less deadly, for it centered on a cultural
chauvinism which was already diluted by severe critique of
his own culture. He was already advocating reforms which
had as their goal achievement of social and political
equality for all races, as opposed to Darwin's view of
obligatory and fatal racial and social struggle. Given
this understanding, Wallace's work deserves a rescue from
relative obscurity if only to restore the social and
political context.
The failure of Wallace's more egalitarian science to
take hold within the community of biologists needs to be
further investigated so that mechanisms of scientific
progress can be further revealed and understood. To this
end we turn now to Chapter Four, the wider social and
political context of Darwin's Social Darwinism.
In closing this chapter it does us well to take
another look at his first successful book, the Malay
Archipelago
. Even in this early work Wallace tries to
disrupt the favorite line of attack on the Native, namely
that the savage is the "missing link" between "man" and
animal. In the standard edition (the tenth edition) the
title page and its facing leaf tell much about his views.
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The first edition had the "Orang-utan attacked by
Dyaks" plate as the first page, while the title page faced
a blank and was illustrated with a bird. See Illustration
17. In the tenth edition (Illustration 16) a strange
"orang-utan," baby-like and sporting a goofy look, is faced
by a depiction of a dangerous and full-grown orangoutang
which attacks a human (in what appears to be self-defense;
note the caption)
. The animal has one hand on the spear of
a Native. While the baby creature looks comically human,
although certainly not to be mistaken as human, the fully
grown animal, standing erect and appearing to be only a
grasp away from mastering spear-throwing, looks like he/she
might vault into humanhood at any moment.
Yet there is opposition to how Darwin would have it,
there is an abyss to such crossing over. The Natives
live an erect life, the orang rears upwards only in
emergencies. The Natives are clothed, the orangoutang is
oblivious to such amenities. The smooth skin of the Native
allies him firmly with the European, and removes him from
the realm of the orangoutang. The lowly Natives sport
artistic bangles, the orangoutang is naked of art. The
Natives are clearly working together, one can almost hear
their yells; the orangoutang is alone and inarticulate; its
screams touch any man's heart--but they are not a prelude
to rational conversation, a curse, or even a joke.
It is no accident Wallace chose this piece of art for
beginning his work on Malaysia—which is "perhaps the least
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360known part of the globe.
Natives depicted, are re
civilized headhunters,
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MALAY ARCHIPELAGO
THE LAND OF THE
ORANG-UTAN AND THE BIRD OF PARADISE
a narrative of travel
WITH STUDIES OF MAN AND NATURE
DOVER PUBLICATIONS, INC.
NEW YORK
Illustration 16: Malay frontispiece, tenth edition.
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the need of "civilized Englishmen" to learn from the black
Native ring true, he has accomplished much.
At the commencement of his book Wallace discusses
raising a baby orangoutang, and probably the title page is
homage to this hapless animal. Having shot its mother in
the interests of science, he tries to save the tiny
creature. He enjoyed this "fatherhood," despite demanding
moments brought on by foster care. The orangoutang "set up
a scream very like that of a baby in similar
circumstances .
"
361
Wa 1 lace explains that the orangoutang will never
qualify as a proto-human:
It may be safely stated, however, that the Orang
never walks erect, unless when using its hands to
support itself by branches overhead or when
attacked. Representations of its walking with a
stick are entirely imaginary. [362]
Nor was Wallace alone in this view, even Huxley criticized
the view that orangutans were the bottom of the
savage/orangutan cusp:
I do not wish to crow unduly over my humble
cousin the orang, but in the aesthetic province,
as in that of intellect, he is nowhere... he has
never been awestruck ... by the dim religious
gloom, as of a temple devoted to the earthgods,
of the tropical forests which he inhabits. [363]
This was so even if one must, according to Huxley, admit
that the orang does have a consciousness, and thus some
aspect of his existence is outside even the realm of
science
.
Physical science may know all about his clutching
the fruit and munching it and digesting it, and
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how the physical titillation of his palate istransmitted to his brain. But the feelings ofsweetness and of satisfaction which, for a
moment, hang out their signal lights in his
melancholy eyes, are as utterly outside thebounds of physics as is the "fine frenzy" of ahuman rhapsodist. [ 364 ]
Huxley's comment about human gloom fits uneasily with his
choice of the word "melancholy" for the orang. However he
held the differences between man and beast to be based in
the details of physiology, even though he considered the
disparity to be a major one of kind:^^
The ape-like arrangement of certain muscles which
is occasionally met with in the white races of
mankind, is not known to be more common among
Negroes or Australians: nor because the brain of
the Hottentot Venus was found to be smoother, to
have its convolutions more symmetrically
disposed, and to be, so far, more ape-like than
that of ordinary Europeans, are we justified in
concluding a like condition of the brain to
prevail universally among the lower races of
mankind, however probably that conclusion may be.
Thus Wallace confronts the major arguments of Darwin
and others purporting to show Natives as links between
European and ape. For Wallace and others such as T.H.
Huxley or George Eliot, there was a great divide between
humans and animals. The fruit of this view was that race
war fails to be necessary or justifiable. Ultimately in
the Victorian context it is emergence which allows for
humanity
.
321
Chapter III Notes
Alfred Russel Wallace, A Narrative of Travels on the
——
-—
*nd Mo Negro, With and Account of the" NativeTribes
, And * ' — —
1 .
Amazon
andM , Observations on the Climate , Geoloqy
— !^--niazon Xglley (New York: Gre^woodPress, 1969), page facing title page. This edition is areprint of the 1895 version of the 1853 edition. Hereafterreferred to as: Ama zon
.
2. Very little has been written about Wallace.Charles H
. Smith : Alfred Russel Wallace / An Anthology of
His Shorter Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991)
,
pps. 475ff for the best bibliography on Wallace to
date.
See
3* Alfred Russel Wallace, My Life / A Record of Events
and Opinions (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company
, 1905) , 2
volumes, 1:12-3. Hereafter referred to as: My Life.
4. My Life
, 1:105.
5. Amazon
, facing page 1.
6. See McKinney.
7. Alfred Russel Wallace, Letters and Reminiscences
,
edited by James Marchant (London and New York: Harper and
Brothers, Publishers, 1916), p. 454. Hereafter referred to
as: Letters .
8. My; Life
,
11:33.
9. Letters
, p. 271.
10. Letters
, p. 321.
11. Letters
, p. 279.
12. My Life
,
11:24. See June 17 issue of The Reader.
13. My Life
,
1:150.
14. My. Life
,
11:258.
15. My Life
,
11:369.
16. My Life
,
11:351. Wallace met him in 1878.
17. William Irvine, Apes
,
Angels
,
and Victorians / The
Story of Darwin
, Huxley , and Evolution (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1955) p. 30. Hereafter referred to as "Apes .
"
18. Man
,
Race and Darwin
,
ed. Philip Mason (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 18. The highly
controversial Test Act prohibited non-conformists from
entering the universities or teaching there.
19. My; Life
,
11:57.
20. See the ISIS article by Kottler, as well as "Man's
Place in Nature" in this chapter.
21. Letters
,
p. 26.
22. Alfred Russel Wallace, The Malay Archipelago / The
Land of the Orang-Utan and the Bird of Paradise / A
Narrative of Travel With Studies of Man and Nature . New
York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962. Reprint of the 1890
tenth edition by MacMillan and Company, London, the
standard edition. Illustration is from page facing viii.
Further references to this work will be to: "Malay ."
322
23. Bolby
, illustration on end sheets
24. Bolby, p. 147.
25. Bolby, p. 161.
77* ?' S
8
‘
-
Taken fr0ni P^e 535 of Journal
.
,
*
^
ee stone s Origin
, in which Darwin's extensived
i
ar
n^
S and coniPlaints are discussed. Also, seeBolby, who diagnoses" Darwin as suffering from
psychosomatic disorders.
28. Descent, 11:404-5; Modem Library: p. 919 .
29* Ages, pp. 20-21. Bibby claims that Huxley becane
excited by the Natives of New Guinea and the Louisade
Archipelago, as is evidenced by his drawings. See page 15,
also illustrations between page 68 and 69.
30. letters, p. 25. Taken from Amazon.
184.
. 202-4.
33.
60.
175.
. 252-3.
31. Amazon,
32. Amazon
33. Amazon
34. Amazon
35. Amazon
36. Anazon
37. Essays
38. Alfred
Stanford, 1883.),
Australasia.
"
39. Anazon, P- 83.
40. Anazon, P- 83.
41. Amazon, P- 83.
42. Amazon, P- 83.
43. Anazon, PP . 250-1.
44. Anazon, P- 207.
45. Anazon, P- 207.
46. Amazon, P- 207.
47. Anazon, PP . 157-8.
48. Amazon, P- 164.
49. Anazon, PP . 176-8.
50. Anazon, P- 179.
51. Anazon, P- 361.
52. Anazon, P- 343.
53. Anazon, PP . 343-4.
54. W. Arens, The Man-
P-
pp.
P-
P-
P-
pp.
111:67.
Russel Wallace, Australasia (London: Edward
p. 516. Hereafter referred to as:
Anthropophagy (New York: Oxford University Press, 19791,
p. 21. Hereafter referred to as "Arens."
55. Australasia
,
p. 473. Wallace's eight references are
to pages: 340, 470, 473, 477, 481, 487, 522, 567. His
sources are: H.N. Moseley, Captain Edward Redlick, Mr.
Perry, F.A. Campbell, A.H. Markham, Captain Erskine, and
Von Popp. Moseley and Erskine are the easiest to track
down, see Bibliography and below.
56. John Elphinstone Erskine, Journal of a Cruise Among
the Islands of the Western Pacific / including the Feejees
and others inhabited by the Polynesian Negro Races
,
in her
Majesty's Ship Havannah (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall,
323
Hereafter
1967)
, pp. 426-8. Reprint of 1853 edition,
referred to as "Erskine."
Erskine makes approximately sixteen references to
cannibalism. Of these, none are witnessed by him. He
refers the reader to Mr. Hunkin, Rev. Turner, Mariner,
Cook, Foster, M. Gervaise, Rev. Hunt, those aboard the U.S.
Peacock, Lawry and John Jackson. Of these, only Mariner,
unidentified witnesses, Rev. Hunt and Jackson are said by
Erskine to have witnessed cannibalism first hand.
57. Erskine, p. 428.
58. Erskine, p. 428.
59. Arens, pp. 119-120.
60. Arens, p. 168.
61. Amazon
, pp. 346-7.
62. Amazon
, p. 347.
63. Amazon
, p. 359.
64. Amazon
, p. 359
65. Malay
, p. 53. See Bowden. See Pannell. She points
out that Wallace collected 125,660 specimens during his
stay in Malaysia—none of which were heads. The other major
collector was Forbes, who brought back nany heads. Pannell
claims English anthropology was a form of head-hunting—
which Wallace resists.
66. Australasia
, p. 359.
67. Malay
, p. 69.
68. Alfred W. Crosby, Germs Seeds & Animals (Arnonk:
M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 97. Hereafter referred to as:
"Crosby .
"
69. Crosby, p. 100.
70. Crosby, p. 101 and following. See also Australasia,
p. 477.
71. Malay
, pp. 194-5.
72. Malay
, p. 196.
73. Malay
, p. 196.
74. Malay
,
p. 196.
75. Australasia
, p. 478.
76. Alfred Russel Wallace, Darwinism
,
an Exposition of
the Theory of Natural Selection With Some of Its
Applications (London and New York: Macmillan and Co.,
1889)
, p. 15. Hereafter referred to as: Darwinism .
77. Australasia
, p. 478.
78. Malay
, p. 332.
79. M^ Life
,
11:53. Letter to Professor George
Rolleston, September 23, 1865.
80. Malay, p. 197.
81. Australasia, p. 197.
82. Australasia, P- 385.
83. Australasia, P- 491.
84. Australasia, P- 497.
85. Australasia, PP . 478-9.
86. Australasia, P- 568.
87. Australasia, P- 174.
88. Australasia, P- 175.
324
89. Malay
, p. 186.
90. Australasia
, pp. 505-6.
91. Australasia
, p. 300.
92. Australasia
, p. 325.
93. Australasia
, p. 325.
94. Australasia
, p. 376.
95. Alfred Russel Wallace, The Wonderful Century / ItsSuccesses and Its Failures (New York : Dodd
, Mead andCompany, 1911), p. 374 . Hereafter referred to as:
Wonderful Century
.
96. Alfred Russel Wallace, The World of Life / A
Manifestation of Creative Power, Directive Mind and
Ultimate Purpose (New York: Moffat, Yard anJ^npany,
1911), p. 427. Hereafter referred to as World.
97. Huxley, Essays
,
VII: 207-8. Huxley“iii^ social
evolution developing both morals and immorals, thus
progress is relative to the particulars one wishes to
discuss.
98. Huxley, Essays
, IX:79-80.
99. Huxley, Essays
,
IX:40.
100 . Australasia
, pp. 511-12.
101. Australasia
, p. 6 .
102. Malay
, p. 68 .
103. Australasia
, p. 88 .
104. Australasia
, p. 86 .
105. Australasia
, p. 86 .
106. Australasia
, p. 104.
Australasia
, p. 86 . Others, such as Lecomte Du Notiy
(some five decades later) make a similar point. See p. 79
of Human Destiny . Even though human emergence is invoked,
and many of Wallace's arguments reproduced—no mention of
Wallace is nade despite the emphasis on evolution, hunan
emergence and teleology.
108. Huxley, Essays
,
VII: 217.
109. Huxley, Essays
,
VII: 155.
110. World
, p. 428.
111. Huxley, Essays
,
IX:35-6.
112. Austra lasia
, pp. 494-5.
113. Australasia
, p. 89.
114. Australasia
,
p. 249.
115. Australasia
, pp. 265-6.
116. Malay
, p. 80.
117. Alfred Russel Wallace, Social Environment and Social
Progress (New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls Company,
1913), pps. 32-3. Hereafter referred to as: Social.
118. Malay
, p. 322.
119. Malay
,
p. 326.
120. Australasia
, p. 260.
121. Malay
,
p. 186.
122. Malay
, p. 336.
123. Malay, p. 364. See also My Life, 1:382.
124. My; Life
,
11:15.
125. Letters
, p. 191. Wallace to Darwin.
325
!2 6. Letters, pp. 192-3. Darwin read Malay about March
5, 1869. See also p. 196, March 22, 1869.
127. Letters, p. 197. Darwin to Wallace, March 27, 1869.
128. Letters, p. 233. Darwin to Wallace.
129. My Life
, 11:29-30.
130. Letters, p. 260. Wallace to Darwin. Huxley hated
George's book. See Apes
, p. 335 and following, and Huxley,
Essays
,
Volume 9, p. 169 and following.
131. Letters
, p. 260. Wallace to Darwin.
132. Letters
, p. 260.
133. My; Life
, 11:120.
134. Wonderful Century
, p. 345.
135. See Bolby.
136. My Life
, 1:87.
137. Alex Cullen, Adventures in Socialism (Glasgow: John
Smith and Son, Ltd., 1910) , facing page 46. Hereafter
referred to as "Cullen."
138.
Cullen, facing page 76.
139. My_ Life
,
11:133.
140. My Life
,
11:128-9.
141. World
, p. 414.
142. Wonderful Century
, p.
143. Wonderful Century
, p.
144. Wonderful Century
, p.
145. Wonderful Century
, p.
146. Wonderful Century
, p.
147. Wonderful Century
, p.
148. Wonderful Century
, p.
149. Wonderful Century
, p.
Century
,
February 1898.
150. Wonderful Century
, p.
151. Wonderful Century
, p.
152. Wonderful Century
, p.
153. Malay
, p. 364.
154. Wonderful Century
, p.
155. Wonderful Century
, pp
156. Australasia
, p. 503.
157. My Life
,
11:121.
158. Wonderful Century
, pp
159. Social
, p. 9.
345.
354.
299.
356.
299; next quote is p.333.
333.
333.
359. See also The Nineteenth
399.
338.
169. Original is in italics.
380.
viii-ix.
366-7.
160. Social
,
p. 11. Notice the possibility of group
selection here.
161. Social
,
p. 11.
162. The Malay went through many editions, some editors
put it at 10, others 12. I come up with at least 20
editions, see the bibliography.
163. Malay
, pp. 455-7.
164. Malay
, pp. 455-7.
165. Malay
, pp. 455-7.
166. Malay
, pp. 455-7.
167. Malay
, pp. 455-7.
168. Wonderful Century
,
p. 380.
169. My Life
,
11:207-8.
326
170. My; Life
, 11:255.
171. Social
, p. 115.
172. Life
, 11:209. See the next chapter for the
reaction of the working class to Malthus.
173. Wonderful Century
, p. 381.
174. Social, P- 112.
175. Social, pp. 160-1.
176. My Life
,
II : 362-72
177. My Life
,
II : 361.
178. Social, P- 72.
179. Social, P- 77.
180. Social, P- 141.
181. Social, P* 142.
182. Social, pp. 156-7.
183. Social, P- 158.
184. Social, P* 159.
185. Social, pp. 124-5.
186. Social, pp. 140-1.
187. Malay
, p. 70.
188. Darwinism
, p. 11.
189. Malay
, p. 69.
190. Malay
, pp. 70-1.
191. Social
, pp. 148-9.
192. Social
, p. 163.
193. Michael Ruse, The Darwinian Paradigm / Essays on its
history, philosophy, and religious implications (New York:
Routledge, 1989)
,
p. 48. See Gould for extensive treatment
of hairlessness in humans and its relation to neoteny,
especially Ontogeny and Phylogeny
, p. 397 and following.
He argues hairlessness is not a case of sexual selection at
all but reflects an arrested development which allows a
longer socialization process and larger brains.
194. George, p. 206.
195. Stephen Jay Gould, Eight Little Piggies
,
(New York:
W.W. Norton and Co., 1993), p. 380. Hereafter referred to
as "Piggies ."
196. Piggies
, p. 380.
197. Piggies
, p. 379.
198. George, p. 212. See also Henry Eliot Howard, The
British Warblers: A History With Problems of Their Lives
,
illustrated by H. GrOnvold, 2 volumes (London: R.H. Porter,
1907-14)
,
p. ?. George does not give full citation. "I
cannot call to mind a single instance in which I have, even
for a brief moment, seen the female looking at the male
while assuming these positions." Quoted by George at that
location. Perhaps the emphasis on ocular stimulation is
also a matter of sexual politics, as it is a commonality
within feminist scholarship that males are more visually
oriented than females.
199. George, p. 211. Wallace quote taken from Darwinism ,
p. 336. Previous material is summarized from The Wonderful
Century .
200. Piggies
,
p.377.
327
Wallace quote is taken from
201. George, pp. 208-9.
Darwinism
, p. 222.
_
202 * (
f
eor9e ' P* 213. See David Lambert Lack, The Life ofthe Robin (London: H.F. & G. Witherby, 1943), p.~?7 ~Georqedoes not provide full citation.
203. George, p. 212.
204. Stephen Jay Gould, Ever Since Darwin (New York*
W.W. Norton & Company, 1977), p. 89. Hereafter referred to
as: "Gould, Ever Since Darwin
.
11
205. Letters,
1877.
pp. 245-6. Darwin to Wallace, August 31,
206. Letters
, pp. 246-7. Wallace to Darwin, September 3,
1877.
207. Letters
, pp. 296-7. Original is in all italics.
208. See Desmond.
209. See Laura L. Betzig's Despotism and Differential
Reproduction: a Darwinian View of History (New York: Aldine
Publications, 1986) for a contemporary attempt to show
differential reproductive success for the upper class.
Also see: Human Reproductive Behavior: A Darwinian
Perspective
,
edited by Laura L. Betzig, Monique Borgerhoff
Mulder, and Paul Turke (Canbridge: Cambridge university
Press, 1988)
.
210. Notebook : "M" Notebook p. 57; text page 16.
211. Darwinism
, p. vi.
212. Darwinism
, p. 100.
213. Letters
, p. 110. Darwin to Wallace, Decenber 22,
1857.
214. Social
, p. 104.
215. Social
, p. 111.
216. My Life
, 11:16; Wallace's italics. See Schurman,
pps. 77 and 102, where he points out Spencer saw "nan" as
unique and not defined by the laws of nature. Spencer was
worried about the ethical complications.
217. Letters
, pp. 196-7. Darwin to Wallace, March 27,
1869.
218. Letters
,
p. 199. Darwin to Wallace, April 14, 1869.
219. Letters
, p. 206. Darwin to Wallace, January 26,
1870.
220. My; Life
,
11:7-8.
221. Letters
, pp. 127-8. Darwin to Wallace, May 28,
1864.
222. Letters
, p. 129. May 29, 1864.
223. Darwinism
, p. 460.
224. My; Life
,
1:421-2.
225. Letters
, pp. 129-30. May 29, 1864.
226. Letters, p. 130. May 29, 1864.
227. Letters, p. 168. Darwin to Wallace, March 19-24,
1868.
228. Letters, p. 226. Darwin to Wallace, August 28,
1872.
229. Origin
,
p. 96.
230. See Kottler, ISIS.
328
231. My Life
, 11:118.
232. Malay
, p. 58.
233. Malay
, p. 340. At the Aru Islands.
234. Darwinism
, pp. 474-5.
235. Essays
, 111:64-5.
236. World
, p. 212.
237. Letters
, p. 341. Wallace to Sir W.T. Thiselton-
Dyer, February 8, 1911.
238. Letters
, pp. 342-3. Thiselton-Dyer to Wallace.
239. World
, pp. 316-7.
240. Kottler
,
ISIS
, p. 158.
241. Darwinism
, p. 477. Also see World, p. vi.
242. World
, pp. 334-5.
243. Darwinism
, pp. 37-8.
244. Letters
, p. 413.
245. World
, p. 421.
246. World
, p. 429.
247. Social
, p. 38.
248. Thomas H. Huxley, Darwiniana (New York: AMS Press,
1970), p. 122. Reprint of the 1896 edition. Hereafter
referred to as: "Huxley, Darwiniana .
"
249. Kottler, ISIS
, p. 158 and following.
250. Huxley, Darwiniana
, p. 121.
251. Huxley, Darwiniana
, p. 162.
252. Huxley, Darwiniana
, pp. 162-3.
253. New York Times Book Review
,
Dec 23, 1990, of Derek
Bickerton's: Language and Species (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990) . See also Huxley, Essays
,
Volume 7,
P* 143—especially the footnote about the watch mechanism.
254. Kottler, ISIS
, p. 145.
255. Social
, p. 40.
256. Social
, pp. 40-1.
257. Essays
,
VII:36.
258. Social
, pp. 106-7.
259. Darwinism
, p. 462.
260. Social
,
p. 107.
261. Darwinism
, p. 11.
262. Malay, p. 70.
263. Australasia
,
p. 601.
264. Australasia
,
p. 601.
265. Australasia
, p. 601.
266. Malay
,
p. 368.
267. Malay
,
p. 369.
268. My Life
,
1:408.
269. Social
,
p. 102.
270. Huxley, Essays
,
111:276-7. See also VII: 143 and
following, where Huxley makes rational speech a uniquely
human attribute, and IX: 9 and following, and IX: 9 where he
argues nan's arts, agriculture and fine arts, make "nan"
unique.
271. Huxley, Essays
,
VII: 279. For more on the argument
for Vitalism, see also 1:117.
272. Huxley, Essays
,
111:164-5.
329
„273 \ stePhen Jay Gould, Hen's Teeth and Horse's Toes (NewYork: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983), p. 156~ Hereaft^F
referred to as: "Gould, Hen's Teeth."
274. Gould, Hen's Teeth
, p. 156.
Darwinism
, pp. 469-70.
Darwinism
, p. 472.
Darwinism
, p. 463.
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (New
York: Image Books, 1967), VIII, part I, p. 171 .
Hereafter referred to as: "Copleston."
279. Kottler
,
ISIS
, p. 164.
Kottler
, ISIS
, p. 170; insertions are Kottler 's.
Kottler, ISIS, p. 171.
187.
275.
276.
277.
278.
280.
281.
282.
283.
Darwinism
, p.
Alex Owen, The Darkened Room / Women, Power and
Spiritualism in Late Victorian England (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), p. 20. Hereafter
referred to as "Owen."
284. Darwinism
, p. 184.
285. Letters
, p. 414.
286. Letters
, p. 415.
287. ISIS
, p. 145. Wallace had little luck with his
scientific friends.
288. Life
, 11:133.
289. Letters
, p. 416.
290. Letters
, p. 427.
291. Letters
, p. 200. Wallace to Darwin, April 18, 1869.
292. Copleston, p. 126. See also T.H. Huxley's Evolution
and Ethics (volume IX of Huxley's Collected Essays), in
which Huxley distinguishes between the natural world and
the human world of ethics.
293. Letters
, p. 418. Huxley to Wallace, November 1866.
294. Owen, p. 152. The 1882 reform acts gave narried
women the right to own property, and more importantly, the
right to sue. This legal right was used with effectiveness
by Spiritualists in several sensational trails of the
period.
295. Braude, pp. 154 and following. See also pp. 144-5.
296. Ann Braude, Radical Spirits / Spiritualism and
Women's Rights in Nineteenth-Century America (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1989), p. 145. Hereafter referred to as
"Braude."
297. Owen, pp. 137-8.
298. Owen, p. 111.
299. Braude, p. 157.
300. Owen, p. 2.
301. Owen, p. 152.
302. See both Owen and Braude, these themes run
throughout both books.
303. Braude, p. 160. Quote is from Marvin: Mediomania,
p. 7.
304.
See Owen, pp. 35 and following and Braude,
pp. 127-36.
330
305. Owen, p. 131.
306. Owen, p. 149.
307. Braude, pp. 158-9.
308. Owen, p. 54.
309. Owen, p. 66.
310. Owen, p. 49.
311. Owen, p. 234.
312. Owen, p. 3 and pp. 6 and following.
313. Owen, p. 10.
314. Owen, p. 10.
315. Owen, pp. 205 and following.
316. Owen, p. 211.
317. Owen, p. 211.
318. Owen, p. 222. See his footnote.
319. Owen, p. 222.
320. Braude, p. 199.
321. Owen, p. 230.
322. Kottler, ISIS
, p. 182.
323. Owen, p. 231.
324. Braude, p. 184.
325. Owen, p. 107.
326. Kottler, ISIS
,
see page 185 for Wallace's
gullibility. See page 192 for the scientific basis of
Wallace's views versus Darwin on "man."
327. Letters
, p. 461. Huxley to Wallace.
328. Wonderful Century
, p. 191.
329. Letters
, p. 288. Wallace to Miss A. Buckley,
February 12, 1871.
330. Darwinism
, p. 391.
331. Copleston, VIII :134.
332. George Henry Lewes, The Biographical History of
Philosophy
,
from its Origin in Greece Down to the Present
Day (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1859)
,
p. 591.
Hereafter referred to as: "Lewes."
333. Lewes, p. 786.
334. Lewes, p. 787.
335. Maurice Mandelbaum, History
,
Man, Reason / A Study
in Nineteenth-Century Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1971)
,
p. 235. Hereafter referred to as:
"Mandelbaum." See George Henry Lewes' Study of Psychology
,
Third Series, volume 1, of Problems of Life and Mind
(Boston: Houghton, Osgood, 1879) . especially page 71.
336. Mandelbaum, p. 235.
337. Mandelbaum, p. 172.
338. Mandelbaum, pp. 379-80.
339. Kottler, ISIS
, pp. 180-1.
340. My Life
,
11:118. See Kottler, ISIS
,
p. 156, in
which Kottler reveals that Wallace argued for a physics
based entirely upon force, albeit two forms of force.
341. Darwinism
, pp. 452-3.
342. Malay
,
p. 469.
343. Malay
,
p. 469.
331
344. Malax, PP* 469-70. Original was all in italics, which
are removed and replaced with ronan for legibility.
345. Malay
, p,
"461.
346. Wonderful Century .
347. Wonderful Century .
348. Wonderful Century .
349. Wonderful Century .
350. Wonderful Century .
351. Wonderful Century .
352. Social
, p. 10.
353. Australasia
, p. 493.
354. Australasia, p. 493.
PP
P-
P-
P-
P-
P-
. viii-ix.
191.
178.
183.
192.
179.
.
Wallace takes the infornation
from Lord George Granville Campbell, Log-Letters from the
Challenger
, p. 120. It is unclear what edition of this
work Wallace refers to. The second edition is by Macmillan
& Company, London and New York, 1877. The fourth edition
is of the same year and publisher.
355. My Life
, 11:399.
356. Social
, p. 43.
357. Social
, p. 46.
358. Social
, p. 40.
359. Social
, p. 43.
360. Malay
, p. 1.
361. Malay
, p. 33.
362. Malay
, p. 46.
363. Essays
,
IX:123.
364. Essays
,
IX:123.
365. Essays
,
VII: 187-8; on page 186 Huxley suggests in a
footnote that one see also Mr. William Selby Church's "On
the Myology of the Orang (Simia Morio) in Natural History
Review
,
Volume I, Number 4, (October, 1861), pp. 510-16.
The article continues in Volume II, Number 5 (January,
1862), pp. 82-94.
332
CHAPTER IV
THE WIDER SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF DARWINISM
A. Malthus: a Stick to Beat the Poor With
As we have seen in the second and third chapters,
Darwin kept discussion of social and political implications
of Natural Selection to an absolute minimum and he informed
Wallace that the topic of politics caused him particular
distress. He thought that by avoiding "contaminating"
discourse he could maintain an objective status for
evolutionary biology. Despite these claims his use of
Malthus' doctrine contained a particular and, to at least
some of his contemporaries, controversial political agenda.
Malthus wrote with the expressed intent of refuting
the nemesis of capitalism: socialism. As his ideas
developed subsequent to the various reactions to his Essay
of 1798 his revised work became a manifesto for what might
be characterized as a "right-wing political view" in the
early nineteenth century and even for the whole of the
Victorian period. He was a controversial figure and
various flaws in his argument for repealing the Poor Laws
were discussed by countless readers and commentators. Yet
he became a "stick to beat the poor" with. 1 The
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explanation of this fact, that a widely contested and
obviously problematic argument could be used within the
foundation of an "objective" science with grave political
consequences, is the first goal of this chapter.
Resolution of this conceptual problem will provide another
basis for evaluating the role of social and political bias
in the work of Darwin and Wallace. Section B of this
chapter will widen the analysis of the context of the
theory of Natural Selection by examining the nineteenth
century construction of the concept of race by examining
the ideas of T.H. Huxley. We turn now to Malthus.
Illustration 18: Portrait of Malthus. Frontispiece
from Malthus and his Work , by James Bonar.
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Given the plethora of discussions of, and opinions
about, the impact of Malthus's work on Darwin (see Chapter
Two) it is best to start with a general overview of the
reception of Malthus's work during the early nineteenth
century and then to shift focus to the particular context
of the Origin (1859) and the Descent of Man (1871). Both
Darwin and Wallace attribute to Malthus a major impetus in
the creation of the theory of Natural Selection. Each
asserted that it was Malthus' clear emphasis on excess
progeny and their subsequent demise which cleared the path
to understanding the creation of new species.
Malthus did not invent the idea of reproductive powers
outstripping food supply--David Hume, for instance, put the
idea forward at an earlier date, 3 nor even the idea that
populations expand faster than the food supply according to
some ratio (Joseph Townsend did that), 3 nor was he the
first to use this idea to advocate repeal of the Poor Laws.
This last item provided public funds to the impoverished,
approximately one-seventh of the population of England.^
Despite his lack of originality, Malthus' essays captured
the attention of friends and foes alike. His "brilliantly
written" Essay of 1798 brought together ideas that had been
inelegantly "floating" about for some time and made them
clear, orderly, presentable and politically attractive to
those of a conservative persuasion.
Despite the homage Darwin pays him, the index to the
Descent gives only one reference to Malthus (to pages 428
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and 429). In this work Darwin starts with the then
controversial evidence that the population of the United
States had doubled in a period of 25 years. ^ He later
writes that Euler "calculated" that such an increase could,
theoretically, occur in a "little over twelve years.
This passage is footnoted (number 57) to Malthus 1 Essay
,
the 1826 rendering of the 3 rd edition. By the time of
these later editions, Malthus had shifted his focus from
attacks on the socialism of Condorcet and Godwin to the
evils' of the Poor Laws . ^ Darwin reproduced the premise
crucial to obtaining political relevance for Malthus'
argument, namely:
The primary or fundamental check to the continued
increase of man is the difficulty of gaining
subsistence, and of living in comfort. [9]
The point to the premise is that an "objective,"
"natural" and "biological" restraint holds "man's"
population in check. It is claimed that the specific
quantity of food available restrains human population to a
particular level no matter how prolific individuals tend to
be or how creative their food-production technology is.
Furthermore, since citizens of the United States were
perceived to be by and large an extension of British
breeding stocks and that the climate and topography of the
United States was similar to England's, this case avoided
complications arising from considerations of disparate
cultures, exotic genetic pools, different climates and the
like. Darwin deals with "savages" and their reproductive
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rates a little farther on, making a special case of them
but in the end claiming that he "knows nothing positively"
about their reproductive rates. 10
Application of the Malthusian principle to the British
Isles is then attempted by Darwin:
If such means [food] were suddenly doubled in
Great Britain, our number would be quickly
doubled. With civilized nations this primary
check acts chiefly by restraining marriages. The
greater death-rate of infants in the poorest
classes is also very important; as well as the
greater mortality, from various diseases, of the
inhabitants of crowded and miserable houses, at
all ages. The effects of severe epidemics and
wars are soon counterbalanced, and more than
counterbalanced, in nations placed under
favourable conditions. Emigration also comes in
aid as a temporary check, but, with the extremely
poor classes, not to any great extent. [11]
Darwin promulgates the central recommendation of
Malthus: the poor should control their numbers through
late, or "restrained," marriages. In the absence of this
technique's effectiveness child mortality, disease and
starvation are assumed to perform the "unavoidable"
function of weeding out those who are the result of
reproduction's ability to outperform agriculture's ability
to feed.
It is important for the suppressed political moral
involved that the "unusual" events of wars and epidemics be
discounted from calculations. Epidemics tend to cross
class lines, and wars smack of political considerations
effected by the ruling classes. Starvation and poverty,
however, are more easily assumed to be "natural" conditions
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because they are "beyond" human control and thus their role
in the population equation may be portrayed as "objective."
Thus, according to Darwin and Malthus, any effort to aid
the poor--with money, food, medicine or better working and
living conditions, would be "sadly misplaced." Such help
would result in the population of the poor being
temporarily disconnected from "reality" by a "short
sighted public policy, and soon the numbers of the poor
would increase beyond the enlarged means at hand and
poverty, along with starvation, would reassert itself. In
this way all motives for social reform are rendered
unsound, "unscientific" and obsolete.
The only "artificial" restraint that Darwin considers
is that of destroying newborns.
Ma 1 thus ... does not lay stress enough on what is
probably the most important [restraint] of all,
namely infanticide... [12]
Darwin's discussion of the topic is limited to considering
the practice with respect to savages and the inhabitants of
India
.
These practices appear to have originated in
savages recognizing the difficulty, or rather the
impossibility of supporting all the infants that
are born. [13]
Darwin wishes to make his disgust with the practice known
by asserting that:
Our early semi-human progenitors would not have
practiced infanticide or polyandry [one woman
with many husbands] ; for the instincts of the
lower animals are never so perverted. [14]
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With this moral judgement/ Darwin attempts to crush the
idea that the poor have any way out of Malthus' bind.
Right away, however, Darwin finds the "objective"
state of things rather messy. Even if one accepts
Malthus' premises, and Wallace among others did not, in the
case of "man" the possibility of a remedy cannot be
ignored: namely, infanticide. A critic of Darwin could
argue that the moral cost of poverty is higher than the
moral cost of infanticide, thus providing an avenue for the
poor to alter their situation. Once the population of the
poor is brought down, there would be plenty of food,
housing, and medicine, and wages could rise.
It must be remembered that part of Malthus' pessimism
relies on the idea that due to the strictures of wage-fund
1 5theory the capital available for paying workers is fixed
for any productivity level of the society. Thus as long as
population outstrips the funds available, insufficient
wages are unavoidable. However if infanticide decreased
worker population, higher wages would inevitably result
—
according to the "iron laws of economics." For Darwin, as
for Malthus and his host of supporters, this simply would
not do.
Sripati Chandrasekhar, introducing Charles Knowlton's
work, points to a passage by Malthus in which wages and birth
control are linked though a claim that bettering the lives
of workers results in depravity:
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Regarding birth control, Malthus asserted, "I
should always particularly reprobate any
art if icial and unnatural modes of checking
population, both on account of their immorality
and their tendency to remove a necessary stimulus
to industry. If it were possible for each
married couple to limit by wish the number of
their children, there is certainly reason to fear
that the indolence of the human race would be
greatly increased." Malthus, Essay, 6th ed.,
1826, p. 543. [16]
First, note the denial of any right to alter "nature's"
course is based on moral claims. (Remember that Darwin
waffles on the relation between reason/evolution and
morality.) What gets the most attention, however, is an
economic/ socia 1 "problem." If workers became scarce they
could demand higher wages and shorter hours— this would
lead to "moral depravity," as leisure time for workers is
assumed to be evil. Thus Darwin's and Malthus' need to
engage a messy argument they would rather avoid, and the
only weapon available is an appeal to moral indignation.
It should be noted that Darwin never elaborates on the
moral argument against infanticide, and thus his strongest
armament relies on an appeal to the reader's repugnance for
Native practices. The shaky argument that even lowly
"ear ly-progenitors" would reject infanticide as a
"perversion" is indicative of Darwin's tenuous position--he
is forced to rely on his audience's indulgence in order to
assert his point of view. He could just as forcibly have
argued that science demands infanticide, and moral scruples
to the contrary are "primitive" emotions out of sync with
scientific understanding of the "iron laws" of biology.
340
At this point the ideological component of Darwin's
use of Malthus should be coming into focus. Darwin's
radical reductive materialism allows, or perhaps forces,
him to understand human population in terms of Malthusian
shortages, while any claim for human control over
fertility—which implies special human status—must be
denied. Given premises of non-emergent materialism and
success of the Empire, Darwin holds that English morality
is "noblest" and carries an evolutionary mandate. This
view was controversial, even though major forces in biology
and British politics supported it and eventually it won the
day
.
During the Bradlaugh-Besant trial during the late
1870's, Knowlton's book on contraception was attacked not
only in the courtroom, but in the press as well.
The Evening Standard became imperialistic to the
extent of pointing out that the Colonial Empire
needed a large population. [17]
The connections between overpopulation, wages and
imperialism were openly discussed. Darwin's tactic of
simply ignoring the din of controversy may be understood in
terms of an assumption of homogeneity within the emerging
class of biological scientists— to which Wallace proved an
exception
.
Huxley presents an amended form of Darwin's view in
which the demise of civilization results from bad human
planning added to Malthus' prophesy of doom. Thus he
stresses the ability of "man" to alter the social world for
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his own purposes even if he agrees with Darwin that the
poor are at times villainous indeed. Huxley's comments
below arise in the context of his dislike of the Salvation
Army—which he considers anti-democratic and metaphysically
deficient because it appeals to "religious emotions" to
achieve its aims.
It is certain that there is an immense amount of
remediable misery amoung us; that, in addition to
the poverty, disease, and degradation which are
the consequences of causes beyond human control,
there is a vast, probably a very much larger,
quantity of misery which is the result of
individual ignorance, or misconduct, and of
faulty social arrangements. Further, I think it
is not to be doubted that, unless this remediable
misery is effectually dealt with, the hordes of
vice and pauperism will destroy modern
civilization as effectually as uncivilized tribes
of another kind destroyed the great social
organization which preceded ours. Moreover, I
think all will agree that no reforms and
improvements will go to the root of the evil
unless they attack it in its ultimate source
—
namely, the motives of the individual man.
Honest, industrious, and self-restraining men
will make a very bad social organization prosper;
while vicious, idle, and reckless citizens will
bring to ruin the best that ever was, or ever
will be, invented. [ 18 ]
Huxley, like Darwin and Malthus, blames the poor for "lack
of restraint" and claims that some poverty is inevitable.
Unlike them he believes that a change in human behavior
is not only possible, but that it would relieve "vast"
amounts of misery. Given his stress upon the idea that
humans are outside much of evolutions' parameters, his
belief in the ability to alter "nature's plan" makes sense.
There is another fallacy which appears to me to
pervade the so-called "ethics of evolution." It
is the notion that because, on the whole, animals
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and plants have advanced in perfection of
organization by means of the struggle for
existence and the consequent 'survival of the
therefore men in society, men as
ethical beings, must look to the same processhelp them towards perfection. [19]
to
For Huxley "man's" special status allows
cosmic process, " or nature, and thus he
Darwinian ideas and approaches Wallace's
alteration of
departs from
the
Social progress means the checking of the cosmicprocess at every step and the substitution for it
of another, which may be called the ethical
process; the end of which is not the survival of
those who may happen to be the f ittest . . .but of
those who are ethically the best. [20]
Although Darwin and Malthus might think in terms of the
"best" being the upper classes, which show a perverse
failure to be fittest—by reproducing at "too slow" a rate,
Huxley has something else in mind. Against Darwin and
Malthus he argues for maximizing the social welfare by
helping the "less fit."
In place of ruthless self-assertion it [ethics]
demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting
aside, or treading down, all competitors, it
requires that the individual shall not merely
respect, but that he shall help his fellows; its
influence is directed, not so much to the
survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as
many as possible to survive. It repudiates the
gladiatorial theory of existence. [21]
Wallace goes further than Huxley for he was not bound
by "inevitable" Malthusian shortages and he agrees that
human morality goes beyond purely biological parameters.
He thought, as we shall see, human control of fertility for
the benefit of the poor was a distinct possibility.
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Darwin, on the other hand, attempted to reassert
Malthus program in such a way as to deny any political
motive, despite the fact that the political component was
discussed widely from the moment Malthus 1 publication
efforts began many decades earlier.
Darwin's strategic use of abhorrence for infanticide
in order to cut the discussion off at its roots fails to
maneuver the discussion out of the natural/artificial
debate. The very concept of infanticide invalidates the
notion that there is no way to reduce and maintain a lower
population level for the working class, or any other class,
for that matter, because it implies conscious and
deliberate agency as well as power. Thus the "law" of
population growth outpacing agricultural production was
certainly not a "natural" one, even if morality is taken to
be "natural," for ethics was not a settled field. Other
considerations, soon to be discussed, will show that Darwin
must have been aware of the human capacity to alter
reproductive rates and so effect social change despite
Malthusian dicta.
1. The political context of Malthus 1 essay
Malthus' Essay was written and promoted in order to
2 2
accomplish a specific political goal. Conservative
theoreticians, economists and officials of late 18th
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century England were anxious to counter the ascending
popularity of Marquis Antoine Nicolas Condorcet ( 1743 - 94 )
and William Godwin 23 (1756-1836). The French Revolution
(1789) being fresh in their minds, 2 ^ conservatives needed a
definitive rebuttal to the concept that a redistribution of
wealth and power in England was necessary in order to
effect social justice.
The first edition of Malthus' famous work focused on
pulling the rug out from under Godwin, the Chartists and
n C
the Owenites. Starting with ideas already enunciated by
earlier conservative thinkers such as Hume, 26 Robert
Wallace, 27 Joseph Townsend, 28 and Sir Walter Raleigh, 29 but
organizing and clarifying them into an elegant argument,
Malthus hoped to demolish the idea that political change,
in terms of a radical redistribution of wealth and power,
was rational or even possible. For the first few years
following his first edition, much attention was focused
upon the Godwin/Malthus debate. Godwin spent years
rebutting his enemy, but to little effect.
The general argument Malthus used was that the poor
would always reproduce in excess of the available material
base, thus any redistribution of wealth would only
temporarily ameliorate their condition. Arguments based on
concepts of justice became irrelevant in this context.
Furthermore, by including an allegiance to Adam Smith's
"wage fund ratio," 30 Malthusian doctrine "explained" why
wages for the poor would often be at levels below
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subsistence. Such a "sad" state of affairs was, on this
view, unavoidable. Malthus even went so far as to assert
that it was poverty that drives the economy .
^
Subsequent editions of Malthus' Essay were able to
shift focus due to reactions provoked by the first edition.
The second edition turned from Godwin to the business of
advocating dismemberment of the Poor Laws . 32 The working
class press was, as one would expect, scandalized by every
new edition and so too were people from every niche of the
political spectrum. From radical John Doherty to
conservative Michael Sadler, many were offended and many
offered criticism. Herbert Spencer argued that increased
populations were beneficial and ultimately led to a reduced
birth rate. 3 ^ Utilitarians accepted the Malthusian
principle but urged birth control to turn Malthus to the
advantage of workers. Despite the clamor his work
provoked, Malthus gained many adherents among the upper
classes and their theorists.
While this thumbnail sketch does scant justice to the
complexity of the debate, it indicates the level of
interest generated. Of utmost importance for an appraisal
of Darwin's use of Malthus is the fact that since its
inception, the Malthusian argument was controversial. Even
Malthus thought so . 35 Darwin's interest in promoting a
political agenda is made visible in this context. By
failing to note the multitudinous objections to Malthus,
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both political and scientific, Darwin smuggled a particular
right-wing political program into his project.
Three important critiques by contemporaries of Malthus
are relevant to evaluation of Darwin's position. Some
argued that the human/nature split rendered biological laws
ultimately inapplicable to humans. Others thought that the
existence of effective birth control technology undercut
Malthus conclusions, and many writers, especially
political leaders within the working class, considered
Malthus' work to be politically motivated to the point of
being mere propaganda.
For Darwin it was essential to prove that the survival
of the fittest principle applied equally to civilized
humans as to the plants and animals of "nature" in order to
manifest the continuity of his science. This drive also,
coincident ly , gave his political views a scientific status.
By assuming a struggle for survival, the over-production of
progeny must lead to necessar i ly-letha 1 competition.
Malthus wrote:
Among plants and animals its effects are waste
of seed, sickness, and premature death. Among
mankind, misery and vice. [36]
In order to move from a parallelism to a claim of
identity, Malthus (and Darwin, following him) points to the
. 3 7
rapid population increase m the United States. But this
attempt drew detailed criticism from many. In particular,
Michael Thomas Sadler (1830) tried to show through
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statistical analysis that the geometric ratio of increase
failed to hold. 38
More important than the argument over the precise
formula of population increase is Sadler's claim that the
source of rapid increase resided in immigration, and that
Malthus "only begins to admit the volume of immigration
when it is supposed to be no longer of any consequence."
Thus Malthus was criticized for manipulating his evidence
in a way which protected his notion of "inevitable increase
based upon the natural affection of the sexes." (More on
this to come.) Sadler then deduces his own "law of
increase " :
The prolificness of human beings, otherwise
similarly circumstanced, varies inversely as
their numbers. [39]
Although Sadler's criticism does not overtly invoke a
human/nature split, its tendency to do so can be
demonstrated easily. As everyone at the time knew, human
biological parameters allow for the generation of one child
4 0per year, or even, technically, at least one per 9 or 10
months
.
[Yet] neither Malthus nor his followers, nor
anyone else for that matter, would seriously
suggest such a standard. There are obvious
biological and social checks... [41]
such as reduction of fertility through nursing and
conscious decisions to limit the number of children through
abstinence or other methods. Thus one can say that
Malthus's tendency [of the sexual drive to
maximize reproduction] is not a tendency at all
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in the strict sense. It is merely an inference
drawn from a statistical aggregate ... To give such
a rate of growth [geometric progression] the
force of a universal law of nature, to use it as
the foundation for ... ruthless ly applied remedies,
can only be justified as an act of faith, and not
as the exercise of reason. [ 42 ]
Sadler's insight includes reference to ideological aspects
of mathematical formulations, in this case a "statistical
aggregate" becomes a "universal law."
Nor were these criticisms ignored by Sadler's
contemporaries. William Hazlitt proposed that sexual
interaction is "as various in itself and its effects as
climate and all other causes, natural and artificial, can
make it."^ Even Darwin notes the upper classes exhibit a
fertility rate far below the "law of geometric increase,"
and this was of great concern to him. This "deficient"
rate is doubly troubling, as the rich should reproduce at
the highest rates, as they have virtually unlimited access
to food.
Other critics, such as Amy Besant, contested the
continuity thesis:
Mr. Darwin puts forward an argument against
scientific checks which must not be omitted here;
he says: "The enhancement of the welfare of
mankind is a most intricate problem; all ought to
refrain from marriage who cannot avoid abject
poverty for their children, for poverty is not
only a great evil, but tends to its own increase
by leading to recklessness in marriage. On the
other hand, as Mr. Galton has remarked, if the
prudent avoid marriage, whilst the reckless
marry, the inferior members tend to supplant the
better members of society. Man, like every other
animal, has no doubt advanced to his present high
condition through a struggle for existence,
consequent on his rapid multiplication, and if he
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is to advance still higher it is to be fearedthat he must remain subject to a severe struggle;otherwise he would sink into indolence, and the
"'^egifted men would not be more successful inthe battle of life than the less gifted. Henceour natural rate of increase, though leading tomany and obvious evils, must not be greatlydiminished by any means."
If the struggle for existence among mankind
were waged under the same conditions as among
animals, then Mr. Darwin's argument would havegreat force... But Mr. Darwin forgets that menhave qualities which brutes have not, such as
compassion, justice, respect for the rights of
others ... [ 44
]
Besant, like Wallace, denies the reductive hypothesis, and
so rejects the necessity of the "natural course."
Furthermore, Besant compromises the moral argument against
contraception by pointing to the virtues of population
control within marriage. She perhaps sinks the
Darwinian/Malthusian moral argument by pointing out that
contraception would promote the very eugenical goals Darwin
seeks. Her argument gains all the more force since her way
would achieve the ends Darwin promotes without requiring
the evils which Darwin requires and yet claims to abhor.
Besant writes:
Scientific checks to population would just do for
man what the struggle for existence does for
brutes: they enable man to control the production
of new human beings; those who suffer from
hereditary diseases, who have consumption or
insanity in the family, might marry, if they so
wished, but would preserve the race from the
deterioration which results from propagating
disease. The whole British race would gain in
vigor, in health, in longevity, in beauty, if
only healthy parents gave birth to children...
laisser al ler in marriage is no wiser that in
other paths of life. [45]
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sant's argument pointsBesides undercutting Malthus, Be
to the crux of the matter: namely, that through judicious
use of contraception, there is no reason for the poor to
'restrain themselves." Early marriages need not result in
worsening poverty and the rampant libidinous desires of the
poor need not lead to vice, offspring, or unnatural
4 6restraint. In the end the argument boils down to
considerations of the moral probity of recreative sexual
activity within marriage. This is not an argument Darwin
would wish to be entangled with, so it is easy to see why
he opts to cut short his discussion.
An alternate form of criticism brought up similar
points in a different direction. Working-class theorists
suggested that once social reform took place the fecundity
of the working class would drop as their living conditions
were improved. Wallace supported this view. The upper
middle classes had, by the 1870's, already linked lower
populations to their own financial well-being and were
limiting their reproductive capacities according ly--in a
4 8
very conscious and calculated manner.
However workers were suspicious of arguments for
limiting their numbers and suggested that they would do so
after they were allowed to better their social situation.
Also, leaders of the working class saw a large population
of workers as conducive to, and perhaps a necessary
4 9prerequisite for, social unrest and subsequent change.
Thus they too debunked the Malthusian idea that high
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reproductive rates were an evil. Another reason that
workers thought unrestricted reproduction was beneficial
was that they relied on the existence of large families as
the only practical guarantee of financial support in their
old age. 0 None of these views were unavailable to Darwin
as they were prominent in the press of the time.
McLaren points to a large body of criticism
generated to counter the idea that social change was
impossible due to "natural" population pressure. From
Dickens' "Malthusian miser": Scrooge, to Owenite journals,
pot shots were taken at Malthus' claim that it was nature's
51fault. Even liberal proponents of birth control as a
remedy to the Malthusian dicta ran aground this
criticism
:
In the popular press there were repeated attacks
on the Malthusian contention that unemployment
was a 'natural' problem which could only be
overcome by a restriction of the labour pool.
The liberals, such as Robert Dale Owen, and editors of
the Na t iona
1
,
pointed to feminist issues arising from
viewing fecundity as a "law" of nature.
In the National Linton had analyzed the
inequities of the existing property and divorce
laws, defended Robert Dale Owen and questioned
the morality of a society that executed the
murderer but left unpunished the man who killed a
woman by forcing her to bear large numbers of
children. [53]
Even establishment liberals, such as John Stuart Mill, made
the distinction.
J.S. Mill argued in Principles of Political
Economy ( 184 8 ) . . . that as women increased their
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political rights
,
so too would they free
themselves from the restraints of their physical
functions. [54]
Perhaps the most damning evidence comes from Malthus
himself. Shifting his focus from Godwin (in the first
edition) to the Poor Laws (in the second edition) Malthus
submits that only through "moral restraint" can the poor
save themselves
.
55 Thus he recognized that people could
make choices about reproduction, and were not merely
automata. 56 Contemporaries called him to account on this
point, for example Thomas Jarrold 57 and Hazlitt. 58
Hence it is clear that the debate over the
human/nature split was a lively, complicated, and
accessible one. That Darwin could ignore the din of voices
and resuscitate Malthus whole is remarkable for its brazen
disregard for Malthus' place in Victorian culture, even if
it went unremarked by most within the circle of
evolutionary biologists.
The recommendation of "moral restraint," or
deliberate celibacy, was a political ploy according to Adam
Smith, and contemporaries stated that it was "a stick to
beat the poor" with. 59 Furthermore, such a policy was
preached with a bad conscience: "Malthus had no faith in
its efficacy." 60 Adam Smith's evaluation comes from the
fact that Malthus wanted it "coming and going." If the
impoverished person listened to reason, he was then driven
by urges too powerful to contain and so would participate
in "vice," according to Malthus. 61 "Vice" covered
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prostitution, among other things, so that in either event a
population increase was possible, and in the latter there
was also risk of "social disease." Thus for Malthus the
lower classes were doomed either to breed themselves out of
existence within marriage, or to breed and/or suffer
disease outside marriage.
One would think that Malthus would embrace birth
control technology as a solution to the problem he raises.
The opposite is true; Malthus took great pains to eliminate
the option of controlling fertility—as his political
agenda would be lost otherwise. 62 He was forced to deal
with the issue not only because the logic of his argument
demanded it, but because his arch enemy, Condorcet, pointed
out the obvious.
The main point is that Malthus was completely
opposed to birth control in the sense of any
means taken to prevent conception during
intercourse. In the first edition of An Essay on
the Principle of Population he specifically
attacked Condorcet for alluding to such
stratagems: 'To remove the difficulty in this
way, will, surely, in the opinion of most men,
be, to destroy that virtue and purity of manners,
which the advocates of equality, and of the
perfectibility of man, profess to be the end and
object of their views.' [63]
Malthus was not the only one concerned about this
proposition: John Wade and J.R. McCulloch weighed in on his
side too. The heat of the protestations underscored the
6 4
significance of the debate. As McLaren puts it:
Their concern was that the preaching of birth
control could completely undermine both the
economic and moral foundation of their argument.
They saw in it a new optimistic ideology that ran
354
COUn6er
1
° thSir OWn which held that civilization
was based on self-denial and progress on
competition resulting from pressure of numbers.
Several points have already been raised on this topic
in the course of this section. To recapitulate a bit, the
working class theorists thought that (1) Malthus was more
interested in a conservative political agenda than in
science," (2) social inequalities were the primary source
of poverty, not overpopulation, (3) workers' numbers would
decline as social status increased, (4) present political
power resided in numbers, and (5) a decent retirement
depended upon the existence of many sons and daughters
(hoping at least one would support and care for the
retiree) .
Working class criticisms were coherent and rational to
the extent that they surely demanded an equally thoughtful
response. Neither Malthus nor Darwin took the trouble to
marshall arguments that specifically dealt with their
opponents' ideas.
Others concerned themselves with the development of
Neo-Malthusianism, which oddly enough embraced birth
control. As noted above, Malthus abhorred birth control,
although it should be added that he at times proposed,
paradoxically, that infanticide might be acceptable. 66
Middle class neo-Malthusians had linked birth control to
maintenance of raised social-status in the face of
7declining economic conditions of the 1860 's.
65
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At first look one would expect the working class to
embrace birth control as a disproof of Malthus and a way to
increase wages. But not only did they have reasonable
fears over reducing their numbers, as noted above, but the
very topic of contraception was rendered more complicated
as it was politically "loaded." Some working class writers
associated birth control with degenerate sexual practices
of the wealthy. ^ In addition, some thought that the very
concept of birth control entailed a strategic error because
it placed responsibility on individuals as opposed to
conceptualizing the problem in terms of social groups.
Thus working class resentment of attempts to limit their
fecundity--such attempts were often taken as an
illustration of a middle class desire to control the
7 0poor. Also, many saw contraception as a violation of
Christian ethics: birth control "frustrated" nature and
took godly matters into human hands. This was not an
argument Darwin could use, being an atheist.
Alongside these criticisms by working class activists
was the suspicion that Malthus was a political hack, and
his "law" was nothing more than an excuse to overturn the
Poor Laws and take what little social welfare there was
7 2
away from the destitute and the working poor. This
confrontation also brought up issues of sexual politics, as
contraception implied a revision of women's position in
7 2
society and this made many Victorian males nervous,
regardless of class status.
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It should also be kept in mind that there were plenty
of "scientific" arguments opposing Malthus 74 even if they
dealt with the matter on a plane inaccessible to most
people. In any case, by the 1880's Malthus' indulgence had
run its course. 75 Thus by the time Darwin was was
finishing up the Descent (1871), Malthus' views had already
lost credibility for many.
At this time it is worth considering how Wallace fits
into this discussion. We have already seen that he thought
birth rates would fall as the social status of the poor
improved, and that he favored giving women power over
reproduction. Obviously his views on the human/nature
split would discount Malthus' argument from the start, even
though he could support the idea that Malthus 's dicta might
hold at the earliest stages of human development or in
times of crisis. Furthermore, as a phrenologist, Wallace
was positioned in opposition to vested interests of the
middle class: particularly doctors. 76 Thus it is easy to
see why Wallace occupies an ideological position very
unlike that of Darwin, even if at the same time Malthus'
work was crucial to both for discovering the engine of
Natural Selection.
A discussion of the position of physicians within the
Malthusian debate will help give insight into the politics
of Darwin and Huxley, and will hint at concerns that may
have shaped the newly-formed profession of biology. Both
7 7Darwin and Huxley were trained in medicine.
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——Professionals and birth control
Doctors during the Victorian period had a professional
interest in controlling the availability of birth control
measures and devices. Since Darwin's father was a doctor,
and he himself was trained as a physician, Darwin was well
placed to appreciate the complexity of the issues
surrounding the sexual and social politics of birth
control
.
The work of Angus McLaren is particularly interesting
for his explanation of why the medical profession opposed
birth control during the second half of the nineteenth
century. McLaren claims that doctors, as a newly-formed
profession, were attempting to gain social standing within
the middle and upper classes as a legitimate professional
7 8entity. This meant they catered to the politics of upper
class patrons and shunned any controversy they could: birth
control seemed to be a topic worth avoiding.
Also, McLaren explains why contraception was
particularly troublesome for doctors. Not only were there
delicate moral and religious considerations, but their
control of the medical market was threatened by others who
wanted to satisfy the demand for contraceptive goods and
services. The means of birth control: herbs, pills,
condoms, syringes, diaphragms, and sponges, to name a few,
were purveyed by midwives, quacks, and rubber-goods
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manufacturers, all of whom threatened the monopoly of
medicine that doctors were attempting to cement in place. 79
Worse still, the practice of withdrawal (82% effective)
allowed people to circumvent the marketplace altogether. 80
Additionally, non-professional "interlopers" presented
a most alarming problem, for they advocated self-help in
medical matters and so threatened the very authority of the
new profession
.
8
^ Thus doctors found themselves opposed to
birth control because of social and political forces having
little to do with the merits of birth control itself.
As an outsider—having risen from the working class
—
Wallace was more free to embrace socialism, feminism and
other doctrines opposed to the entrenched status of people
in positions of power. Phrenology and Spiritualism
presented alternatives to the emerging medical
establishment, and thus took on a political and social role
as forms of resistance. 88 Darwin, of course, sat on the
other side to the fence.
Birth control presented other interesting problems for
doctors. On the one hand, even though the Church tried to
stay out of the fray, 88 Priests did subscribe to the view
that birth control "frustrated" na ture/marr iage/God
.
8
4
These ideas were not new: Chaucer called withdrawal
o c
murder. The commonly held Christian view was that God
had condemned women to bear children, marked certain eggs
and sperms to unite, as it were, and that birth control
would interfere with God's plan. In the nineteenth century
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It should be
many people disagreed with this ideology. 86
kept in mind that by mid-century advances in microscopic
work had put a crimp into the old "frustration" argument.
Male agency in human reproduction had been known in a
very concrete and ocular way since the seventeenth century.
Antony Von Leeuwenhoek, a pioneer in microscope
construction, discovered the sperm in 1677. 87 At the time
this allowed for a finer articulation of the idea that the
man contributed the child (homunculus) to the woman—who
served merely as a house to the creature. By 1840,
however, Theodore Ludwig Wilhelm Bischoff (1807-82) had
discovered the human egg, and linked its presence to the
menstrual cycle. 88 This meant that the "frustration"
argument became merely probable at best, since it was
realized that in most cases the sperm and egg failed to
fuse and were unproductive. Thus God himself ordained
"waste" of eggs and sperm within marriage. One could still
argue that deference ought be given to higher authority by
allowing Him to choose when to be productive and when to
waste, but this was an adulterated argument at best.
In Darwin's case, the evolutionary argument could be
applied quite handily to the sperm seeking an egg, thus
dispensing with God's wishes entirely. As an atheist
evolutionist, the "frustration" argument holds no value
whatsoever. Therefore one major obstacle to birth control
fell to pieces before Darwin and the evolutionists. This
is so despite rather interesting permutations of the
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"frustration" argument. Some doctors went so far as to
claim that the health of males would be placed in jeopardy
if vital fluids" of the female were not absorbed by the
male during copulation. 89 This argument falls short of the
desired goal of discrediting contracept ion--specif ically
the condom, for the man could gather vital fluids and still
frustrate conception (by timing the use of the condom,
withdraws 1 , etc . ) .
The condom was first referred to in the written
English language in 1705." Its long history reached back
to ancient Rome, if not to 15,000 B.C. 91 In any event,
following the discovery of syphilis in 1500 the condom
became associated with prevention of the pox and with
9 2prostitution. Made of linen or animal intestines, or
after 1844 saw the invention of vulcanization— rubber, the
condom was pervasive within all levels of Victorian
9 7
society, even if it carried with it a shady aura and was
banned by Papal Bull in 1826 .
"
In addition to the problem that birth control would
allow women to partake in sex without the complication of
pregnancy--and thus, according to some turning them into
"prostitutes," 95 was the fact that the middle and upper
class female clients, who doctors served, desired birth
control services. Faced with a fear of public
disapprobation but private practical necessity, the
profession adopted a two-faced attitude. Publicly, it
claimed birth control was not a medical matter while
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professionally (but privately) it dispensed the needed
goods and services. 96 Also, doctors avoided research which
could be construed as involving birth control. 97 Even as
late as 1868, doctors disingenuously put forward the idea
that "man" did not have the right to interfere with "life,"
bowing in the direction of the clergy. 98
And yet privately many doctors supported the use of
any practical means to limit births. 99 By 1850 it was
obvious even to physicians that childbirth was a dangerous
and taxing enterprise. Limits were medically advisable in
many cases, regardless of professional concerns or "moral"
problems. 100 Doctors advised prolonged nursing, rhythm
(they had exactly the wrong view of "safe" days)
,
and
abstinence. These methods avoided most objections, and so
allowed their contradiction-filled ideology and practice to
remain intact. 101
Yet the immense pressure brought to bear on physicians
in favor of birth control produced more and more evidences
of an active professional role in regulating female
reproductive rates. Physicians, as it were "accidentally
and unknowingly," supplied clients with more "invasive"
birth control technology than their public stance would
lead one to believe was possible. Pessaries, long used to
prevent conception or induce abortion (1860 B.C. crocodile
dung, wax, various herbs) and the sponge were prescribed
for the vexing "uterine tilt." 102 Although a controversial
treatment within the medical establishment, the discussion
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did not venture into the birth control issue. 103 Pin s to
"bring on a period" which was for "some reason" late were
also dispensed. Doctors in public discussions seemed
confused about the nature of these pills, yet it was
obvious what they were for. 104 This quandary became
particularly manifest as pregnant women sought abortion to
remedy their situation and dismissed the moral quibbles of
doctors by advancing the claim that "quickening" did not
occur for four and one-half months. Physicians reported to
one another that many women argued that they had a right to
an abortion. 105 Both the notions of "quickening" and
'female rights" were obviously and professedly outside the
domain of medicine, and this only made the situation worse,
as the whole point was to avoid contentious issues.
By mid-century doctors acknowledged medically valid
reasons for utilizing birth control and by 1877 it was
common knowledge that birth control was used widely and
doctors were major players within the enterprise. Yet
political and social considerations drove the profession to
oppose all forms of birth control in the public arena. 106
It should be clear by now that many forms of
contraception were available throughout the nineteenth
century. Furthermore, public knowledge about the
technologies was extensive. This was true even in Malthus'
time. Following on the heels of Malthus' Essay
,
Francis
Place distributed pamphlets (1823) and books which detailed
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Place
the technique of withdrawal and use of the sponge,
set his enterprise in the context of helping people within
the institution of marriage, which helped to legitimate his
endeavor. 107 He linked social reform with birth control in
order to formulate an answer to Malthus. Despite one
historian's claim that not until 1870 was birth control
discussable in polite society, 108 just about anyone who
could read had ready access to literature on the topic and
anyone engaged with the marketplace had access to the
various and diverse technologies of the day.
Nor were mainstream philosophers and social reformers
oblivious to the situation. In 1797 Jeremy Bentham hinted
at the use of the sponge; 1824 saw Mill writing an article
on contraception (without attribution) ; and in 1826 Richard
Carlile blatantly wrote about the subject. About this time
the marketplace exploded with birth control literature.
Knowl ton published his book The Fruits of Philosophy in
1832 in New York, and 1834 in London. From 1834-1876 his
work ran through 1,000 copies a year. Darwin, being well
read, in most probability knew about this literature at the
time he read Malthus in 1838. 109 All during the time
Darwin was formulating his theories, Robert Dale Owen's
book, Mora 1 Physiology
,
raced through 75,000 copies (by
1877). 110 Owen advocated withdrawal, the sponge and the
condom. 111 Even though many Doctors prescribed birth
control for their middle and upper class patients, and the
lower classes relied on the devices and pharmaceuticals
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readily available in the marketplace, it is true that birth
control remained a controversial topic. There were cases
of official harassment of those who advocated contraception
too vocally. Dr. Charles Knowlton's trial landed him 3
months hard labor in 1876, 112 although this was due to the
graphic illustration in his book, not, strictly speaking,
due to his advocacy of birth control. 113
The trial however proved a boon to sales. In three
months, during the trial, 125,000 copies of Knowlton's book
sold. By 1890 175,000 copies of Besant
' s pamphlet were in
circulation. Charles Brandlagh and Annie Besant,
infuriated by the court's attack on Knowlton, forced the
court to take them to task for their provocative pamphlet
specially created for the situation and through a jury
trial won their case in 1877. 115 They contended that is
was hypocrisy to publicly censure what was privately
accepted, and forced the judicial system to acknowledge the
legitimacy of birth control literature.
Whether one considers the brisk trade in pills, herbs,
diaphragms, condoms, syringes, and sponges or the major
enterprise of publishing, birth control was common
knowledge, widely practiced, and semi-off icia 1 ly condoned.
This was so despite the Lord Amberley affair— in which his
public support of birth control cost him his seat in
Parliament and removed him from polite society. 116
Doctors, however, because of their pretensions to upward
mobility and their fear of competition were particularly
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loud in public condemnation of those who would advocate
contraception. There were those within the field who
regarded the hypocrisy as ridiculous. Dr. Henry Albutt in
1880 attempted to gather support among physicians for the
Neo-Ma 1 thusian movement. He was attacked and struck from
the medical register for "having published The Wife's
Handbook " in 1886. This did not stop him however. He
went on to make a sixpence pamphlet in order to distribute
information to the poor. He proclaimed that the
persecution that followed was due to other Doctors' wishes
to protect their monopoly and maintain pretenses Thus
even contemporaries made vocal and powerful criticisms of
the situation.
Just how important Malthus was to Darwin in terms of
the applicability of the survival of the fittest doctrine
to humans can be gauged by the location of Malthus' work in
the Descent . The argument that man is descended from the
animal kingdom starts in Chapter I with appeals to homology
in anatomical structure. Chapter II provides the engine
for the descent by invoking Malthus on human increase.
Thus Malthus occupies a crucial point in the argument.
Given the vast political discourse on the topic of the
"necessity" of positive checks to human population growth,
it is clear that in Victorian terms it was not necessary to
assume that contemporary population controls must be
limited to poverty, disease and lack of food. Yet Darwin
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chose to take this view, without reference to the
controversial nature of the position. He wrote:
The greater death-rate of infants in the poorest
classes is also very important [in restraining
population growth]; as well as the greater
mortality, from various diseases, of the
inhabitants of crowded and miserable houses, at
all ages. [119]
Darwin treats this situation as a stable, transparent fact,
provided by an untainted source--Ma 1 thus
.
Was this use of Malthus necessary to Darwin's thesis
on "Man?" Logically speaking, no. He could have utilized
Malthus to describe the "savage" condition of early or
uncivilized "man." He could have emphasized his position
on sympathy and allowed that Malthus' dicta is inapplicable
to humans in advanced society, or he could have argued that
contraception was unacceptable or ineffective and therefore
Malthus' point still applied. He did neither.
From what has been shown it should be clear that
Darwin had a particular conservative political/biological
agenda in mind when he constructed the Origin and his
Descent of Man . He opposed socialism, feminism and a
special status for "man," and his materialist metaphysics
provided a basis for rejecting these views and drove him to
reproduce and rely on Malthus' pessimistic ideology.
If Darwin had allowed the possibility of control over
fertility his scientific enterprise as applied to humans
would lose its logic. The collapse of necessity for
emigration based on over-population would ultimately lead
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to questioning of the need for Europeans to form colonies
and dominate Natives. Also, Darwin's reductive psychology
and moral theory would be thrown into disarray. Thus just
as doctors feared contraception for its impact on their
social status, both as professionals and as men, Darwin's
Descent had much to lose by failing to invoke Malthus'
conservative politics under the guise of scientific purity
3. Biology and politics
Evaluation of Darwin's place in the creation of racist
biology must take into account the revolutionary nature of
his theory. For instance, the Victorian doctors' claim
that "man" had no right to "interfere" with God's plan
through the use of contraception falls apart once Lyle's
dicta on only admitting natural causes is adopted.
Furthermore, given knowledge of the role of egg and sperm
in reproduction, Darwin's new biology called out for
regulation of reproduction. Such regulation could take the
form of a repressive policy of eugenics, or it could give
impetus for alleviating the conditions of the poor. In
itself, the removal of religion's hold over reproductive
ideology was neither progressive or regressive--but it held
a liberating potential which Darwin resisted and Wallace
utilized
.
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If it is granted that humans should exercise their
power in this regard, then the political agenda of the
conservatives
— such as Malthus and Darwin—are put into
relief and can be evaluated in terms of politics. Thus
when Wallace criticizes colonial practices one can
understand why Darwin did not wish to discuss the topic.
To discuss would be to elevate to consciousness and to
legitimate
.
Given the existence of political debate and
technologies of contraception, Darwin must be criticized
for failing to address the political content of Malthus.
In so far as Darwin's use of Malthus promoted a repression
of the poor, colonialism and racism, he stands culpable for
promoting these political programs. The commonly offered
opinion of contemporary scholars that Darwin's politics are
unassailable because "all Victorian men held such views" is
simply false.
B. Darwin's Circle
Of the core group of evolutionary scientists—Darwin,
Wallace, Huxley, Lyell, Hooker and Gray, four took
significant voyages in the name of science. Of the four
within this circle of fellow scientists three had the
opportunity to visit non-European indigenous peoples.
These voyages provided an experiential basis which not only
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Illustration 19: Portrait of T.H. Huxley. 120
helped create attitudes about Natives, but which modified
preconceptions and provided evidence for arguments to be
constructed much later. Given the importance of the debate
over the status of Natives, accounts of these travels
provide a window into the Victorian formation of both
biological and racial concepts.
Darwin, on one extreme, spent little time with
"natives." Wallace, on the other, spent virtually all of
his time living amongst "savages." Huxley's experience is
especially interesting in this regard, as he visited
Australia and New Guinea--where the "lowest" of "savages"
dwelt
.
There is a second reason for giving the voyage of the
HMS Rattlesnake our attentions. Since Huxley placed human
culture, especially ethics, outside the domain of biology,
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it can be expected that his attitude towards foreign social
arrangements might differ from Darwin's and reveal another
facet of Victorian experience of the "other."
Indeed
, Huxley's trip and his subsequent writings on
the status of Natives presents a position intermediate
to Darwin and Wallace. On the one hand, at times Huxley
treats "low" human development as if it were akin to animal
existence (1893) . He describes a gradient of consciousness
leading from animals to "man."
Where the cosmopoetic energy works through
sentient beings, there ar ises . . . that which we
call pain or suffering. This baleful product of
evolution increases in quantity and in intensity,
with advancing grades of animal organization,
until it attains its highest level in man. [122]
Then he draws a line between "civilized man" and "savages."
Further, the consummation is not reached in man,
the mere animal; nor in man, the whole or half
savage; but only in man, the member of an
organized polity. And it is a necessary result
of his attempt to live in this way; that is,
under those conditions which are essential to the
full development of his noblest powers. [123]
In this case "true" humanity, which includes "real"
suffering, eludes the Native. However he does not entirely
accept Darwin's cusp of humanity, but
ambivalence. Despite the quip above,
the Methods and Results of Ethnology"
that the human mental constitution is
even if there are variations:
displays an
in another work, "On
(1865) he asserts
essentially uniform,
...the minds of men being everywhere
similar, differing in quality and quantity but
not in kind or faculty... [124]
372
In the end Huxley places an absolute gap between man and
animal in terms of consciousness, 125 rational speech, 126
art, and ethics, 126 as we have already noted.
Since he ultimately drew a sharp distinction between
the human and the natural, it is to be expected that the
term "savage" would have the potential to float free of its
biologized moorings. Nor are his readers disappointed:
Homer he calls a "half savage Greek,
"
12
^ and he refers to
"many of the best minds of these days [1868]" as stricken
like savages before an solar eclipse in their confrontation
with materialism. 1561 In terms of craniometries, Huxley
(1863) disconnects brain size from human evolutionary
status
:
It [the Engis skull] is, in fact, a fair average
human skull, which might have belonged to a
philosopher, or might have contained the
thoughtless brains of a savage. [131]
In discussing the burning question of the science of human
origins, or ethnological philology, he points out in "On
the Aryan Question" [1890] that all humans share the
ability to learn any language, thus language is no marker
of origin or race:
It is therefore conceivable that the structure of
this highly complex speaking apparatus should
determine a man’s linguistic potent ia 1 ity ... it is
further conceivable that a particular linguistic
potentiality should be inherited and become as
good a race mark as any other . . .But . . . I do not
think there is any good ground for the
supposition that an infant of any race would be
unable to learn, and to use with ease, the
language of any other race of men among whom it
might be brought up. History abundantly proves
the transmission of languages from some races to
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°th e r s; and there is is no evidence, that I knowof, to show that any race is incapable of
substituting a foreign idiom for its nativetongue. [132]
Yet his use of the term savage was not always devoid
of condescension and insult: when contrasting the human to
the natural in Evolution and Ethics [1893] he places human
ethical behavior at odds with conduct in the struggle for
survival: "the life of. ..a brutal savage." 133 For a more
complete understanding of his view of the Native, we must
turn to his travels.
In Behind the Picture Marnie Bassett covers the voyage
of the HMS Rattlesna ke from 1846-1850. Besides telling a
gripping story, Bassett provides an account that reads like
a proof arguing for the depravity of the Native. Right off
[October 1848, Solomon Islands] Benjamin Boyd met his end
at the hands of unseen Natives while seeking food. 134
Given the dangers it does not seem overly odd that
Huxley let most opportunities to go on shore pass him by.
Literature occupied his time.
Anchored in the steaming heat of Rockingham Bay
he found he could do nothing but sleep and read
novels— a kind of dreaming. [135]
Later, while the ship surveyed the "Inner Passage" he
concentrated on Dante's Inferno . 136
Initial contact with the Natives was tempered by the
knowledge that they had reasons to hate Europeans, even if
the ship's artist, Brierly, showed enthusiastic interest.
The process of debarking [equipment and supplies
to the Tam 0 ' Shanter ] was closely watched from
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the shore by a party of nat i ves—not
, saidBnerly, remembering the blacks far south,debased by long contacts with whites, 'not your
spirit drinking emaciated and worn out creaturesbut the real children of the Forest with all the
excitement of the possibility of treachery or an
attempt on one's life'.
The Fly, he here reminded himself, on her
recent visit to Rockingham Bay, 'killed two men
at this Island [Gould Island]--a slight
circumstance in no way calculated to put one at
ease while on shore among them'. He hoped if
possible to get speech with the natives assembled
to watch the disembarkation, a wish typical of an
interest that on board the Rat t lesnake earned him
the nickname of 'the niggeriser'. [137]
Typically, Huxley missed it, for he spent the day on a
small neighbouring island chasing the elusive
1 O O
cockatoos..." Long inactive, he volunteered for the
first of two Kennedy expeditions. After six days of rough
exploring" they returned to the ship. Denied permission
to go on the longer trip, Huxley was disappointed but this
misfortune probably saved his life: only three people
escaped starvation, disease and Native spears. 139 Towards
the end of the rescue mission that ensues the sailors
refuse to go ashore into Native territory. 140
If Bassett's rendering of the story is indicative of
anything, it is that Native life is deficient in morals and
dangerous. In one of the most chilling episodes of
Kennedy's doomed flight through the jungle the Natives'
appear to offer a solution to the explorers' need for food.
In a few days the blacks returned, bringing a few
of their gins as if to show that they had no
hostile intentions. These women were as well-
built as the men; both differed in many ways
from any natives he [Carron] had seen and seemed
to be of a much finer race than those in
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Rockingham Bay... On this visit they offered fishtoo stale to be eaten even by themselves, and apaste of roasted mangrove seeds pounded withleaves and roots; the paste was accepted, thoughdisagreeable in taste and gritty with sand. [141]
It was a trap the hungry men fell into. By offering food
unfit to eat, the Natives were sizing up their prey. The
attack soon commenced. Kennedy died of spear wounds and
only his guide, the aboriginal Jackey Jackey, made it out
of the jungle. (Three others, left behind at an earlier
time due to their weakened condition, were rescued by
Jackey leading the crew of the Ariel
.
)
The voyage of the Ratt l esnak e provided two definitive
instances which could readily be interpreted as a proof of
depravity. Jackey's status at first look seems to prove
that the Native could, with sufficient contact with
Europeans, rise up out of the natural condition his race
was subject to. Jackey spoke English and managed to
survive where an expert such as Kennedy failed to hang onto
his life. Furthermore, Jackey's knowledge of the jungle
proved more reliable than that of the English. In the
return to see if the abandoned men of Kennedy's group had
survived, the map identified one location, while Jackey's
memory indicated another for "Pudding Pan Hill."
...as the Arie l approached the chart's Pudding
Pan Hill, Jackie was quite positive a mistake had
been made; the place they sought, he said was
further south. Vallack and Dobson, consulting
together, hesitated whether to abide by the
printed chart or Jackey's unsupported certainty:
Jackey, seeing their doubt, called them to the
foretop, 'Do you think I am stupid?...' [142]
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Yet his good judgement only proved his depravity, for after
the glory was heaped upon him for his part in the rescue,
he defected:
Not far from the Library [Mitchell Library in
Sydney, Australia], is a tablet put up by the
Colonial Government to commemorate Kennedy and
his companions; on it all, including Jackey, are
individually named, and the figure of Jackey is
sculptured in bas-relief holding the dying
Kennedy in his arms. Jackey' s heroism was widely
praised and he received an official reward of a
small sum of money--a gift of doubtful benefit to
such as he. After this, his qualities of
courage, skill and devotion--qualities typical of
an unsophisticated intelligent Aboriginal--were
apparently no longer called on; without such
stimulus he went back to his tribe and fell into
idyl ways. Only a few years afterwards, wrapped
in the traditional blackf e 1 low 1 s blanket, stupid
with drink he fell one day into the camp fire and
died of the resulting burns. [143]
This meteoric rise and fall only demonstrated one
half of the required syllogism: that the Native cannot
vault himself up into proper English culture. The flip
side of the argument is still left standing: that the
worthy fellow knew both forms of life and preferred his
own. Thus even his drunkenness and ignoble end held an
uncomfortable aspect of judgement--a judgement that had
been proven in a fire Englishmen had failed to survive.
Yet the Rattles nake was not done with this project.
On the 16th of October, 1849, the crew discovered Mrs.
Thompson (born Crawford) . This Scotts woman had been saved
from drowning by Natives and she lived amongst them on
14 4
Southern Prince of Wales Island for roughly six years.
Having no contact with Europeans, she learned the language
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and customs of the savages. Huxley writes in his diary
that she spoke well of her captors:
Of the kindness and good disposition of the men
she speaks in the highest terms, and of the women
too she speaks well but says that some of them
were not so kind. [147]
She had witnessed awful ceremonies
She has already given us a great deal of curiousinformation about the habits of these people,
with an air of the most perfect truth and
sincerity, and with no little intelligence. One
story was rather startling. She says that a
little to the N. and W. of us there is a tribe of
very bad natives, and that one night they lighted
a very large fire on their beach as a challenge
to the P. of Wales Id. blacks, to come over and
fight them. Her friends, no wise backward,
lighted a fire on their side to show that the
challenge had been accepted, and one night
embarking all their disposable force in six
canoes landed very secretly on the main. They
stole up on an encampment of their enemies and
falling upon them suddenly killed two men, a
woman and a child. They cut off the heads of
these and returned in great triumph, making a
hideous noise upon a conch, to the island. A
great corobbory was celebrated and the four heads
having been placed on one of their rude ovens
they ate the eyes and pieces of the cheeks of
their enemies "to make them brave" as they said.
The repulsion of ritualized cannibalism aside, the fact
that the woman enjoyed Native society and then rejected it
in favor of a European existence suggests the superiority
of English ways. Thus Jackey's demise, taken in context,
is but the prolegomenon to the proof that Bassett
constructs, however unknowingly.
Overall, the tenor of Bassett's account fails to
comprehend the complexity of Huxley's motivations. After
describing the his reluctance to leave off reading books he
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could have read at another time— it is difficult to
understand why he would suddenly volunteer to go with
Kennedy. To some extent, Huxley was prone to depression,
as all his biographers note, so swings in mood were to be
expected. In any event Huxley's diary suddenly mushrooms
during his fourth cruise, the period of May 1849 to January
1850. Julian Huxley writes:
Although the third cruise only lasted a few weeks
less than the fourth, Huxley's gloom on the
former and his delight in recording every detail
of his contacts with native life during the
latter have led to a great disparity in the two
relevant sections of the Diary. Indeed the
entries for the fourth cruise take up more than
three times as much space... [149]
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Throughout his diary Huxley expresses a desire to meet
the Natives. His wish is expressed in terms of curiosity
and humor:
We saw natives on the beach and parties of them
engaged in fishing close to the reef, but they
were too far off to make out their ugly mugs.
Some of the canoes had large lateen sails. I
hope we shall be nearer neighbours. [150]
It is also tinged with fear, aggravated, no doubt, by the
lack of a common language:
There were a great many bananas ... and like these
yams were planted quite irregularly. On
returning to the beach I found that the natives
had come round the point and from all I could
hear I suppose they must have imagined that we
were taking French leave with their cocoa-nuts
and yams. One of them ... appeared very angry...
and posing his spear made up to Robinson .. .who
took it very coolly, just bringing his gun to his
hand in readiness and looking at the fellow, who
on coming closer thought better of it... though
had I been in Robinson's place I should most
undoubtedly have shot the man. I don't see the
fun of waiting till you have a spear through you
before you fire. [151]
In several instances he maintains the view that firing
first to defend oneself, even if fear of the other was
unfounded, is sound policy.
That Yule did rightly in firing cannot I think
admit of doubt. But it is to be lamented that
the taking of the pig [from the Natives] without
a fair exchange should have put our people in the
position of aggressors. That the natives
intended any hostilities when they came is wholly
absurd, as the fact of bringing their women and
children shows. [152]
Yet despite this policy of shoot-first and regret later,
Huxley comes again and again to the opinion that human
similarity outweighs differences. He does not, as Darwin
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would, place a
peoples
.
vast divide between savage and civilized
The girls were very merry and unconstrained
coo
U<
^
Perfectly modest in their behaviour. They
no/’th
half lnclined to have a dance too but had
Y
t e courage. It amused me very much to seehow perfectly women are women all the world over.
Men too, are of an identical sort, even if they do not
share similar cultural complexities.
The Natives have no idea of moral or legal
obligation. No fixed punishments are annexed toany cr imes ... Unchastity before marriage isthought nothing of. Afterwards, its punishmentdepends pretty much on the temper of the husband.
He would be considered quite justified, however,in spearing both parties if taken flagrante
otherw ise, Mrs. T. very naively told ustn8t the husband 1 s wrath would be very likely
regulated by the state of the guisdi Hi [?] . ifthat were kept full of yams he would probably
shut his eyes. It is astonishing how similar man
is to man from "China to Peru". [154]
Like Wallace he passes no judgement upon the "strange,"
"violent" or "unacceptable" practices of the Natives. His
recounting of the cannibalism as described by Mrs. Thompson
above betrays no judgements of his own. He does not reveal
the desire to "upgrade" the Natives, but rather like
Wallace criticizes the missionaries:
The people seem happy, the means of subsistence
are abundant, the air warm and balmy, they are
untroubled with "the malady of thought", and so
far as I see civilization as we call it would be
rather a curse than a blessing to them. I could
little admire the mistaken goodness of the
"Stigginses" of Exeter Hall, who would send
missionaries to these men and tell them that they
will all infallibly be damned. [155]
At points he admires their material culture,
especially its beauty.
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Brierly and I spent [Dec. 5th, 1849] the greaterpart of yesterday on the island [Mount Ernes
Island, or Trage]...and then visited the houses,
the Wowres " . . . then we went and sat down in thebeautiful "chapel", studying lights and shades in
most artistic fashion, as we proceeded with ourdrawings ... We knew the hot sun was pouring down a
flood of light and heat out side ... The silence and
the gloom heightened the strange appearance of
the fantastic savage monument. You might have
fancied it a temple for the performance of
strange and horrible savage rites, had it not
looked so utterly peaceful... I shall never forget
the beauty of the place? while in it I felt as if
listening to beautiful music. [156]
This was the second trip to this spot. Two days before he
had witnessed its charm:
Seeing a native path leading into the bush I
began poking my nose into it... and passing
through a low arched opening, we came at once
into a most beautiful opening in the brush arched
over by magnificent trees and so shade and cool,
with such a "dim religious light" pervading it,
it looked quite like a chapel, and indeed the
name would not be wholly inappropriate, for there
was a strange sort of fantastic monument in this
savage sanctuary. Suppose a great screen of
posts five or six feet high supporting vertically
a long wall-like plaited mat, cut at each end so
that the upper ends overhung the lower, and their
ends fringed with long hanging strips of grass.
The tops and offshoots of the posts were covered
with huge reddened Fusus shells. The front of
the screen was set with regular series of the
spider shell, also reddened, and stuck up against
the foot of the screen were a number of flat
stones of all shapes carved and painted with
hideous human faces. [157]
Given Huxley's more mature view of human emergence,
it is not surprising that even at the distance of many
leagues and the remove of many years, he could still say in
1882 :
...it has been my fate to know many lands and
many climates, and to be familiar, by personal
experience, with almost every form of society,
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from uncivilised savage of Papua and Australia
and the civilised savages of the slums and dens
of the poverty-stricken parts of great cities, tothose who perhaps, are occasionally the somewhat
over-civilised members of our upper ten thousand.
And I have never found, in any of these
conditions of life, a deficiency of something
which was attractive. Savagery has its
pleasures, I assure you, as well as
civilisation [158]
It was fitting for him to mention the poor, for early
on in his life (1839) as part of his preparation for
medical training he encountered the impoverished people of
East End London.
I saw strange things there—among the rest,
people who came to me for medical aid, and who
were really suffering from nothing but slow
starvation. I have not forgotten--am not likely
to forget so long as memory holds— a visit to a
sick girl in a wretched garret where two or three
other women, one a deformed woman, sister of my
patient, were busy shirt-making. After the
examination, even my small medical knowledge
sufficed to show that my patient was merely in
want of some better food than the bread and bad
tea on which these people were living. I said so as
gently as I could, and the sister turned upon me
with a king of choking passion. Pulling out of
her pocket a few pence and halfpence, and holding
them out, "That is all I get for six and thirty
hours' work, and you talk about giving her proper
food." [159]
He struggles with the Malthusian dicta, in the end deciding
that the rationality of enforced eugenics is illusory:
However, I doubt whether even the keenest judge
of character, if he had before him a hundred boys
and girls under fourteen, could pick out, with
the least chance of success, those who should be
kept, as certain to be serviceable members of the
polity, and those who should be chloroformed, as
equally sure to be stupid, idle, or vicious. The
"points" of a good or bad citizen are really far
harder to discern than those of a puppy or a
short-horn calf; many do not show themselves
before the practical difficulties of life
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stimulate manhood to full exertion. And by thattime the mischief is done. The evil stock, if it
is nul lified^
aC
[l6 0]
ie ^ n 'Ulti^' selection
He preempted the Social Darwinists by pointing to the
complexities of human development even before the
rediscovery of Mendel. Like Darwin he feared the moral
cost of active eugenics would be disruption of social
cooperation
, rendering the enactment of Malthus’ hard
reason self-defeating.
Yet even if Huxley argued against devaluing the lives
of the poor and the savage, he was not immune to an
ideology of superiority. in his article "Emancipation-
Black and White" (1865)
,
he perpetuates the idea of white
male supremacy:
It may be quite true that some negroes are better
than some white men; but no rational man,
cognisant of the facts, believes that the average
negro is the equal, still less the superior, of
the average white man.
Able to restrain himself no longer, he launches into what
he believes to be a humorous vein:
And, if this be true, it is simply incredible
that, when all his disabilities are removed, and
our prognathous relative has a fair field and no
favour, as well as no oppressor, he will be able
to compete successfully with his bigger-brained
and smaller- jawed rival, in a contest which is to
be carried on by thoughts and not by bites. [162]
Oddly enough, despite the title and initial topic of
the article, Huxley launches into a different but related
theme that occupies his mind: sexual equality. Of the ten
pages, only two and a bit pages deal with the race
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question, the rest belongs to consideration of the
education of women. His condescending wit again lashes
out
:
Let us have "sweet girl graduates" by all means.They will be none the less sweet for a little
wisdom; and the "golden hair" will not curl lessgracefully outside the head by reason of therebeing brains within. [163]
Huxley's argument is that women, like blacks, are inferior
but none the less deserve to be given a chance to prove
what powers they might possess.
Recognise the fact that they [girls] share the
senses, perceptions, feelings, reasoning powers,
emotions, of boys, and that the mind of the
average girl is less different from that of the
average boy, than the mind of one boy is from
that of another. [164]
He concludes with a plea for fairness:
The duty of man is to see that not a grain is
piled upon that load beyond what Nature imposes;
that injustice is not added to inequality. [165]
The plea is based upon two points. On the one hand, upon
justice or equal opportunity. On the other, that
oppression—slavery based on racial or sexual
characteristics—harms the perpetrator. In this he
anticipates Lacan's reading of Hegel's master and slave
dialectic
.
Thus Huxley presents additional evidence
that an emergentist metaphysics tended to restrain the
virulence of the racism inherent in Darwin's formulation of
evolutionary theory. It also acted as a break upon sexism,
even if Huxley was not immune from either racism or sexism.
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Given Huxley's love of clever and biting arguments it is
worth keeping in mind that he often positioned himself in
order to maximize impact. Thus when arguing for
evolutionary theory against anti-evolutionists, he stresses
the similarity of man and ape in terms of bodily
development. On the other hand, when discussing moral
theory, he emphasizes uniqueness. Unlike Darwin, he severs
evolutionary success and what is ethically best.
There is another fallacy which appears to me topervade the so-called "ethics of evolution." it
not i°n that because, on the whole, animals
and plants have advanced in perfection of
organization by means of the struggle for
existence and the consequent 'survival of thefittest'; therefore men in society, men as
ethical beings, must look to the same process tohelp them towards perfection [166]
Huxley reminds the reader that fitness is situational.
Thus it may be the savage that is fittest, should the
climate shift:^^
...if it became hotter, the pleasant valleys of
the Thames and Isis might be uninhabitable by any
animated beings save those that flourish in a
tropical jungle. They, as the fittest, the best
adapted to the changed conditions, would survive.
That he could suggest that the savage might after all
be the fittest version of "man" is not without precedent.
Although he would not praise the Native to the extent that
Wallace would, he was more willing than Darwin to admit the
virtues of the Other. It is no accident that Huxley and
Wallace should agree on this topic, for they both shared a
favorable and rare contact with indigenous peoples and a
metaphysics that conceptualized human culture as outside
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the survival of the fittest doctrine's domain. Huxley
does waffle on the uniformity of human consciousness.
Attention to the work of others in Darwin's circle
reveals further evidence of a connection between
emergent ist metaphysics and progressive social theory. The
work of Asa Gray (1810-1888), evolutionist in the United
States, focuses on the problem of "man's" status. He goes
further than Wallace (of the middle period—marked by
Wallace's belief in natural evolution of the body, but an
emergent mind) by claiming a special creation for humans.
But, as the author [Darwin] speaks disrepectf ul ly
of spontaneous generation, and accepts a
supernatural beginning of life on earth ... there
seems as great likelihood that one special
origination should be followed by another upon
fitting occasion (such as the introduction of
man ... [ 168
]
Of course Darwin only allowed for divine intervention
due to lack of evidence about origins and a strategy to
placate theists by placing biology on a par with physics.
He has no real need of divine action, as an accidental
combination of the inorganic into the organic was just as
acceptable an origination.
The rub comes with too much emergence or too little.
A "shortage" of emergence is theoretically possible in terms
of the long and branching development of "man." Thus a
hierarchy of races might result from one race splitting off
from another and becoming "higher." "Too much" emergence,
separate special creations of each race, can result in the
same thing.
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Any three or more of the human races, for
theTen^
a
£
e,?Pecies °r not species, according toe bent of the naturalist's mind. [169]
That is to say that if there was only one special creation
then differences of race are merely local, but if there are
several creations then differences are perhaps significant.
But "Darwin's theory brings us the other way to the same
result," 170 on his view because Darwin allows any number
of ways for the races to have evolved.
Thus on Gray's view the mere fact of emergence does
not require the view that all races are equally human.
However his religious views tie this knot.
It is only the backwards glance that reveals
anything a larming
. . . The very first step backward
makes the negro and the Hottentot our blood-
relat ions not that reason or Scripture objects
to that, though pride may. [171]
He does draw the line at linking apes to humans.
Fortunately, however--even if we must account for
him scientifically—man with his two feet stands
upon a foundation of his own. [172]
As of 1873 the debate over the turf of atheist biology
was still quite hot. In his article "The Attitude of
Working Naturalists Toward Darwinism" (The Nation
,
October
16, 1873) a string of evolutionists are discussed. Of
Lyell, Owen, Candolle, Flower, Phillips, Allman, Bentham
(George)
,
Dawson, Spencer, Henslow, and Hodge, only two:
Darson and Owen resist Darwin. As for the rest. Gray finds
with them support for a theist version of Natural
Selection, and claims it is the only good way to proceed.
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Against those who would argue that Darwinism i
atheistical, he points to theist versions:
One would suppose that Dr. Dawson mi
at least as much of a divine foundat
as Herbert Spencer and Mathew Arnold
Further investigation of the circle of natural
of emergence and Social Darwinism would be int
add additional depth to our understanding. At
it is clear that the combination of religion a
emergentist metaphysics provided a resistance
inherent in Social Darwinism.
s inherently
ght discern
ion to Nature
... [ 173 ]
ists in terms
eresting and
this point
nd
to the abuses
C. Conclusion to Chapter Four
The work of Wallace, Malthus and Huxley tell us much
about Darwin's theory. Without an understanding of the
roots and wider context of Darwinian evolutionary theory,
Darwin s social and political theory tends to remain
hidden or viewed as tangential. Disagreement over the
boundaries and content of science, biology and religion
provided a rich area of debate. The topic of birth control
by itself demonstrates the complexity of the amalgam of
science and social/political matters. At the core of the
differences between Wallace and Darwin lies the issue of
reductive materialism. Darwin's metaphysics provided him
with a way to amass evidence and coalesce theory. If
Malthus had restricted himself to a description of
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reproduction versus food supply, Darwin would have had to
invent Malthus' politics.
Ma 1 thus
' ideological content, once thrown into relief,
makes Darwin's unabashed use of his ideas indicate the
extent to which biological theory was entwined with
politics. Even if one ignores the availability of birth
control devices, procedures and drugs, the fact remains
that working class critics and others offered an array of
cogent and interesting objections to Malthus' ideas. That
Darwin could recapitulate Malthus' work whole, and weave it
into a doctrine that ultimately argued for oppression
of the poor and the Savage is remarkable. That critics
fail to notice the scientific/social/political needs
driving Victorian science, or dismiss manifest
social and political content as merely commonly held
ideology, is indicative of the rip "pure science" ideology
has on scholars.
Huxley's writings also provide interesting
illumination of Darwin's work. Since he, too, failed to
mention birth control, and was highly critical of Wallace's
introduction of Spirits to explain the unique status of
humans, it might be expected that as "Darwin's Bulldog" he
would also offer an ideology of domination akin to
Darwin ' s
.
However Huxley's work is more similar to Wallace's
than to Darwin's. By emphasizing Darwin's view that morals
take "man" outside the domain of nature, at least for a
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time, Huxley fights for the concept of human emergence and
this philosophical move resulted in a much more tolerant
attitude towards women, the poor, and the Native, even if
he argues for white male superiority. In this way the
commitment to emergence, coupled with attitudes resulting
from favorable contacts with Native cultures during his
youth, created a more benign version of European belief in
their own superiority. That Huxley argues for the end of
Empire speaks for itself, even if it is driven by the
selfish desire to avoid the corrosive effects of
domination
.
Despite the centrality of the topic, as trained
medical practitioners Huxley and Darwin must have felt
pressure to avoid the birth control issue. Sexual politics
might also incline them to silence. On Darwin's part,
admission of the possibility of conscious human control
over reproduction was tantamount to rejection of
cont inuity--and could create problems for his view that
evolution occurs at the individual level only. Thus the
topic was dangerous and subversive to "purely scientific"
matters in countless ways.
While Huxley would share concerns over medical
hegemony, as we have seen in Evolution and Ethics he argues
that humans do step outside the dictates of Malthus. He
explains this leap with appeals to a vague principle of
sympathy, and to cooperation, with his primary focus upon
ethics as an uplifting agency. Ethical behavior is
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distinguished from competitive behavior, thus with this
philosophical distinction Darwinian individualism is
rendered inapplicable to the case of contemporary "man."
Hence Huxley does not specifically need the technology of
birth control to generate difference with animals, although
his view is not compromised or contradicted by the
existence of such measures— for it is on the contrary
enhanced by such technology.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Part of the charm and integrity of Darwin's thought is
revealed by the inconsistencies he left visible in his
work. He held views which, if given the upper hand, would
have overpowered the easy racism inherent in ranking races
according to skull size or even so-called "complexity of
culture. For example, in brilliant passages Darwin
decouples the concept of evolution from that of progress.
However this insight is ambivalently held in the case of
man. Usually he discards his new understanding of
progress in order to prove that the evolution of human
culture moves through stages of civilization to the
creation of a "noblest" society ruled by aristocrats and
captains of industry.
Perhaps one of the tell-tale marks of a genius in new
territory is the confusion inherent in the conceptual
project of smoothing out wrinkles but leaving topology
intact so that a map may be created for those who follow.
Whether it be: individual versus group selection; absolute
continuity down to atoms versus emergence of unique human
characteristics; or social evolution as an extension of
Malthusian dictates versus the end of Natural Selection at
the doorstep of ethics, these dichotomies found Darwin
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wavering on how to solve scientific/social/political
issues. Witnessing Darwin's twists and turns helps our
understanding of scientific change and social history, and
demonstrates the folly of those who seek "uncontaminated"
science
.
It is not difficult to demonstrate that Charles Darwin
was the first Social Darwinist. Darwin's Natural Selection
not only provided a mechanism for descent with modification
within the natural world, it also sought to demonstrate
that poverty was a necessary result of competition for
scarce resources within the human domain. Beyond
justification of low wages for workers and profit taking by
the upper classes, the field of his biological theory
included a sexual politics of male superiority and an
explanation of imperialism in terms of inevitable race war.
What is difficult to understand is how one of the most
scrutinized scientific enterprises of all time has
continued to be portrayed as an essentially non-ideological
project. Darwin's own claims for such purity are
representative of a deep desire within Western science and
philosophy to carve out a special status for science within
epistemology
.
Attempts to explore prominent ideological aspects of
his ideas are often met with denials and when not with
outright rejection then with claims to the effect that "all
men [!] of the time shared that ideology so it would be
anachronistic to critique such social and political
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facets
.
Such a dismissal blinds the investigator to
intimate connections between biases, metaphysics, social
theory, scientific theory, and evidence, as well as to
actual history. The scholar must be wary for even this
list is deceptive as it implies these items enjoy separate
lives. in the end historical and the philosophical
critiques of science have failed to bring Darwin's position
to account, especially with regard to racism.
Comparison with the ideas of Alfred Russel Wallace
puts Darwin's theory into more proper perspective. Perhaps
the single most telling contrast lies in the ramifications
of their divergence over the status of "man." Central to
Darwin's theory of Natural Selection is a radically
reductive materialism which plays a key role in shaping the
new science by setting boundaries, organizing evidence, and
molding theory. Because all human behaviour is reducible
to a biological base in his theory, all social and
political activities are essentially struggles over scarce
resources in which the largest-brained white males will
dominate. Others, such as Haeckel, understood the
structure of Darwin's enterprise well enough in order to
regenerate particular and bizarre details even where Darwin
made such items unavailable to his reading public.
While philosophy of science has spent resources
exploring bias in science, it has failed utterly in the
case of Darwin and Wallace to find the true structure of
nineteenth century biology and therefore has failed to
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contribute to our understanding of Darwin's role in the
creation of a new and virulent form of racism emerging
around the end of the last century in the form of Eugenics.
It is not the case that biases towards capitalism,
sexism and racism on Darwin's part can be best understood
as contaminants to an otherwise "pure" scientific theory.
The materialist agenda is respectable enough in itself, and
Played an integral role in "purely" scientific concerns
such as setting research agendas, organizing evidence and
directing theory. However the "pure" concerns were part
and parcel of a drive which also propelled a particular
political view. Perhaps the best way to describe the
situation is: overdetermined. While "non-scient if ic
"
biases informed certain aspects of Natural Selection,
scientific moves generated political ramifications. The
two cannot be separated, except in exposition.
In the first chapter Darwin's reliance upon reductive
materialism to organize and define the domain and concerns
of his science is laid out in some detail. His theory is
all the more complex and interesting due to the internal
inconsistencies and struggles which show themselves
prominently in his treatment of transitional human forms
and the function of morality in restraining eugenics within
Victorian society. In the latter waffling he finds it
impossible to settle the role of morals, for Victorian
ethics tend to demonstrate what looks like group and
emergent behaviour. The "inadequate" reproductive efforts
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of the "best" generates further wrinkles for his view that
human society is reducible to a struggle of each against
each for scarce resources in which the best win.
Such areas of confusion in science get scant attention
for they are usually thought to be aberrations or defects.
When considering a major icon of science such as Darwin, it
is understandable why such wafflings are down-played.
Given the important locations of wafflings within his
theory, and given the insights which flow from discussion
of such areas, it must be concluded that confusion plays an
important role in science and should not be summarily
dismissed
.
The work of Wallace is important not only for putting
the lie to claims of purity on Darwin's part but also
because his alternative metaphysics generated a more humane
version of Natural Selection. The mere existence of his
theory makes the impetus to scientific racism more visible
as one option among many. The exploration of origins of
scientific racism is barely begun by this dissertation and
hopefully will be taken up by others. Special attention
should be paid to the role of professionalization in both
medicine and biology in shaping Victorian science.
Emergentism and materialism take on special importance
due to their far-reaching effects. The emancipatory
potential of emergentist Natural Selection is confirmed
through examination of the work of Huxley. While it is not
impossible to strip emergentism of its more positive
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aspects, in its context it presented progressive potential.
The horror Darwin expresses over Wallace's views on
man" may in part be understood in the light of anti-
religious bias. For Darwin the intervention of a god is
ruled out in principle by materialist concerns. Even
though he professes a willingness to allow divine
intervention at the point of creation of life (or by
extension, the world)
,
he admits he would be just as happy
with a non-religious explanation. The equivocation here is
disingenuous, for a non-religious explanation is superior
because then only one principle need be invoked. It is in
the sense of this scientific strategy that the theory is
essentially atheist.
However Darwin cannot quite bring himself to settle
for a strictly materialist explanation of human behavior
and struggles with the relationship between morality and
"hard reason," the logic of evolution. Wallace's
emergentist leanings tinged with spiritualism and a
paradoxical connection to phrenology allow for an
alternative explanation of human complexity, even if it did
not ultimately become the dominant version of Natural
Selection
.
When assessing the struggle between these two
approaches it is important to keep in mind that both
strategies faced major problems. In each case there were
claims which were in principle unverif iable . Darwin's
hesitation to publish about the psychology of atoms speaks
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for itself. Wallace's assertions about "spiritual influx"
were similarly opaque, even if Darwin allowed for the
possibility of divine causes in the creation of life. New
work on Spiritualism allows for an interpretation of
Wallace's involvement in terms of progressive sexual
politics. In the end, it simply is not the case that
Darwin's approach can be thought of as "pure," and
Wallace's as "impure."
Even a limited investigation of the use Darwin makes
of Malthus's attack on the Poor Laws reveals that
reproductive technology of the time had made assimilation
of human sexual practices to those of animals untenable.
Natural Selection's grip on social and political aspects of
human reproduction was controversial at best. The spillage
of concerns from the medical profession into evolutionary
biology only complicated the issue. That these topics were
openly debated at the time makes contemporary blindness to
the context all the more glaring.
In conclusion, it must be said that the work of Darwin
cannot be properly appreciated without knowledge of
Wallace's version of Natural Selection. Points of
ambivalence and confusion in the texts of both writers
provide key entry points to the deeper structure of their
science. Special attention must be paid to the
metaphysical views which influenced both writers, as well
as the political context of Malthus' writings and the
influence of newly formed professionalism. Claims for
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purity" in science deserve utmost skepticism, especially
when scientists or philosophers make them. Only when
Darwin's work is placed in this context will a better
understanding of Darwinism, biology, Victorian science and
the origins and resistances to scientific racism be made
possible
.
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